@fastify/rate-limit before 11.2.0 keys rate-limit buckets by the verbatim client IP string returned from request.ip. Because a single IPv6 client can control a large address range (a /64 holds 2^64 distinct addresses) and the same address has multiple valid textual representations, an IPv6 capable client can defeat the rate-limit boundary by rotating addresses or by rewriting the same address in different forms. Applications that use @fastify/rate-limit to protect endpoints such as authentication, password reset, OTP delivery, or expensive API calls can be bypassed by IPv6 clients behind a proxy that surfaces IPv6 to the origin when trustProxy is enabled. The issue is fixed in @fastify/rate-limit 11.2.0, where the default key generator normalizes IPv6 addresses to their canonical form, collapses IPv4 mapped IPv6 to IPv4, and applies a configurable prefix mask (default /64) via a new ipv6Subnet option.

@fastify/forwarded resolves client addresses from the X-Forwarded-For header. In versions before 3.0.2, when the header contains two or more comma separated entries, the parser trims only space characters and does not strip horizontal tabs, even though RFC 7230 defines optional whitespace as both space and tab. As a result, an entry padded with a tab keeps the literal tab in the resolved address string. Applications that make exact string match security decisions on the resolved client IP, such as an allowlist, a blocklist, a per IP rate limit key, or audit log correlation, can be evaded because the tab corrupted string no longer matches the expected value. This does not cross the trust boundary, since a tab corrupted string is not a valid IP and cannot be mistaken for a trusted proxy. The issue is fixed in @fastify/forwarded 3.0.2.

@fastify/static evaluates the allowedPath callback before normalizing dot segments and duplicate path separators in the pathname used for file resolution. Versions up to and including 10.1.1 are affected. An unauthenticated attacker can bypass allowedPath restrictions by requesting equivalent non-canonical pathnames, causing files that were intended to be denied to be served anyway. The bypass does not allow access outside the configured static root by itself, it defeats path-based filtering only. The issue is patched in @fastify/static 10.1.2.

@fastify/static up to and including version 10.1.0 fails to reject dot-dot path segments in request pathnames before the file-resolution stage. This is a bypass of the earlier fix for CVE-2026-6414, which only covered encoded forward slashes. Because the underlying send library normalizes dot segments before applying its own path-traversal guard, an unauthenticated attacker can bypass any route-scoped middleware and read files inside the static root that live under the guarded URL prefix. The bypass does not allow access outside the configured static root by itself, it defeats route-guard filtering only. The issue is patched in @fastify/static 10.1.1.

Impact: @fastify/http-proxy versions up to and including 11.5.0 fail to rewrite the request prefix when the prefix segment is URL-encoded. Fastify's router URL-decodes paths for route matching, but request.url retains the original encoded form, and the prefix-rewrite step uses a literal string replace against the decoded prefix. A request that encodes one or more characters of the configured prefix therefore matches the route but skips the rewrite, so the raw encoded path is forwarded to the upstream unchanged. The upstream then decodes the path and serves it, letting an attacker reach upstream paths that the proxy was configured to hide via rewritePrefix, including internal or administrative endpoints. Patches: upgrade to @fastify/http-proxy 11.6.0. Workarounds: none.

Impact: @fastify/http-proxy versions from 9.4.0 up to and including 11.5.0 fail to validate the resolved WebSocket destination path against the configured rewrite prefix. The WebSocket routing path in WebSocketProxy.findUpstream resolves the destination via the WHATWG URL constructor, which collapses dot segments, so a crafted upgrade request with path traversal sequences can escape the rewrite prefix and reach upstream endpoints that were not meant to be exposed by the proxy. This is a variant of CVE-2021-21322 in a code path that never went through the HTTP fix in fastify/reply-from. Exploitation requires a non-normalizing WebSocket client, since browsers and the ws package normalize the request path before sending, but raw HTTP clients or downstream proxies that forward the request target unchanged make the attack reachable in production topologies. Patches: upgrade to @fastify/http-proxy 11.6.0. Workarounds: none.

Impact: @fastify/reply-from versions from 8.3.1 up to but not including 12.6.4 build the internal URL cache key by concatenating the destination and source path without a delimiter. Different destination and source pairs can therefore produce the same key while resolving to different upstream URLs. When getUpstream selects an upstream from request data, a URL cached for one upstream can be reused for a request intended for another upstream, causing cross-upstream data access and modification. The default configuration is affected. Setting disableCache to true prevents the behavior. Patches: upgrade to @fastify/reply-from 12.6.4. Workarounds: pass disableCache: true when registering the plugin.

@fastify/accepts-serializer cached serializer-selection results keyed by the request Accept header without a size limit or eviction policy. A remote unauthenticated client could send many distinct but matching Accept header variants to make the cache grow unbounded, eventually exhausting the Node.js heap and crashing the process. Versions <= 6.0.3 are affected. Update to 6.0.4 or later, which bounds the cache via an LRU with a default size of 100 entries, configurable through the new cacheSize plugin option.

@fastify/middie versions 9.3.1 and earlier are vulnerable to middleware bypass when the deprecated Fastify ignoreDuplicateSlashes option is enabled. The middleware path matching logic does not account for duplicate slash normalization performed by Fastify's router, allowing requests with duplicate slashes to bypass middleware authentication and authorization checks. This only affects applications using the deprecated ignoreDuplicateSlashes option. Upgrade to @fastify/middie 9.3.2 to fix this issue. There are no workarounds other than disabling the ignoreDuplicateSlashes option.

@fastify/static versions 8.0.0 through 9.1.0 allow path traversal when directory listing is enabled via the list option. The dirList.path() function resolves directories outside the configured static root using path.join() without a containment check. A remote unauthenticated attacker can obtain directory listings for arbitrary directories accessible to the Node.js process, disclosing directory and file names. File contents are not disclosed. Upgrade to @fastify/static 9.1.1 to fix this issue. As a workaround, disable directory listing by removing the list option from the plugin configuration.

@fastify/middie versions 9.3.1 and earlier do not register inherited middleware directly on child plugin engine instances. When a Fastify application registers authentication middleware in a parent scope and then registers child plugins with @fastify/middie, the child scope does not inherit the parent middleware. This allows unauthenticated requests to reach routes defined in child plugin scopes, bypassing authentication and authorization checks. Upgrade to @fastify/middie 9.3.2 to fix this issue. There are no workarounds.

@fastify/static versions 8.0.0 through 9.1.0 decode percent-encoded path separators (%2F) before filesystem resolution, while Fastify's router treats them as literal characters. This mismatch allows attackers to bypass route-based middleware or guards that protect files served by @fastify/static. For example, a route guard on a protected path can be circumvented by encoding the path separator in the URL. Upgrade to @fastify/static 9.1.1 to fix this issue. There are no workarounds.

Impact: Fastify applications using schema.body.content for per-content-type body validation can have validation bypassed entirely by prepending a space to the Content-Type header. The body is still parsed correctly but schema validation is skipped. This is a regression introduced in fastify >= 5.3.2 by the fix for CVE-2025-32442 Patches: Upgrade to fastify v5.8.5 or later. Workarounds: None. Upgrade to the patched version.

Summary When trustProxy is configured with a restrictive trust function (e.g., a specific IP like trustProxy: '10.0.0.1', a subnet, a hop count, or a custom function), the request.protocol and request.host getters read X-Forwarded-Proto and X-Forwarded-Host headers from any connection — including connections from untrusted IPs. This allows an attacker connecting directly to Fastify (bypassing the proxy) to spoof both the protocol and host seen by the application. Affected Versions fastify <= 5.8.2 Impact Applications using request.protocol or request.host for security decisions (HTTPS enforcement, secure cookie flags, CSRF origin checks, URL construction, host-based routing) are affected when trustProxy is configured with a restrictive trust function. When trustProxy: true (trust everything), both host and protocol trust all forwarded headers — this is expected behavior. The vulnerability only manifests with restrictive trust configurations.

Fastify incorrectly accepts malformed `Content-Type` headers containing trailing characters after the subtype token, in violation of RFC 9110 §8.3.1(https://httpwg.org/specs/rfc9110.html#field.content-type). For example, a request sent with Content-Type: application/json garbage passes validation and is processed normally, rather than being rejected with 415 Unsupported Media Type. When regex-based content-type parsers are in use (a documented Fastify feature), the malformed value is matched against registered parsers using the full string including the trailing garbage. This means a request with an invalid content-type may be routed to and processed by a parser it should never have reached. Impact: An attacker can send requests with RFC-invalid Content-Type headers that bypass validity checks, reach content-type parser matching, and be processed by the server. Requests that should be rejected at the validation stage are instead handled as if the content-type were valid. Workarounds: Deploy a WAF rule to protect against this Fix: The fix is available starting with v5.8.1.

A vulnerability in @fastify/middie versions < 9.2.0 can result in authentication/authorization bypass when using path-scoped middleware (for example, app.use('/secret', auth)). When Fastify router normalization options are enabled (such as ignoreDuplicateSlashes, useSemicolonDelimiter, and related trailing-slash behavior), crafted request paths may bypass middleware checks while still being routed to protected handlers.

Fastify is a fast and low overhead web framework, for Node.js. Prior to version 5.7.3, a denial-of-service vulnerability in Fastify’s Web Streams response handling can allow a remote client to exhaust server memory. Applications that return a ReadableStream (or Response with a Web Stream body) via reply.send() are impacted. A slow or non-reading client can trigger unbounded buffering when backpressure is ignored, leading to process crashes or severe degradation. This issue has been patched in version 5.7.3.

Fastify is a fast and low overhead web framework, for Node.js. Prior to version 5.7.2, a validation bypass vulnerability exists in Fastify where request body validation schemas specified by Content-Type can be completely circumvented. By appending a tab character (\t) followed by arbitrary content to the Content-Type header, attackers can bypass body validation while the server still processes the body as the original content type. This issue has been patched in version 5.7.2.

@fastify/middie is the plugin that adds middleware support on steroids to Fastify. A security vulnerability exists in @fastify/middie prior to version 9.1.0 where middleware registered with a specific path prefix can be bypassed using URL-encoded characters (e.g., `/%61dmin` instead of `/admin`). While the middleware engine fails to match the encoded path and skips execution, the underlying Fastify router correctly decodes the path and matches the route handler, allowing attackers to access protected endpoints without the middleware constraints. Version 9.1.0 fixes the issue.

fastify-reply-from is a Fastify plugin to forward the current HTTP request to another server. Prior to 12.5.0, by crafting a malicious URL, an attacker could access routes that are not allowed, even though the reply.from is defined for specific routes in @fastify/reply-from. This vulnerability is fixed in 12.5.0.

Fastify is a fast and low overhead web framework, for Node.js. In versions 5.0.0 to 5.3.0 as well as version 4.29.0, applications that specify different validation strategies for different content types have a possibility to bypass validation by providing a _slightly altered_ content type such as with different casing or altered whitespacing before `;`. This was patched in v5.3.1, but the initial patch did not cover all problems. This has been fully patched in v5.3.2 and v4.29.1. A workaround involves not specifying individual content types in the schema.

fastify-reply-from is a Fastify plugin to forward the current HTTP request to another server. A reverse proxy server built with `@fastify/reply-from` could misinterpret the incoming body by passing an header `ContentType: application/json ; charset=utf-8`. This can lead to bypass of security checks. This vulnerability has been patched in '@fastify/reply-from` version 9.6.0.

All versions of @fastify/oauth2 used a statically generated state parameter at startup time and were used across all requests for all users. The purpose of the Oauth2 state parameter is to prevent Cross-Site-Request-Forgery attacks. As such, it should be unique per user and should be connected to the user's session in some way that will allow the server to validate it. v7.2.0 changes the default behavior to store the state in a cookie with the http-only and same-site=lax attributes set. The state is now by default generated for every user. Note that this contains a breaking change in the checkStateFunction function, which now accepts the full Request object.

@fastify/passport is a port of passport authentication library for the Fastify ecosystem. The CSRF (Cross-Site Request Forger) protection enforced by the `@fastify/csrf-protection` library, when combined with `@fastify/passport` in affected versions, can be bypassed by network and same-site attackers. `fastify/csrf-protection` implements the synchronizer token pattern (using plugins `@fastify/session` and `@fastify/secure-session`) by storing a random value used for CSRF token generation in the `_csrf` attribute of a user's session. The `@fastify/passport` library does not clear the session object upon authentication, preserving the `_csrf` attribute between pre-login and authenticated sessions. Consequently, CSRF tokens generated before authentication are still valid. Network and same-site attackers can thus obtain a CSRF token for their pre-session, fixate that pre-session in the victim's browser via cookie tossing, and then perform a CSRF attack after the victim authenticates. As a solution, newer versions of `@fastify/passport` include the configuration options: `clearSessionOnLogin (default: true)` and `clearSessionIgnoreFields (default: ['passport', 'session'])` to clear all the session attributes by default, preserving those explicitly defined in `clearSessionIgnoreFields`.

@fastify/passport is a port of passport authentication library for the Fastify ecosystem. Applications using `@fastify/passport` in affected versions for user authentication, in combination with `@fastify/session` as the underlying session management mechanism, are vulnerable to session fixation attacks from network and same-site attackers. fastify applications rely on the `@fastify/passport` library for user authentication. The login and user validation are performed by the `authenticate` function. When executing this function, the `sessionId` is preserved between the pre-login and the authenticated session. Network and same-site attackers can hijack the victim's session by tossing a valid `sessionId` cookie in the victim's browser and waiting for the victim to log in on the website. As a solution, newer versions of `@fastify/passport` regenerate `sessionId` upon login, preventing the attacker-controlled pre-session cookie from being upgraded to an authenticated session. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.