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NVD · CVE-2026-64604 · In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: VMX: Grab vmcs12 on CR8 interception update iff vCPU is in guest mode When updating CR8NVD · CVE-2026-64603 · In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: platform/x86: intel-hid: Protect ACPI notify handler against recursion Since commit e2ffcda1NVD · CVE-2026-64602 · In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iio: adc: spear: Initialize completion before requesting IRQ In the report from Jaeyoung ChuNVD · CVE-2026-64601 · In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: us144mkii: capture_urb_complete: redundant usb_anchor_urb corrupts anchor list on eachCISA KEV · CVE-2026-20349 · Cisco Secure Firewall Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) and Secure Firewall Threat Defense (FTD) Heap Inspection Vulnerability · Added 2026-08-11 · Due 2026-08-14CISA KEV · CVE-2026-68820 · Microsoft Windows Ancillary Function Driver for WinSock Use-After-Free Vulnerability · Added 2026-08-11 · Due 2026-08-25NVD · CVE-2026-64604 · In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: VMX: Grab vmcs12 on CR8 interception update iff vCPU is in guest mode When updating CR8NVD · CVE-2026-64603 · In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: platform/x86: intel-hid: Protect ACPI notify handler against recursion Since commit e2ffcda1NVD · CVE-2026-64602 · In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iio: adc: spear: Initialize completion before requesting IRQ In the report from Jaeyoung ChuNVD · CVE-2026-64601 · In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: us144mkii: capture_urb_complete: redundant usb_anchor_urb corrupts anchor list on eachCISA KEV · CVE-2026-20349 · Cisco Secure Firewall Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) and Secure Firewall Threat Defense (FTD) Heap Inspection Vulnerability · Added 2026-08-11 · Due 2026-08-14CISA KEV · CVE-2026-68820 · Microsoft Windows Ancillary Function Driver for WinSock Use-After-Free Vulnerability · Added 2026-08-11 · Due 2026-08-25

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CVE-2025-59942HIGH 7.5

go-f3 is a Golang implementation of Fast Finality for Filecoin (F3). In versions 0.8.6 and below, go-f3 panics when it validates a "poison" messages causing Filecoin nodes consuming F3 messages to become vulnerable. A "poison" message can can cause integer overflow in the signer index validation, which can cause the whole node to crash. These malicious messages aren't self-propagating since the bug is in the validator. An attacker needs to directly send the message to all targets. This issue is fixed in version 0.8.7.

CVE-2025-59941MEDIUM 5.9

go-f3 is a Golang implementation of Fast Finality for Filecoin (F3). In versions 0.8.8 and below, go-f3's justification verification caching mechanism has a vulnerability where verification results are cached without properly considering the context of the message. An attacker can bypass justification verification by submitting a valid message with a correct justification and then reusing the same cached justification in contexts where it would normally be invalid. This occurs because the cached verification does not properly validate the relationship between the justification and the specific message context it's being used with. This issue is fixed in version 0.8.9.

CVE-2021-21405MEDIUM 5.9

Lotus is an Implementation of the Filecoin protocol written in Go. BLS signature validation in lotus uses blst library method VerifyCompressed. This method accepts signatures in 2 forms: "serialized", and "compressed", meaning that BLS signatures can be provided as either of 2 unique byte arrays. Lotus block validation functions perform a uniqueness check on provided blocks. Two blocks are considered distinct if the CIDs of their blockheader do not match. The CID method for blockheader includes the BlockSig of the block. The result of these issues is that it would be possible to punish miners for valid blocks, as there are two different valid block CIDs available for each block, even though this must be unique. By switching from the go based `blst` bindings over to the bindings in `filecoin-ffi`, the code paths now ensure that all signatures are compressed by size and the way they are deserialized. This happened in https://github.com/filecoin-project/lotus/pull/5393.