multiparty@4.2.3 and lower versions are vulnerable to denial of service via uncaught exception. By sending a multipart/form-data request with a Content-Disposition header whose filename* parameter contains a malformed percent-encoding, the parser invokes decodeURI on the value without try/catch. The resulting URIError propagates as an uncaught exception and crashes the process. Impact: any service accepting multipart uploads via multiparty is affected. Workarounds: none. Upgrade to multiparty@4.3.0 or higher.

multiparty@4.2.3 and lower versions are vulnerable to denial of service via uncaught exception. By sending a multipart/form-data request with a field name that collides with an inherited Object.prototype property such as __proto__, constructor, or toString, the parser invokes .push() on the inherited prototype value rather than an array, throwing a TypeError that propagates as an uncaught exception and crashes the process. Impact: any service accepting multipart uploads via multiparty is affected. Workarounds: none. Upgrade to multiparty@4.3.0 or higher.

multiparty@4.2.3 and lower versions are vulnerable to denial of service via regular expression backtracking in the Content-Disposition filename parameter parser. A crafted multipart upload with a long header value can cause regex matching to take seconds, blocking the event loop. Impact: any service accepting multipart uploads via multiparty is affected. Workarounds: limiting upload sizes at the proxy or gateway layer reduces but does not eliminate the attack surface, since a small header of around 8 KB is sufficient to trigger the vulnerable backtracking. Upgrade to multiparty@4.3.0 or higher.

Impact: A bad regular expression is generated any time you have multiple sequential optional groups (curly brace syntax), such as `{a}{b}{c}:z`. The generated regex grows exponentially with the number of groups, causing denial of service. Patches: Fixed in version 8.4.0. Workarounds: Limit the number of sequential optional groups in route patterns. Avoid passing user-controlled input as route patterns.

Impact: When using multiple wildcards, combined with at least one parameter, a regular expression can be generated that is vulnerable to ReDoS. This backtracking vulnerability requires the second wildcard to be somewhere other than the end of the path. Unsafe examples: /*foo-*bar-:baz /*a-:b-*c-:d /x/*a-:b/*c/y Safe examples: /*foo-:bar /*foo-:bar-*baz Patches: Upgrade to version 8.4.0. Workarounds: If you are using multiple wildcard parameters, you can check the regex output with a tool such as https://makenowjust-labs.github.io/recheck/playground/ to confirm whether a path is vulnerable.

Impact: A bad regular expression is generated any time you have three or more parameters within a single segment, separated by something that is not a period (.). For example, /:a-:b-:c or /:a-:b-:c-:d. The backtrack protection added in path-to-regexp@0.1.12 only prevents ambiguity for two parameters. With three or more, the generated lookahead does not block single separator characters, so capture groups overlap and cause catastrophic backtracking. Patches: Upgrade to path-to-regexp@0.1.13 Custom regex patterns in route definitions (e.g., /:a-:b([^-/]+)-:c([^-/]+)) are not affected because they override the default capture group. Workarounds: All versions can be patched by providing a custom regular expression for parameters after the first in a single segment. As long as the custom regular expression does not match the text before the parameter, you will be safe. For example, change /:a-:b-:c to /:a-:b([^-/]+)-:c([^-/]+). If paths cannot be rewritten and versions cannot be upgraded, another alternative is to limit the URL length.