@oblique/cli 15.4.0 contains an OS command injection vulnerability in the project creation functionality. The CLI constructs shell commands through string concatenation and executes them with execSync(). A user-controlled project-name argument is inserted into the shell command without proper neutralization, allowing shell metacharacters to execute additional operating-system commands when the CLI is invoked with a crafted project name.

The wp-downloadmanager WordPress plugin, in version 1.68.11 (also affecting the 6.9.4 release line), allows an admin-privileged user (current_user_can('manage_downloads')) to upload arbitrary files via download-add.php with no extension or MIME-type validation of any kind - no wp_check_filetype_and_ext(), no validate_file(), and no extension blocklist exist anywhere in the upload handler. The destination path is additionally built by concatenating the raw, unsanitized $_POST['file_upload_to'] value with no traversal check (no ../ filtering, no basename()/realpath() applied). Since the base download path is required to live under WP_CONTENT_DIR (a web-accessible location), an uploaded PHP file lands in a web-servable path and can be directly executed, resulting in remote code execution. The plugin's own later changelog confirms these protections were absent in this version: v1.69 added file-type validation via wp_check_filetype_and_ext(), and v1.69.1 added directory-traversal protection - neither existed in 1.68.11.

Inventory-Management-System-PHP's login.php constructs its authentication query via direct string concatenation of raw POST parameters: $sql = "select * from user where email = '$email' and password = '$password'", with no escaping or parameterization, allowing authentication bypass via a payload such as email=' OR 1=1 LIMIT 1-- -. Separately, delete.php executes mysqli_query($db, "DELETE FROM product WHERE product_id=" . $_GET['id']) with no authentication check and no validation of the id parameter, allowing an unauthenticated attacker to delete arbitrary product rows or perform blind SQL injection via payloads such as id=0 OR SLEEP(5).

Mautic's getLeadIdsByFieldValueAction (LeadBundle/Controller/AjaxController.php) reads a field parameter from the request, sanitizes it only with InputHelper::clean() (which HTML-entity-encodes quotes and angle brackets but does not restrict other characters), and passes it into LeadRepository::buildQueryForGetLeadsByFieldValue() where it is concatenated directly as a raw SQL column identifier ($col = 'l.'.$field) rather than being validated against a whitelist of real column names or passed as a bound parameter. Since Doctrine cannot parameterize identifiers, and the sanitizer does not block spaces, parentheses, or other SQL-relevant characters, an attacker can inject SQL via the field name itself. The action requires only a valid session (any authenticated user), unlike sibling actions in the same controller that carry additional permission checks.

The backmeup npm package assembles shell command strings by directly concatenating its option values (name, source, destination, filter) - e.g. cmd = "mkdir -p " + path.join(info.destination, info.name) + "; " - and executes the resulting string through a shell via ssh2-exec (locally via child_process, or remotely via SSH when an ssh handle is supplied), rather than using execFile/spawn with an argument array. The only processing applied is path.normalize()/path.join(), which do not neutralize shell metacharacters (;, |, &, $(), backticks, newline). Any application that passes attacker-influenced values into these options (e.g. a user-chosen backup name) is vulnerable to arbitrary OS command execution on the backup host, or on the remote SSH target when one is configured.

Miantang/IoT-PHP's index.php implements a POST /userlogin route that reads the password directly from $_POST['pwd'] with no sanitization and concatenates it into a raw SQL string: mysql_query("select * from userlists where username='$username' and password='$password' limit 1"). The username value is passed through htmlspecialchars(), which does not encode single quotes by default and therefore does not prevent SQL injection through the password field. An unauthenticated attacker can submit a payload such as pwd=' OR '1'='1 to bypass authentication and, via UNION-based injection, extract arbitrary data from the database.

IOTSmartHome's gui/login.php checkCookie() function builds an authentication query as SELECT * FROM users WHERE ID='<decoded lastLogin cookie>' after base64-decoding the client-supplied lastLogin cookie via safe_decode(), which performs URL-safe base64 decoding with no sanitization of the decoded value before it is concatenated into the SQL string. An unauthenticated attacker can set a lastLogin cookie containing a base64-encoded SQL injection payload (e.g. base64("' OR '1'='1")) to bypass authentication and, via UNION-based injection, extract arbitrary data including user credentials.

The Backup Migration plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to OS Command Injection in all versions up to, and including, 2.1.5.1 due to insufficient sanitization of the `file` POST parameter on the `restoreBackup()` AJAX handler. The handler applies `esc_attr()` — an HTML-context sanitizer that does not strip shell metacharacters — and concatenates the result, unquoted, into a `php-cli -f … bmi_restore <file> <remote>` command passed to `exec()`. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Administrator-level access (or any user granted the plugin's `do_backups` capability) and above, to execute arbitrary OS commands as the web-server user, bypassing WordPress hardening constants such as `DISALLOW_FILE_EDIT` and `DISALLOW_FILE_MODS` that would otherwise prevent code execution from the admin UI. This is an incomplete fix of CVE-2023-7002, which patched the same pattern only in the `$_POST['url']` path of `handleQuickMigration()`; the equivalent mitigations (`rawurlencode()` + explicit shell-metachar replacement + double-quoting in `exec()`) were never applied to `$backupName`.

The Stock-Inventory-Management-System application's login.php assigns raw $_POST username/password values to $_SESSION and builds its authentication query by directly concatenating those session values into a SQL statement with no parameterization or escaping. An unauthenticated remote attacker can submit a payload such as ' OR '1'='1 in the login form to bypass authentication entirely. The same script additionally contains hardcoded administrative credentials (admin/neola) in a post-login conditional check, providing a second, independent full-authentication-bypass path.

The SKT Skill Bar plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Stored Cross-Site Scripting via the `chart_size` attribute of the `skillwrapper` shortcode in all versions up to, and including, 2.6. This is due to insufficient input sanitization and output escaping on the `chart_size` attribute, which is concatenated directly into an inline `<style>` block. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Contributor-level access and above, to inject arbitrary web scripts in pages that will execute whenever a user accesses an injected page.

The Seraphinite Accelerator plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Reflected Cross-Site Scripting via the 'seraph_accel_prep' parameter in versions up to, and including, 2.29.15. This is due to the CacheExtractPreparePageParams() function using PHP's loose inequality operator (!=) to compare the expected HMAC string against the JSON-decoded 'nonce' value — supplying the JSON boolean true causes any non-empty HMAC string to compare as loosely equal, bypassing the signature check — combined with insufficient output escaping in the _CbContentFinishSkip() function, which concatenates the attacker-controlled 'selfTest' field directly into the HTML response body. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to inject arbitrary web scripts in pages that execute if they can successfully trick a user into performing an action such as clicking on a specially crafted link.

The User Access Manager plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Second-Order SQL Injection via the 'id' parameter of the wp_ajax_save-attachment-compat AJAX action in versions up to, and including, 2.3.12. This is due to insufficient validation on the objectId value stored in the saveAjaxAttachmentData() function and subsequent unparameterized concatenation in the addQueryExcludedPostFilter() function — the stored value is later retrieved from the database and used as an array key, then directly imploded into a SQL NOT IN() clause without integer casting or prepared statements. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with subscriber-level access and above, to append additional SQL queries into already existing queries that can be used to extract sensitive information from the database.

OpenSIPS is a Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) server implementation. In versions prior to 3.6.6 and 4.0.0-rc1, the construct_uri() function concatenates multiple URI components (protocol, username, domain, port, params) into a fixed 1024-byte global BSS buffer without any bounds checking. When a routing script calls construct_uri() with an attacker-controlled username, a combined component length exceeding 1024 bytes overflows the buffer, corrupting adjacent global data with attacker-controlled content. The overflow reaches disable_503_translation, a global flag controlling SIP 503 response handling, allowing an attacker to deterministically set the flag via the URI username and alter the server's routing behavior for subsequent messages. Because the same buffer is shared with contact_builder(), the overflow also corrupts that function's data, and without a memory sanitizer the adjacent globals are silently overwritten on every request containing a long username. This issue has been fixed in versions 3.6.6 and 4.0.0-rc1.

OpenMeter contains a stored, or second-order, SQL injection vulnerability in the handling of customer usage-attribution values. An attacker who can create or update a customer can store a malicious value in the usageAttribution.key or usageAttribution.subjectKeys fields. When that customer is subsequently used in a meter or event query, OpenMeter inserts the stored value into a ClickHouse WITH map(...) expression using string concatenation. OpenMeter versions from v1.0.0-beta.218 through v1.0.0-beta.231 are affected.

Koha's reports/issues_stats.pl (the circulation statistics report) builds its calculation query in sub calculate by concatenating several user-controlled request parameters directly into the SQL string. The PeriodTypeSel, PeriodDaySel, and PeriodMonthSel parameters are interpolated raw into single-quoted equality and function-comparison fragments, and the Filter slots plus the Line and Column identifiers are likewise interpolated with no whitelist and no placeholder binding. An authenticated staff user holding the reports module permission can inject arbitrary SQL and read any table reachable by the Koha database user, including borrowers (password hashes, two-factor secrets, personal data), api_keys, and sessions.

Koha's reports/bor_issues_top.pl builds dynamic SQL in sub calculate by concatenating several user-controlled request parameters directly into the query string. The Criteria parameter is only normalized by a table-name prefix and is never whitelisted, landing verbatim in identifier positions (SELECT DISTINCTROW, GROUP BY, ORDER BY); Filter values are concatenated raw into single-quoted LIKE, BETWEEN, and comparison fragments, and the Limit parameter is appended raw to a LIMIT clause. An authenticated staff user holding the reports module permission can inject arbitrary SQL and read any table reachable by the Koha database user, including borrowers (password hashes, two-factor secrets, personal data), api_keys, and sessions.

Koha's reports/issues_avg_stats.pl builds dynamic SQL in sub calculate by concatenating several user-controlled request parameters directly into the query string. The Line and Column parameters are not validated against any whitelist and land verbatim in identifier positions (SELECT DISTINCTROW, GROUP BY, ORDER BY), and each Filter slot is concatenated raw into single-quoted LIKE, BETWEEN, and comparison fragments with no bound parameters. An authenticated staff user holding the reports module permission can inject arbitrary SQL and read any table reachable by the Koha database user, including borrowers (password hashes, two-factor secrets, personal data), api_keys, and sessions.

Koha's reports/catalogue_stats.pl builds dynamic SQL in sub calculate by interpolating the user-controlled Line and Column request parameters directly into identifier positions of the query (SELECT DISTINCTROW, GROUP BY, ORDER BY) with no whitelist validation. When Line contains itemcallnumber and the cotedigits parameter is truthy, cotedigits is additionally concatenated raw as the numeric argument of a LEFT() call. An authenticated staff user holding the reports module permission can inject arbitrary SQL and read any table reachable by the Koha database user, including borrowers (password hashes, two-factor secrets, personal data), api_keys, and sessions.

Socket.IO enables bidirectional and low-latency communication for every platform. Prior to 4.2.7, 3.4.5, and 3.3.6, a specially crafted Socket.IO packet can make the server wait for a large number of binary attachments and buffer them, which can be exploited to make the server run out of memory. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.2.7, 3.4.5, and 3.3.6.

Krayin CRM before 2.2.4 contains a blind SQL injection vulnerability in the leads DataGrid that allows authenticated users with leads access to inject arbitrary SQL into a HAVING clause by manipulating the rotten_lead[in] query parameter, which is concatenated without parameterized binding directly into a havingRaw() call in LeadDataGrid.php. Attackers can exploit this flaw using time-based and boolean-based blind injection techniques to extract the entire database contents, including user credential hashes, CRM records, and application configuration data.

XML::Sig versions before 0.71 for Perl allow XPath injection in ID lookup. verify() and _get_signed_xml() in lib/XML/Sig.pm build XPath expressions by concatenating the SignedInfo/Reference/@URI value read from the document being verified. The value is neither escaped nor checked against the NCName grammar that XML requires of an ID, so a URI containing a single quote closes the string literal in the generated expression and appends arbitrary XPath operators. A crafted URI can make the lookup match elements the reference does not name, or every element in the document, so which node is selected for digest verification is decided by the injected expression rather than by the reference.

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SiYuan before v3.7.3 contains a SQL injection vulnerability in the /api/filetree/searchDocs endpoint, where the caller-supplied keyword parameter is concatenated directly into SQL statements with no escaping or parameter binding. The endpoint is reachable by a publish RoleReader token, or unauthenticated when publish mode is enabled with Publish.Auth.Enable set to false. Because the statement executes on a read-write SQLite handle via a driver that supports stacked (semicolon-separated) statements, an attacker can read and modify database content across all cleartext (non-encrypted) notebooks on the instance.