In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: hwmon: (lm90) Stop work before releasing hwmon device Sashiko reports: In lm90_probe(), the devm action to cancel the alert_work and report_work (lm90_restore_conf) is registered in lm90_init_client() before devm_hwmon_device_register_with_info() is called. Because devm executes cleanup actions in reverse order during module unbind or probe failure, the hwmon device is unregistered and freed first. If lm90_alert_work() or lm90_report_alarms() runs in the window between the hwmon device being freed and the delayed works being cancelled, lm90_update_alarms() will dereference the freed data->hwmon_dev here. Fix the problem by canceling the workers separately after registering the hwmon device and before registering the interrupt handler. This ensures that the workers are canceled after interrupts are disabled and before the hwmon device is released. Add "shutdown" flag to indicate that device shutdown is in progress to prevent workers from being re-armed.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mac80211: bounds-check link_id in ieee80211_ml_epcs IEEE80211_MLE_STA_EPCS_CONTROL_LINK_ID is 0x000f, so link_id extracted from a PRIO_ACCESS ML element PER_STA_PROFILE subelement can be 0..15. sdata->link[] has IEEE80211_MLD_MAX_NUM_LINKS (15) entries (indices 0..14), making index 15 out-of-bounds. A connected WiFi 7 AP can trigger this by sending an EPCS Enable Response action frame with a PER_STA_PROFILE subelement where link_id = 15. The unsolicited-notification path (dialog_token = 0) is reachable any time EPCS is already enabled, without any prior client request. sdata->link[15] reads into the first word of sdata->activate_links_work (a wiphy_work whose embedded list_head is non-NULL after INIT_LIST_HEAD), so the NULL check on the result does not catch the invalid access. The garbage pointer is then passed to ieee80211_sta_wmm_params(), which dereferences link->sdata and crashes the kernel. The same class of bug was fixed for ieee80211_ml_reconfiguration() by commit 162d331d833d ("wifi: mac80211: bounds-check link_id in ieee80211_ml_reconfiguration").

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: seq: Serialize UMP output teardown with event_input seq_ump_process_event() borrows client->out_rfile.output without synchronizing with the first-open and last-close transition in seq_ump_client_open() and seq_ump_client_close(). The last output unuse can therefore drop opened[STR_OUT] to zero and release the rawmidi file while an in-flight event_input callback is still inside snd_rawmidi_kernel_write(). That leaves the rawmidi substream runtime exposed to teardown before the write path has taken its own buffer reference. Add a per-client rwlock for the event_input-visible output file. Publish a newly opened output file under the write side, and hold the read side from the output lookup through snd_rawmidi_kernel_write(). The last output close copies and clears the visible output file under the write side, then drops the lock and releases the saved rawmidi file. Use IRQ-safe rwlock guards because event_input can also be reached from atomic sequencer delivery. The buggy scenario involves two paths, with each column showing the order within that path: path A label: event_input path path B label: last unuse path 1. seq_ump_process_event() reads 1. seq_ump_client_close() client->out_rfile.output. drops opened[STR_OUT] to zero. 2. snd_rawmidi_kernel_write1() 2. snd_rawmidi_kernel_release() has not yet pinned runtime. closes the output file. 3. The writer continues using 3. close_substream() frees the borrowed substream. substream->runtime. This keeps the output substream and runtime alive for the full event_input write while keeping rawmidi release outside the rwlock. KASAN reproduced this as a slab-use-after-free in snd_rawmidi_kernel_write1(), with allocation through seq_ump_use()/snd_seq_port_connect() and free through seq_ump_unuse()/snd_seq_port_disconnect(). Validation reproduced this kernel report: KASAN slab-use-after-free in snd_rawmidi_kernel_write1+0x9d/0x400 RIP: 0033:0x7f5528af837f Read of size 8 Call trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x73/0xb0 (?:?) print_report+0xd1/0x650 (?:?) srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 (?:?) __virt_addr_valid+0x1a7/0x340 (?:?) kasan_complete_mode_report_info+0x64/0x200 (?:?) kasan_report+0xf7/0x130 (?:?) snd_rawmidi_kernel_write1+0x9d/0x400 (?:?) __asan_load8+0x82/0xb0 (?:?) update_stack_state+0x1ef/0x2d0 (?:?) snd_rawmidi_kernel_write+0x1a/0x20 (?:?) seq_ump_process_event+0xd4/0x120 (sound/core/seq/seq_ump_client.c:82) __snd_seq_deliver_single_event+0x8a/0xe0 (?:?) snd_seq_deliver_from_ump+0x2b2/0xd60 (?:?) lock_acquire+0x14e/0x2e0 (?:?) find_held_lock+0x31/0x90 (?:?) snd_seq_port_use_ptr+0xa6/0xe0 (?:?) __kasan_check_write+0x18/0x20 (?:?) do_raw_read_unlock+0x32/0xa0 (?:?) _raw_read_unlock+0x26/0x50 (?:?) snd_seq_deliver_single_event+0x45c/0x4b0 (?:?) snd_seq_deliver_event+0x10d/0x1b0 (?:?) snd_seq_client_enqueue_event+0x192/0x240 (?:?) snd_seq_write+0x2cd/0x450 (?:?) apparmor_file_permission+0x20/0x30 (?:?) security_file_permission+0x51/0x60 (?:?) vfs_write+0x1ce/0x850 (?:?) __fget_files+0x12b/0x220 (?:?) lock_release+0xc8/0x2a0 (?:?) __rcu_read_unlock+0x74/0x2d0 (?:?) __fget_files+0x135/0x220 (?:?) ksys_write+0x15a/0x180 (?:?) rcu_is_watching+0x24/0x60 (?:?) __x64_sys_write+0x46/0x60 (?:?) x64_sys_call+0x7d/0x20d0 (?:?) do_syscall_64+0xc1/0x360 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:87) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f (?:?)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: parport: Fix race between port and client registration The parport subsystem registers port devices before they are fully initialised, resulting in a race condition where client drivers such as lp can attach to ports that are not completely initialised or even being torn down. When the port and client drivers are built as modules and loaded around the same time during boot, this occasionally results in a crash. I was able to make this happen reliably in a VM with a PC-style parallel port by patching parport_pc to fail probing: > --- a/drivers/parport/parport_pc.c > +++ b/drivers/parport/parport_pc.c > @@ -2069,7 +2069,7 @@ static struct parport *__parport_pc_probe_port(unsigned long int base, > if (!p) > goto out3; > > - base_res = request_region(base, 3, p->name); > + base_res = NULL; > if (!base_res) > goto out4; > and then running: while true; do modprobe lp & modprobe parport_pc wait rmmod lp parport_pc done for a few seconds. In the long term I think port registration should be changed to put the call to device_add() inside parport_announce_port(), but since the latter currently cannot fail this will require changing all port drivers. For now, add a flag to indicate whether a port has been "announced" and only try to attach client drivers to ports when the flag is set.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: target: iscsi: Validate CHAP_R length before base64 decode chap_server_compute_hash() allocates client_digest as kzalloc(chap->digest_size) and then, for BASE64-encoded responses, passes chap_r directly to chap_base64_decode() without checking whether the input length could produce more than digest_size bytes of output. chap_base64_decode() writes to the destination unconditionally as long as there is input to consume. With MAX_RESPONSE_LENGTH set to 128 and the "0b" prefix stripped by extract_param(), up to 127 base64 characters can reach the decoder. 127 characters decode to 95 bytes. For SHA-256 (digest_size=32) this overflows client_digest by 63 bytes; for MD5 (digest_size=16) the overflow is 79 bytes. The length check at line 344 fires after the write has already happened. The HEX branch in the same switch statement already validates the length up front. Apply the same approach to the BASE64 branch: strip trailing base64 padding characters, then reject any input whose data length exceeds DIV_ROUND_UP(digest_size * 4, 3) before calling the decoder. Stripping trailing '=' before the comparison handles both padded and unpadded encodings. chap_base64_decode() already returns early on '=', so the full original string is still passed to the decoder unchanged. The mutual CHAP path decodes CHAP_C into initiatorchg_binhex, which is kzalloc(CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN). extract_param() caps initiatorchg at CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN characters, so at most CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN-1 base64 characters reach the decoder. The maximum decoded size, DIV_ROUND_UP((CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN-1) * 3, 4), is less than CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN, so no overflow is possible there. A comment is added at the call site to document this.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: 9p: avoid putting oldfid in p9_client_walk() error path When p9_client_walk() is called with clone set to false, fid aliases oldfid. If the walk subsequently fails after the request has been sent, the error path jumps to clunk_fid, which currently calls p9_fid_put(fid) unconditionally. This drops a reference to oldfid even though ownership of oldfid remains with the caller. If this is the last reference, oldfid can be clunked and destroyed while the caller still expects it to be valid. A later use or put of oldfid can then trigger a use-after-free or refcount underflow. Fix this by only putting fid in the clunk_fid error path when it does not alias oldfid, matching the existing guard in the error path below. This can be triggered when a multi-component walk is split into multiple p9_client_walk() calls and a later non-cloning walk fails. A reproducer and refcount warning logs are available on request.

linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nfsd: release layout stid on setlease failure nfs4_alloc_stid() publishes the new stid into cl->cl_stateids via idr_alloc_cyclic() under cl_lock before returning to nfsd4_alloc_layout_stateid(). When nfsd4_layout_setlease() then fails, the error path frees the layout stateid directly with kmem_cache_free() without ever calling idr_remove(), leaving the IDR slot pointing at freed slab memory. Any subsequent IDR walker (states_show, client teardown) dereferences the dangling pointer. The correct teardown for an IDR-published stid is nfs4_put_stid(), which removes the IDR slot under cl_lock, dispatches sc_free (nfsd4_free_layout_stateid) to release ls->ls_file via nfsd4_close_layout(), and drops the nfs4_file reference in its tail. A second issue blocks that switch: nfsd4_free_layout_stateid() unconditionally inspects ls->ls_fence_work via delayed_work_pending() under ls_lock, but INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&ls->ls_fence_work, ...) currently runs only after the setlease call. On the setlease-failure path the destructor would touch an uninitialized delayed_work. nfsd4_alloc_layout_stateid() nfs4_alloc_stid() /* idr_alloc_cyclic under cl_lock */ nfsd4_layout_setlease() /* fails */ nfs4_put_stid() nfsd4_free_layout_stateid() delayed_work_pending(&ls->ls_fence_work) /* needs INIT */ nfsd4_close_layout() /* nfsd_file_put(ls->ls_file) */ put_nfs4_file() Fix by hoisting the ls_fenced / ls_fence_delay / INIT_DELAYED_WORK initialization above the nfsd4_layout_setlease() call, and replace the manual nfsd_file_put + put_nfs4_file + kmem_cache_free cleanup with a single nfs4_put_stid(stp).

linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nfsd: fix posix_acl leak and ignored error in nfsd4_create_file nfsd4_create_file() has two bugs in its ACL handling: The return value of nfsd4_acl_to_attr() is silently discarded. When the NFSv4-to-POSIX ACL conversion fails (e.g., -EINVAL for unsupported ACE types), the file is created without any ACL and the client receives NFS4_OK. This violates RFC 7530/8881 which require the server to reject unsupported attributes on CREATE. When start_creating() fails after ACL attributes have been populated in attrs (either via nfsd4_acl_to_attr or via ownership transfer from open->op_dpacl/op_pacl), the function jumps to out_write which skips nfsd_attrs_free(). The posix_acl allocations are leaked. A client can trigger this repeatedly with OPEN(CREATE), ACL attributes, and an invalid filename (e.g., longer than NAME_MAX). Fix both by capturing the nfsd4_acl_to_attr() return value and by changing the early error paths to jump to out instead of out_write. Initialize child to ERR_PTR(-EINVAL) so that end_creating() is safe to call even if start_creating() was never reached.

linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nfsd: fix dead ACL conflict guard in nfsd4_create nfsd4_create() steals create->cr_dpacl/cr_pacl into the local nfsd_attrs via the designated initializer, then immediately sets the source pointers to NULL. The subsequent conflict guard tests the already-nilled source fields, making it permanently dead code: if (create->cr_acl) { if (create->cr_dpacl || create->cr_pacl) /* always false */ When a client encodes both FATTR4_WORD0_ACL and FATTR4_WORD2_POSIX_{DEFAULT,ACCESS}_ACL in the same CREATE fattr bitmap, nfsd4_acl_to_attr() overwrites attrs.na_pacl/na_dpacl without releasing the originals, leaking two posix_acl slab objects per request. Repeated requests cause unbounded slab exhaustion. Fix by checking attrs.na_dpacl/na_pacl (the stolen values) instead of the nilled create->cr_dpacl/cr_pacl, matching the correct pattern already used in nfsd4_setattr().

linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nfsd: reset write verifier on deferred writeback errors nfsd_vfs_write() and nfsd_commit() both call filemap_check_wb_err() to detect deferred writeback errors, but neither rotates the server's write verifier (nn->writeverf) when this check fails. Every other durable-storage-failure path in these functions calls commit_reset_write_verifier() before returning an error. The missing rotation means clients holding UNSTABLE write data under the current verifier will COMMIT, receive the unchanged verifier back, and conclude their data is durable — silently dropping data that failed writeback. This violates the UNSTABLE+COMMIT durability contract (RFC 1813 §3.3.7, RFC 8881 §18.32). Add commit_reset_write_verifier() calls at both filemap_check_wb_err() error sites, matching the pattern used by adjacent error paths in the same functions. The helper already filters -EAGAIN and -ESTALE internally, so the calls are unconditionally safe.

linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: NFSv4/pNFS: reject zero-length r_addr in nfs4_decode_mp_ds_addr nfs4_decode_mp_ds_addr() decodes the r_netid and r_addr opaques of a netaddr4 from a GETDEVICEINFO multipath-DS body, then immediately calls strrchr(buf, '.') to locate the port separator. Both decodes use xdr_stream_decode_string_dup(), and the current code checks only "nlen < 0" / "rlen < 0" before dereferencing the returned string. When the on-wire opaque has length zero, xdr_stream_decode_opaque_inline() returns 0 and xdr_stream_decode_string_dup() falls through to its "*str = NULL; return ret" tail, leaving buf NULL with a return value of 0. The "< 0" check does not catch this, and the next line is strrchr(NULL, '.'), a kernel NULL pointer dereference reachable from any pNFS-flexfile client mounted against a malicious or compromised metadata server. Reject the zero-length cases explicitly so the decoder fails with -EBADMSG (treated as a malformed GETDEVICEINFO body) instead of panicking the client.

linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: fix out-of-bounds read in smb_check_perm_dacl() The permission-check ACE walk in smb_check_perm_dacl() validates the ACE header size and caps sid.num_subauth at SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES, but it never checks that ace->size is actually large enough to contain num_subauth sub-authorities before compare_sids() dereferences them. CIFS_SID_BASE_SIZE covers the SID header up to but excluding the sub_auth[] array, and offsetof(struct smb_ace, sid) is the ACE header, so the existing guards only guarantee the 8-byte SID base, i.e. zero sub-authorities. compare_sids() then reads ace->sid.sub_auth[i] for i < min(local_sid->num_subauth, ace->sid.num_subauth). The local comparison SIDs (sid_everyone, sid_unix_NFS_mode, and the id_to_sid() result) always have at least one sub-authority, and an attacker controls the ACE revision and authority bytes (which lie within the in-bounds SID base), so they can match one of those SIDs and force the sub_auth read. A crafted ACE with size == 16 and num_subauth >= 1 placed at the tail of the security descriptor therefore causes a heap out-of-bounds read of up to SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES * sizeof(__le32) bytes past the pntsd allocation. The security descriptor is loaded by ksmbd_vfs_get_sd_xattr() into a buffer sized exactly to the on-disk data (kzalloc(sd_size) in ndr_decode_v4_ntacl()), so the read lands past the allocation. The malformed descriptor can be stored verbatim via SMB2_SET_INFO (the DACL is not normalised before being written to the security.NTACL xattr) and the read fires on a subsequent SMB2_CREATE access check, making this reachable by an authenticated client on a share that uses ACL xattrs. Add the missing num_subauth-versus-ace_size check, mirroring the identical guards already present in the sibling parsers parse_dacl() and smb_inherit_dacl().

linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: reject non-VALID session in compound request branch smb2_check_user_session() takes a shortcut for any operation that is not the first in a COMPOUND request: it reuses work->sess (the session bound by the first operation) and validates only the SessionId, then returns "valid". It never re-checks work->sess->state == SMB2_SESSION_VALID, and a SessionId of 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF (ULLONG_MAX, the MS-SMB2 related-operation value) skips even the id comparison. The standalone path (ksmbd_session_lookup_all() plus the SESSION_SETUP state machine) does enforce the VALID state; the compound branch bypasses all of it. A SESSION_SETUP carrying only an NTLM Type-1 (NtLmNegotiate) blob publishes a fresh SMB2_SESSION_IN_PROGRESS session whose sess->user is still NULL (->user is assigned later, by ntlm_authenticate()). Used as operation 1 of a COMPOUND with operation 2 = TREE_CONNECT (related, SessionId=ULLONG_MAX, \\host\IPC$), the tree-connect then runs on that IN_PROGRESS session and reaches ksmbd_ipc_tree_connect_request(), which dereferences user_name(sess->user) with sess->user == NULL (transport_ipc.c:687/701/704) -> remote NULL-pointer dereference and a kernel Oops that wedges the ksmbd worker for all clients. Reject any non-first compound operation that lands on a session which is not SMB2_SESSION_VALID, mirroring the validity the standalone lookup path enforces. SESSION_SETUP itself legitimately runs on an IN_PROGRESS session, but it is never carried as a non-first compound operation, so multi-leg authentication is unaffected by this check.

linux

Impact: fast-uri versions from 2.3.1 through 4.1.0 (including the 3.x line up to 3.1.3 and the 2.x line up to 2.4.2) do not treat a literal backslash character (U+005C) as an authority delimiter. Node's native WHATWG URL parser, used by fetch, undici, and Node's http and https clients, normalizes the backslash to a forward slash for special schemes such as http, https, ws, wss, ftp, and file. As a result, the two parsers extract different hosts from the same input string. Applications that use fast-uri to enforce host-based policy such as allowlists, denylists, loopback or SSRF filtering, redirect validation, or outbound proxy routing before passing the same URL into Node's URL or fetch consumers can be steered to an unintended destination, including cloud metadata endpoints, loopback, or internal hosts. Patches: upgrade to fast-uri 4.1.1, 3.1.4, or 2.4.3. Workarounds: none.

openjsf

Impact: @fastify/http-proxy versions from 9.4.0 up to and including 11.5.0 fail to validate the resolved WebSocket destination path against the configured rewrite prefix. The WebSocket routing path in WebSocketProxy.findUpstream resolves the destination via the WHATWG URL constructor, which collapses dot segments, so a crafted upgrade request with path traversal sequences can escape the rewrite prefix and reach upstream endpoints that were not meant to be exposed by the proxy. This is a variant of CVE-2021-21322 in a code path that never went through the HTTP fix in fastify/reply-from. Exploitation requires a non-normalizing WebSocket client, since browsers and the ws package normalize the request path before sending, but raw HTTP clients or downstream proxies that forward the request target unchanged make the attack reachable in production topologies. Patches: upgrade to @fastify/http-proxy 11.6.0. Workarounds: none.

fastify

AsyncSSH is a Python package which provides an asynchronous client and server implementation of the SSHv2 protocol on top of the Python asyncio framework. Prior to 2.23.0, AsyncSSH expands the OpenSSH-compatible AuthorizedKeysFile %u token in asyncssh/config.py, asyncssh/connection.py, asyncssh/auth_keys.py, and asyncssh/misc.py with the raw SSH username during pre-authentication server config reload, allowing a server configured with AuthorizedKeysFile authorized_keys/%u to read an authorized-keys file outside the intended directory when the SSH username contains /, \, or .. path traversal segments and authenticate with an attacker-selected key file. This issue is fixed in version 2.23.0.

asyncssh_project

Kiota is an OpenAPI based HTTP Client code generator. Prior to 1.32.5, Kiota emitted x-ms-kiota-info clientClassName and clientNamespaceName values without identifier or path sanitization as both generated client class or namespace names and generated output path components when `kiota generate` ran without -c/--class-name, allowing an attacker-controlled or compromised OpenAPI description to write generated source outside the -o output directory and inject arbitrary text into generated class or namespace declarations. This issue is fixed in version 1.32.5 by GenerationConfiguration.SanitizeClientClassName and SanitizeClientNamespaceName.

Kiota is an OpenAPI based HTTP Client code generator. Prior to 1.32.5, `kiota info` read x-ms-kiota-info.languagesInformation.<language>.dependencyInstallCommand plus dependency name and version values from an OpenAPI description and presented the spec-supplied command as Kiota's recommended install command, allowing an attacker-controlled or compromised description to cause command injection when the suggested command was run manually or through the Kiota VS Code extension's kiota info --json dependency-install flow. This issue is fixed in version 1.32.5.

Kiota is an OpenAPI based HTTP Client code generator. Prior to 1.32.0, Kiota's Python generator let attacker-controlled enum value descriptions from x-ms-enum.values[].description flow through KiotaBuilder.SetEnumOptions into Documentation.DescriptionTemplate and PythonConventionService.RemoveInvalidDescriptionCharacters without newline sanitization, allowing generated inline comments to split and execute attacker-controlled Python code at module scope when generated modules were imported. This issue is fixed in version 1.32.0.

Kiota is an OpenAPI based HTTP Client code generator. Prior to 1.32.0, Kiota's Ruby generator embedded OpenAPI default fields, property names, and other schema-derived strings through CodeMethodWriter.cs and SanitizeForQuotedLiteral() in Writers/StringExtensions.cs into Ruby double-quoted literals without escaping #, allowing attacker-controlled #{expr}, #$var, or #@var interpolation markers to inject arbitrary Ruby code into generated model classes. This issue is fixed in version 1.32.0.

Kiota is an OpenAPI based HTTP Client code generator. Prior to 1.32.3, Kiota is affected by a code-generation injection vulnerability in the C# XML documentation-comment sink (the description, externalDocs label, and externalDocs link fields emitted as /// … comments). When text from an OpenAPI description is written into single-line XML doc comments without stripping newline and Unicode line-terminator characters, an attacker can break out of the /// comment line and inject additional code into generated C# clients. This issue is fixed in version 1.32.3.

Kiota is an OpenAPI based HTTP Client code generator. Prior to 1.32.4, Kiota's PHP generator embedded OpenAPI description, default fields, property names, and other schema-derived strings into PHP double-quoted literals through SanitizeDoubleQuote() in Writers/StringExtensions.cs without escaping $, allowing attacker-controlled ${...}, $var, or {$obj->prop} interpolation constructs to inject arbitrary PHP code into generated model and request-builder classes. This issue is fixed in version 1.32.4.