ws is an open source WebSocket client and server for Node.js. All versions from 1.1.0 up to (but not including) 5.2.5, from 6.0.0 up to 6.2.4, from 7.0.0 up to 7.5.11, and from 8.0.0 up to 8.21.0 are affected by a memory exhaustion DoS vulnerability. A peer can send a high volume of exceptionally small fragments and data chunks, with modest network traffic, to force the remote peer into allocating and holding structural wrappers that consume far more memory than the default documented message-size limit, leading to process termination due to OOM. This issue has been fixed in versions 5.2.5, 6.2.4, 7.5.11, and 8.21.0.

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A heap buffer overflow vulnerability was found in GStreamer's librfb (RFB/VNC client). The rectangle bounds check incorrectly validates area rather than individual dimensions, allowing a malicious VNC server to send a rectangle that extends beyond the framebuffer. A remote attacker could set up a malicious VNC server and trick a user into connecting, resulting in an out-of-bounds heap write that could lead to code execution or a crash.

Fortra BoKS Manager contains an OS command injection vulnerability in the client upgrade and patch tooling for legacy tar-based client installations. A malicious or compromised legacy tar-installed client selected for upgrade or patching may be able to cause commands to be executed on the BoKS Master during client version handling.

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The Wertheim SafeController Software, AssemblyVersion 6.15.8328.28014, contains an IP restriction bypass vulnerability in the login process. The application restricts user logins based on the IP address associated with a branch location, but the client IP address is derived from the HTTP X-Forwarded-For header when that header is present. An attacker with valid branch user credentials can manipulate the X-Forwarded-For header during login to spoof the expected branch IP address and obtain a valid authenticated session from an unauthorized network location.

The Form Builder CP WordPress plugin before 1.2.47 does not properly sanitize a form configuration value before storing it and using it as part of a client-side script execution, allowing authenticated users with Editor-level access and above to perform Stored Cross-Site Scripting attacks against any visitor of a page rendering the affected form, even when the `unfiltered_html` capability is disallowed (e.g. in a multisite network).

LiamBindle MQTT-C through version 1.1.6 contains a heap-based out-of-bounds read and integer underflow in the mqtt_unpack_publish_response() function in src/mqtt.c that allows a remote unauthenticated attacker controlling an MQTT broker - or able to inject MQTT traffic into an unencrypted session - to crash a subscribed MQTT-C client and potentially disclose adjacent heap memory by sending a single crafted PUBLISH packet. The function validates only that the fixed-header remaining_length is at least 4, then reads the 16-bit topic_name_size field from the broker-controlled packet and advances the parse pointer by that value without verifying that topic_name_size plus the surrounding overhead fits within remaining_length; it subsequently computes application_message_size as remaining_length - topic_name_size - 2 (QoS 0) or - 4 (QoS greater than 0) in unsigned arithmetic, producing an integer underflow that is then passed to memmove(). A PUBLISH packet with topic_name_size = 0xFFFF and remaining_length = 7 advances the parse pointer 65535 bytes past the receive buffer (out-of-bounds read) and causes an application_message_size near 2^32, crashing the process when the resulting memmove() is executed.

SQL Injection in reports/catalogue_out.pl in Koha Community Koha through 22.11.37, 23.x, 24.x before 24.11.16, 25.05.x before 25.05.11, 25.11.x before 25.11.05, 26.05.x before 26.05.01, and 26.11.x before 26.11.00 allows an authenticated staff user with the Reports module flag to read arbitrary data from the Koha application database via the Filter URL parameter when the Criteria parameter matches /branchcode/. The vulnerable sink in sub calculate concatenates the unmodified Filter request parameter directly into a LIKE clause of the auxiliary $strsth2 statement and executes it via DBI without bound parameters: my $f = @$filters[0]; $f =~ s/\*/%/g; $strsth2 .= " AND $column LIKE '$f' "; This enables error-based SQL injection (e.g., via EXTRACTVALUE) and full read access to sensitive tables including borrowers (password hashes, 2FA secrets, PII), borrower_password_recovery, api_keys, and sessions. Proof of concept (error-based, single request): GET /cgi-bin/koha/reports/catalogue_out.pl?do_it=1&output=screen&Limit=10&Criteria=branchcode&Filter=x'+AND+EXTRACTVALUE(1,CONCAT(0x7e,VERSION(),0x7c,USER(),0x7c,DATABASE(),0x7e))--+- Cookie: CGISESSID=<LIBRARIAN_SESSION> The response body contains the DBI exception leaking the MariaDB version, database user, client IP, and database name, after which arbitrary data can be paged out using LIMIT n,1 / SUBSTRING(...). The vulnerable sink was introduced in commit 6bb77ae3e4 (2008-07-09); CVE-2015-4633 patched the same class in sibling files but did not generalise the fix to reports/catalogue_out.pl. Fixed in Koha 22.11.38, 24.11.16, 25.05.11, 25.11.05, 26.05.01, and 26.11.00 by replacing the raw concatenation with a parameterised placeholder.

OpenClaw before 2026.5.18 accepts WebSocket client-declared operator scopes before binding to server-approved pairing or trusted-proxy authorization baseline. Unpaired or restricted trusted-proxy Control UI clients can obtain cached operator.admin authority on live WebSocket connections to execute admin-gated Gateway RPCs.

Nezha Monitoring is a self-hostable, lightweight, servers and websites monitoring and O&M tool. From version 0.20.0 to before version 2.0.10, an authenticated Nezha dashboard user can create or update a DDNS profile with provider webhook and configure an arbitrary webhook_url, HTTP method, request body, and headers. When DDNS is triggered for a server that uses that profile, the dashboard process sends the configured request with utils.HttpClient without the SSRF protections used by notification webhooks. This allows a low-privileged authenticated user who controls an owned server/DDNS profile to make the dashboard host issue HTTP requests to loopback or internal network services. The response body is not returned to the attacker in the confirmed path, so this is a blind SSRF / internal state-changing request primitive. This issue has been patched in version 2.0.10.

AgenticMail gives AI agents real email addresses and phone numbers. Prior to version 0.9.27, @agenticmail/mcp exposes a Streamable HTTP transport when started with --http or MCP_HTTP=1. In that mode, the /mcp endpoint accepts requests without any HTTP authentication layer. A remote client can initialize a session and call tools directly. This issue has been patched in version 0.9.27.

Actual is a local-first personal finance tool. The `POST /openid/config` endpoint in Actual Budget's sync-server versions <= 26.4.0 exposes the full OpenID Connect configuration—including the OAuth2 `client_secret`—to any caller who knows the bootstrap password. The endpoint also lacks authentication and rate limiting, making the bootstrap password brute-forceable. Version 26.5.0 fixes the issue.

Parse Server is an open source backend that can be deployed to any infrastructure that can run Node.js. Prior to versions 8.6.80 and 9.9.1-alpha.6, a relation query using the $relatedTo operator could read the membership of a Relation field even when that field was hidden from the requesting client by protectedFields, and even when the object owning the relation was not readable by the client under its ACL or class-level permissions. The request requires only the public API credentials that Parse clients normally carry — no user session, master key, or Cloud Code is needed. As a result, an unauthenticated client who knows or obtains the owning object's objectId could enumerate the objects linked through a protected relation, or combine the operator with an objectId constraint to use it as a membership oracle — confirming whether a specific object is linked to a private parent. This affects applications that rely on protectedFields or object ACLs to keep Relation membership confidential, such as private group memberships, block lists, or account-to-resource associations. This issue has been patched in versions 8.6.80 and 9.9.1-alpha.6.

Parse Server is an open source backend that can be deployed to any infrastructure that can run Node.js. From version 9.8.0 to before version 9.9.1-alpha.3, the routeAllowList server option restricts external client access to a configured list of REST API routes. The check is only enforced as Express middleware against the outer HTTP request URL, so the /batch handler dispatches each sub-request to the internal router without re-running the allow-list check. An external caller whose outer route matches batch can issue batch sub-requests to any REST API route that the operator omitted from the allow-list. Authentication, ACL, CLP, and other inner-route authorization controls still apply — only the operator-configured route firewall is bypassed. This issue has been patched in version 9.9.1-alpha.3.

Parse Server is an open source backend that can be deployed to any infrastructure that can run Node.js. Prior to versions 8.6.77 and 9.9.1-alpha.1, an unauthenticated attacker who knows a publicly-known Parse Application ID can submit a single HTTP request whose client SDK version field contains adversarial input that triggers polynomial backtracking in a request-header parser. The parsing runs before session authentication and before rate limiting on every /parse/* request, so the request consumes seconds to minutes of synchronous CPU on a Node.js worker before any access control evaluates it. A small number of concurrent requests can saturate a worker; a single large request via the body-field variant can pin a worker for minutes. Production deployments running the default configuration are affected. This issue has been patched in versions 8.6.77 and 9.9.1-alpha.1.

Improper handling of HPACK dynamic table size updates in the AWS Common Runtime aws-c-http library might allow a remote threat actor operating a server to cause memory corruption on a connecting client application, potentially leading to arbitrary code execution, via a crafted sequence of HTTP/2 HEADERS frames. To remediate this issue, users should upgrade to aws-c-http version 0.11.0.

Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. Prior to versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final, Netty HTTP/2 max header size handling produces an attack similar to HTTP/2 Rapid Reset. There is a setting in the http2 specification called `SETTINGS_MAX_HEADER_LIST_SIZE`. When a client sends that setting to Netty, it appears that Netty will behave as follows: read the request; proxy the request to the origin; attempt to produce a response; and create an exception while writing the headers for the response. Functionally, this should be similar to the http2 reset attack, but with a different on-the-wire signature. Versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final patch the issue.

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Aqara Home Android (com.lumiunited.aqarahome) 6.0.0 (and white-label clients embedding the same liblumidevsdk.so) uses hard-coded cryptographic keys, which is an instance of "CWE-321: Use of Hard-coded Cryptographic Key" and has an estimated CVSS of CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N (9.1 Critical).

The Aqara IAM/SSO Gateway (gw-builder.aqara.com) used a hardcoded OAuth client credential, which is an instance of "CWE-798: Use of Hard-coded Credentials." This issue has an estimated CVSS of CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N (9.1 Critical). When combined with CVE-2026-50082, CVE-50084, and CVE-50085, this can lead to a fully unauthenticated, remote takeover of affected devices.

Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. Prior to versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final, before reading the first request-line, `HttpObjectDecoder` skips every byte for which `Character.isISOControl(b)` is `true` (0x00–0x1F and 0x7F) as well as all whitespace. RFC 9112 §2.2 only asks servers to ignore empty CRLF lines preceding the request-line — a carefully scoped robustness allowance intended to handle HTTP/1.0 POST workarounds. Silently absorbing NUL bytes, SOH, STX, and other non-CRLF control characters goes significantly beyond this, and can be exploited for request-boundary confusion in pipelined or multiplexed transports where a front-end component treats those bytes differently. Versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final patch the issue.

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Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. Prior to version 4.2.15.Final, Netty QUIC exposes the stateless reset token on the network path when using the default HMAC-based connection-ID and stateless-reset-token generators. The reset token for the server's current source connection ID can be derived from bytes that appear as the connection ID in QUIC headers after a source-CID rotation. An on-path attacker observing the headers can use the token to perform a Denial of Service by sending a spoofed Stateless Reset packet. Version 4.2.15.Final patches the issue.

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The Yarbo cloud does not enforce per-device or per-user authorization. Any client possessing valid credentials, whether the shared hard-coded credentials or legitimate per-user credentials, can subscribe to wildcard topics covering all robots globally, and can publish to any robot's command topic using only the robot's serial number (disclosed in the telemetry stream). Even after removal of hard-coded credentials from the app, a single compromised credential could still provide fleet-wide access without per-device access controls.

Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. Prior to versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final, DefaultHttp2Connection.DefaultEndpoint initialises maxActiveStreams/maxStreams to Integer.MAX_VALUE, and Http2Settings never inserts SETTINGS_MAX_CONCURRENT_STREAMS by default (Http2Settings.java:305-307 only clamps a user-supplied value). Unless the application explicitly calls initialSettings().maxConcurrentStreams(n), a Netty HTTP/2 server advertises no limit and enforces none locally. Each open stream allocates a DefaultStream object, PropertyMap slots, flow-controller state and IntObjectHashMap entry; with ~2^30 permissible odd stream IDs a single TCP connection can create hundreds of thousands of long-lived stream objects. This is also the precondition for CVE-2023-44487-style Rapid-Reset amplification, where the absence of a low concurrent cap multiplies backend work. Versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final patch the issue.

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