RustFS is a distributed object storage system built in Rust. Prior to 1.0.0-beta.2, the admin router explicitly whitelists /profile/cpu and /profile/memory from the authentication layer, allowing any unauthenticated HTTP client to invoke profiling handlers without credentials. On supported builds (e.g., glibc), the handler invokes a fixed 60-second CPU profiling operation (dump_cpu_pprof_for(Duration::from_secs(60))). This may result in significant CPU resource consumption per request and can potentially lead to denial of service when abused. Additionally, the handler returns the server’s absolute filesystem path in the response body, resulting in information disclosure. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.0.0-beta.2.

Python Liquid is a Python engine for the Liquid template language. Prior to 2.2.0, the built-in FileSystemLoader and CachingFileSystemLoader do not guard against reading files outside their search paths when given an absolute path to resolve. This allows malicious template authors to load and render arbitrary files via the {% include %} and {% render %} tags. Targeted files would need to contain valid Liquid markup and be readable by the application process. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.2.0.

pam_usb provides hardware authentication for Linux using ordinary removable media. Prior to 0.9.0, multiple pam_usb helper tools resolved external binaries through the PATH environment variable rather than using absolute paths. An attacker who can influence the process environment during PAM authentication or tool execution could substitute malicious binaries. The affected tools are pamusb-check (src/tmux.c), pamusb-conf (tools/pamusb-conf), and pamusb-keyring-unlock-gnome (tools/pamusb-keyring-unlock-gnome). This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.0.

Algernon is a small self-contained pure-Go web server. Prior to 1.17.7, when Algernon is invoked with a single file path instead of a directory, singleFileMode is set to true and debugMode is forcibly enabled. debugMode activates the PrettyError renderer, which on any Lua or template error response dumps the absolute path of the file that errored, complete byte contents of that file, and exception or parser error text. This response is served with HTTP 200 OK to whoever sent the request that triggered the error. Any client able to reach the server and able to provoke a runtime error in the served script obtains the full server-side source of that script and of any sibling Lua data file consulted during the request. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.17.7.

Algernon is a small self-contained pure-Go web server. Prior to 1.17.7, when Algernon is asked for any URL path that resolves to a directory without an index file, DirPage walks upward through parent directories — past the configured server root — looking for a file named handler.lua to execute as the request handler. The loop terminates only after 100 ancestor steps or when filepath.Dir returns ., so on any absolute server-root path the search reaches the filesystem root (/ on Unix, drive letter on Windows). The first handler.lua it finds is loaded into the Lua interpreter with the full Algernon API exposed — including run3(), httpclient, os.execute, io.popen, PQ, MSSQL, raw filesystem access, and the userstate database. Any process that can write handler.lua anywhere in a parent directory of the server root obtains pre-authenticated remote code execution on the next HTTP request. This is reachable without authentication — the lookup happens before the permission check returns a hit (the perm system only gates URL prefixes, not the handler-resolution step), and any URL pointing at a directory without an index triggers the walk. On a fresh stock Algernon install the request GET / is enough. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.17.7.

Archive::Tar versions before 3.08 for Perl extract hardlinks to attacker controlled paths outside the extraction directory. _make_special_file() passes the tar header's linkname to link() without validating it against absolute paths or .. segments, creating a hardlink that shares the victim file's inode. A subsequent write through the extracted name modifies the victim file, and the post-extraction chmod, chown, and utime block in _extract_file() (guarded only against symlinks via -l) applies the tar header's mode, owner, and timestamps to the shared inode during extraction alone.

archive\

Archive::Tar versions before 3.08 for Perl extract symlinks with attacker controlled targets outside the extraction directory. _make_special_file() passes the tar header's linkname to symlink() without validating it against absolute paths or .. segments. The secure-extract mode check that guards regular file extraction does not cover the symlink target. A subsequent open through the extracted name reads or writes the attacker chosen path.

archive\

A path traversal vulnerability exists in the Altium Enterprise Server Viewer StorageController due to improper handling of file path route parameters. On on-premise deployments that use local filesystem storage, a regular authenticated user can supply a URL-encoded absolute path (such as an encoded drive letter) in a Viewer storage API request, causing the configured storage root to be discarded and allowing arbitrary files to be read from the server filesystem. Because the readable files include the server's master configuration, which stores database credentials, signing key locations, certificate passwords, and OAuth secrets, exploitation can lead to disclosure of all server secrets and full compromise of the server and its data. Cloud deployments are not affected, as they use object storage and do not enable this component.

Summarize prior to 0.15.1 contains a path traversal vulnerability in the /v1/summarize daemon endpoint that allows authenticated callers to write files to arbitrary directories by supplying an absolute path or directory traversal sequence in the slidesDir request parameter. Attackers can exploit this to write slide_*.png and slides.json files to any writable directory and subsequently delete matching files at the specified location through repeat extraction.

steipete

Microsoft APM is an open-source, community-driven dependency manager for AI agents. Prior to 0.13.0, Microsoft APM contains a Windows-specific archive extraction boundary failure in the legacy-bundle probe used by apm install <bundle> on supported Python 3.10 and 3.11 runtimes. When apm install is given a local .tar.gz that is not recognized as a plugin-format bundle, APM probes whether it is a legacy --format apm bundle. On Python versions earlier than 3.12, that probe extracts untrusted tar members with raw tar.extractall() without rejecting Windows absolute member names such as D:/.... This vulnerability is fixed in 0.13.0.

Microsoft APM is an open-source, community-driven dependency manager for AI agents. Prior to 0.8.12, Microsoft APM normalizes marketplace plugins by copying plugin components referenced in plugin.json into .apm/. The manifest fields agents, skills, commands, and hooks are attacker-controlled, but the implementation does not enforce that those paths remain inside the plugin directory. A malicious plugin can therefore use absolute paths or ../ traversal paths to copy arbitrary readable host files or directories from the installer's machine during apm install. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.8.12.

The MCP Registry provides MCP clients with a list of MCP servers, like an app store for MCP servers. From 1.1.0 to 1.7.4, the TrailingSlashMiddleware in internal/api/server.go is vulnerable to an open redirect attack. An attacker can craft a URL with a protocol-relative path (e.g., //evil.com/) that, after trailing slash removal, results in a Location header of //evil.com — which browsers interpret as an absolute URL to an external domain. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.7.5.

The MCP Registry provides MCP clients with a list of MCP servers, like an app store for MCP servers. Prior to 1.7.7, the public catalogue UI served at GET / (file internal/api/handlers/v0/ui_index.html) is vulnerable to stored cross-site scripting via the server.websiteUrl field of any published server.json. Server-side validation in internal/validators/validators.go (validateWebsiteURL) only checks that the URL parses, is absolute, and uses the https scheme; it does not reject quote characters. Client-side, the value is interpolated into a double-quoted href attribute via innerHTML, using a homegrown escapeHtml helper that performs the standard textContent → innerHTML round-trip. Per the HTML serialisation algorithm, that round-trip encodes only &, <, > and U+00A0 inside text nodes — it does not encode " or '. A literal " in websiteUrl therefore breaks out of the href attribute, allowing arbitrary on* event handlers to be appended to the same <a> element. The Content-Security-Policy on / is script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' https://cdn.tailwindcss.com, so the injected event handlers execute. Any user able to obtain a publish token (e.g. via POST /v0/auth/github-at with their own GitHub account, or POST /v0/auth/none on a deployment that has anonymous auth enabled) can plant a poisoned record visible to every visitor of the registry homepage. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.7.7.

lfprojects

Flight is an extensible micro-framework for PHP. Prior to 3.18.1, the default error handler Engine::_error() writes the full exception message, exception code, and stack trace (including absolute filesystem paths) directly into the HTTP 500 response, with no debug gating. Production deployments leak internal paths, any secret interpolated into an exception message, and full module structure — giving attackers primitives for chaining other weaknesses (LFI, path traversal). This vulnerability is fixed in 3.18.1.

vm2 is an open source vm/sandbox for Node.js. Prior to 3.11.0, vm2's CallSite wrapper class (intended as a safe wrapper for V8's native CallSite) blocks getThis() and getFunction() to prevent host object leakage, but allows getFileName() to return unsanitized host absolute paths. Any sandboxed code can extract the full directory structure, library paths, and framework versions of the host server. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.11.0.

vm2_project

Crabbox before 0.9.0 contains a path traversal vulnerability in the Islo provider's workspace path resolution that allows attackers to supply absolute or relative paths that resolve outside the intended /workspace directory. Attackers can craft a malicious .crabbox.yaml or crabbox.yaml file with traversal sequences to cause arbitrary file deletion and overwrite when sync.delete is enabled, as the workspace preparation logic executes rm -rf and mkdir -p operations on the resolved path without proper validation.

Tookie is a advanced OSINT information gathering tool. Prior to 4.1fix, modules/modules.py's write_txt, write_csv, write_json, and (commented-but-shipping) scan_file helpers open their output as open(f"{user}.<ext>"), where user comes unsanitized from the -u CLI flag or any line of a -U usernames file. A username that contains path-separator sequences (.., /, \, or an absolute path) causes tookie-osint to write the scan output to an arbitrary path the invoking user has write permission for. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.1fix.

OpenClaw before 2026.4.15 contains an arbitrary local file read vulnerability in the webchat audio embedding helper that fails to apply local media root containment checks. Attackers can influence agent or tool-produced ReplyPayload.mediaUrl parameters to resolve absolute local paths or file URLs, read audio-like files, and embed them base64-encoded into webchat responses.

openclaw

SolidCAM-GPPL-IDE is an unofficial, independently developed extension, Postprocessor IDE for SolidCAM. From version 1.0.0 to before version 1.0.2, the inc "filename" directive in GPPL postprocessor files is resolved by GpplDocumentLinkHandler into a clickable link (VS Code textDocument/documentLink). The handler accepted arbitrary paths — absolute, relative with parent-directory segments (..\..\..\), UNC (\\server\share\), and arbitrary subfolders — and called File.Exists on each to decide whether to render the link. Two distinct attack surfaces resulted: information disclosure via File.Exists probing and NTLM hash leak via UNC path probing. This issue has been patched in version 1.0.2.

PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to version 4.6.37, the _safe_extractall helper that all recipe pull, recipe publish, and recipe unpack flows route through validates each archive member's name for absolute paths, .. segments, and resolved-path escape — but does not validate member.linkname, does not reject symlink/hardlink members, and calls tar.extractall(dest_dir) without filter="data". A bundle that contains a symlink with a name inside dest_dir but a linkname pointing outside it, followed by a regular file whose path traverses through the just-created symlink, escapes dest_dir and lets the attacker write arbitrary content to an attacker-chosen location on the victim's filesystem. This issue has been patched in version 4.6.37.

praison

PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to version 4.6.34, PraisonAI's MCP (Model Context Protocol) server (praisonai mcp serve) registers four file-handling tools by default — praisonai.rules.create, praisonai.rules.show, praisonai.rules.delete, and praisonai.workflow.show. Each accepts a path or filename string from MCP tools/call arguments and joins it onto ~/.praison/rules/ (or, for workflow.show, accepts an absolute path) with no containment check. The JSON-RPC dispatcher passes params["arguments"] blind to each handler via **kwargs without validating against the advertised input schema. By setting rule_name="../../<some-path>" an attacker walks out of the rules directory and writes any file the running user can write. Dropping a Python .pth file into the user site-packages directory escalates this primitive to arbitrary code execution in any subsequent Python process the user spawns — the next praisonai CLI invocation, an IDE script run, the user's python REPL, or any background Python service. This issue has been patched in version 4.6.34.

praison