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The Secret Type Management REST API does not correctly isolate access controls when deleting a secret type. The on-delete cascade logic, when triggered, fails to enforce organizational boundaries, leading to the removal of secrets associated with that type across all organizations. Exploitation of this vulnerability can result in the unintended deletion of secrets across the entire deployment, potentially causing configuration failures, service interruptions, and a denial-of-service condition. This vulnerability requires delete permissions for the Secret Type Management REST API, which are by default only granted to administrators.
The system accepts authentication requests without sufficient validation to enforce tenant isolation when using Email OTP, SMS OTP, or Magic Link as first-factor authenticators. This failure to adequately separate user data between tenants can lead to the exposure of personally identifiable information. Successful exploitation allows an attacker to disclose personally identifiable information of users in different tenants, resulting in privacy violations and potential regulatory non-compliance. This may include unauthorized access to user details such as mobile numbers.
When Multi-Attribute Login is enabled, the login interface fails to consistently mask the existence of user accounts. For valid users, the server resolves and displays their canonical username, while for non-existent users, it echoes the original input. This occurs regardless of the validate_username configuration. The discovery of valid usernames can increase the risk of brute force attacks, social engineering attacks, and targeted information leakage. Attackers can leverage this information to craft more effective phishing campaigns or social engineering tactics to compromise user accounts or extract sensitive data.