cert-manager adds certificates and certificate issuers as resource types in Kubernetes clusters, and simplifies the process of obtaining, renewing and using those certificates. From 1.18.0 until 1.19.6 and 1.20.3, Challenge resources under acme.cert-manager.io can be created directly by namespace users without admission validation tying the Challenge to an Order, owner reference, or Issuer-selected solver, allowing attacker-controlled Challenge.spec.solver values referencing a ClusterIssuer to bypass DNS01 solver selectors such as dnsZones, dnsNames, and matchLabels and cause cert-manager to use ClusterIssuer DNS credentials for attacker-selected provider settings and DNS names, including disclosure of X-Api-User and X-Api-Key headers for acme-dns. This issue is fixed in versions 1.19.6 and 1.20.3.

linuxfoundation

Jupyter Enterprise Gateway launches remote Jupyter Notebook kernels across distributed clusters like Apache Spark, Kubernetes, and Docker Swarm. In versions prior to 3.3.0, the server interpolates untrusted environment variables (e.g., KERNEL_XXX) into Kubernetes manifests without YAML-aware escaping, enabling YAML injection attacks. Attackers can inject new fields, overwrite critical fields (e.g., duplicate securityContext keys, where the last one prevails), and inject document boundaries (--- for new documents, ... for end-of-document) to generate multiple resources, potentially creating arbitrary types, such as privileged pods. The Jinja2 template for the Kubernetes manifest contains several kernel_xxx variables, such as kernel_working_dir that are used when rendering the manifest and are all vectors for YAML injection. This issue has been fixed in version 3.3.0.

jupyter

Jupyter Enterprise Gateway launches remote Jupyter Notebook kernels across distributed clusters like Apache Spark, Kubernetes, and Docker Swarm. In versions 2.0.0rc2 and above, prior to 3.3.0, the environment variables (KERNEL_XXX) used during the rendering of the Kubernetes manifest are vulnerable to Server Side Template Injection (SSTI). By including Jinja2 template expressions it is possible to execution Python code and OS Commands in the Enterprise Gateway service. The code can use or steal the Kubernetes service account token, which can steal Kubernetes secrets and be used to fully compromise the Kubernetes cluster by scheduling a privileged pod or a pod with a hostPath volume mount. This issue has been fixed in version 3.3.0.

jupyter

Jupyter Enterprise Gateway launches remote Jupyter Notebook kernels across distributed clusters like Apache Spark, Kubernetes, and Docker Swarm. Versions 2.0.0rc1 and above prior to 3.3.0 have a prohibited UID and GID feature that by default prevents launching kernels with UID or GID 0 (root), and this restriction can be bypassed using a specially crafted KERNEL_UID or KERNEL_GID value. This input validation vulnerability allows running Jupyter kernels as root, which can be dangerous as it allows more attack surface, and may lead to container escapes, compromising the worker node and all workloads running on it. Repeated exploitation can compromise all worker nodes, and thus the entire Kubernetes cluster. It is possible to specify volume mounts, so one vector for a container escape is to use a hostPath R/W volume mount, use this UID/GID bypass to run as root, and then gain code execution in the underlying worker node by creating a crontab entry in the mounted host file system. This issue has been fixed in version 3.0.0.

jupyter

Argo Workflows is an open source container-native workflow engine for orchestrating parallel jobs on Kubernetes. Prior to 3.7.15 and 4.0.6, the allow-list fix for CVE-2026-31892 is incomplete because workflow/util/merge.go ValidateUserOverrides and SanitizeUserWorkflowSpec walk only the top-level fields of WorkflowSpec via reflection, and WorkflowSpec.ArtifactGC is allow-listed wholesale; the struct behind that field, WorkflowLevelArtifactGC, has a PodSpecPatch sub-field whose contents flow unmodified into util.ApplyPodSpecPatch on the artifact-GC pod, the same sink the original fix closed for WorkflowSpec.PodSpecPatch, so a user submitting a Workflow under templateReferencing: Strict or Secure (against a referenced WorkflowTemplate that declares an output artifact and setting spec.artifactGC.strategy: OnWorkflowCompletion) can still inject an arbitrary strategic merge patch into the artifact-GC pod, including hostPath volumes, privileged: true, arbitrary image and command, and hostNetwork: true, defeating the stated purpose of Strict/Secure reference mode. This issue is fixed in versions 3.7.15 and 4.0.6.

argoproj

Tilt defines dev environments as code for microservice apps on Kubernetes. From 0.20.8 through 0.37.3, the Tilt HUD HTTP server registers handlers on a gorilla/mux router with no authenticating middleware. When the HUD is bound to a non-loopback address, an unauthenticated network caller can trigger developer-defined resources, tamper with Tiltfile arguments, read full engine state including the session token, and invoke apiserver resources through the token-attaching /proxy handler. This issue is fixed in version 0.37.4.

We have released version 5.24.0 of the Grafana Operator. This patch includes a CRITICAL severity security fix for a path traversal/privilege escalation vulnerability in the Grafana Operator. ### Summary The Grafana Operator supports loading dashboards & library panels using the jsonnet data templating language. The jsonnet expression is evaluated in the context of the operator manager pod. ### Impact It is possible for a malicious user who can create Dashboard or LibraryPanel resources for a Grafana instance to obtain the Kubernetes service account token of the Grafana Operator manager. ### Affected versions All Grafana Operator versions <= 5.23 ### Solutions and mitigations All installations should be upgraded as soon as possible. As a workaround, the following ValidatingAdmissionPolicy prevent the creation or modification of jsonnet based resources: apiVersion: admissionregistration.k8s.io/v1 kind: ValidatingAdmissionPolicy metadata: name: "prevent-jsonnet-dashboards" spec: failurePolicy: Fail matchConstraints: resourceRules: - apiGroups: ["grafana.integreatly.org"] apiVersions: ["v1beta1"] operations: ["CREATE", "UPDATE"] resources: ["grafanadashboards", "grafanalibrarypanels"] validations: - expression: "!has(object.spec.jsonnetLib)" --- apiVersion: admissionregistration.k8s.io/v1 kind: ValidatingAdmissionPolicyBinding metadata: name: "prevent-jsonnet-dashboards-clusterwide" spec: policyName: "prevent-jsonnet-dashboards" validationActions: [Deny] ### Acknowledgement We would like to thank Artem Cherezov for responsibly disclosing the vulnerability.

mcp-server-kubernetes is a Model Context Protocol server for Kubernetes cluster management. Prior to version 3.7.0, the kubectl_generic tool in mcp-server-kubernetes passes user-supplied flags directly to kubectl without any allowlist, enabling a privilege escalation attack within Kubernetes environments. An attacker who already has limited cluster or codebase access, for example, a developer with pod-deployment permissions but not cluster-admin credentials, can plant a single structured JSON line in an application's log output. When an operator with a privileged kubeconfig uses the MCP server to read those logs and their AI agent follows the injected instruction, kubectl_generic is called with --server=https://attacker.example.com and --insecure-skip-tls-verify=true. kubectl sends all API requests, including the Authorization: Bearer <token> header from the operator's kubeconfig to the attacker's endpoint. The captured token can then be replayed directly against the real Kubernetes API server, granting the attacker the full RBAC permissions of the operator's service account. This issue has been patched in version 3.7.0.

mcp-server-kubernetes is a Model Context Protocol server for Kubernetes cluster management. Prior to version 3.6.0, mcp-server-kubernetes exposes three environment variables (ALLOW_ONLY_READONLY_TOOLS, ALLOW_ONLY_NON_DESTRUCTIVE_TOOLS, ALLOWED_TOOLS) documented as access controls for restricting which Kubernetes operations are available. These controls are enforced at the tool discovery layer (tools/list) but not at the execution layer (tools/call). Any client that knows a tool name can invoke it directly regardless of the configured restriction mode. The access control was effectively cosmetic. This issue has been patched in version 3.6.0.

Fission is an open-source, Kubernetes-native serverless framework that simplifies the deployment of functions and applications on Kubernetes. Prior to version 1.25.0, Fission added PodSpec safety validation for tenant-facing Environment and Function CRDs (ValidatePodSpecSafety / ValidateContainerSafety admission webhook + sanitizeContainerSecurityContext executor merge layer), but the capability check was implemented as a fixed denylist of six Linux capabilities (SYS_ADMIN, NET_ADMIN, SYS_PTRACE, SYS_MODULE, DAC_READ_SEARCH, DAC_OVERRIDE). The denylist omitted CAP_SYS_TIME, among others. As a result, a tenant who could create a Function or Environment CRD could request securityContext.capabilities.add: ["SYS_TIME"], pass Fission's admission validation and merge-layer sanitization, and run attacker-controlled code with CAP_SYS_TIME in the resulting function or runtime container. This issue has been patched in version 1.25.0.

Fission is an open-source, Kubernetes-native serverless framework that simplifies the deployment of functions and applications on Kubernetes. Prior to version 1.25.0, HTTPTriggerSpec.Validate() validated Methods, FunctionReference, Host, IngressConfig, and CorsConfig, but silently skipped RelativeURL and Prefix. Those two fields were validated at the CLI level only (pkg/fission-cli/cmd/httptrigger/create.go:83). The post-CRD-modernization webhook for HTTPTrigger was retired in favor of API-server CEL — and CEL had no rules on those fields either — so an HTTPTrigger created via kubectl apply or a direct Kubernetes REST API call bypassed every URL-level check. This issue has been patched in version 1.25.0.

Fission is an open-source, Kubernetes-native serverless framework that simplifies the deployment of functions and applications on Kubernetes. Prior to version 1.25.0, SanitizeFilePath in pkg/utils/utils.go validated that a path stayed under a safe directory by calling strings.HasPrefix(path, safedir). This is a lexical check, not a directory boundary check: /packages-extra/evil starts with /packages, so it passed. The function did not enforce a path-separator boundary, so any sibling directory whose name began with the safe-directory string was accepted. Callers included the builder's Clean handler (pkg/builder/builder.go:208) and the fetcher's Fetch / Upload handlers (pkg/fetcher/fetcher.go). A tenant who could pre-create or control a sibling directory under the fetcher / builder's shared volume could induce a write or read outside the intended safe directory. This issue has been patched in version 1.25.0.

Fission is an open-source, Kubernetes-native serverless framework that simplifies the deployment of functions and applications on Kubernetes. Prior to version 1.25.0, Unarchive in pkg/utils/zip.go joined each archive entry name with the destination directory via filepath.Join and wrote the result without checking whether the resolved path stayed under the destination. A zip entry named ../../tmp/evil therefore landed at /tmp/evil. An attacker who could control a Package.Spec.Source.URL or Deployment.URL archive could induce the fetcher (running as the per-environment pod's fission-fetcher sidecar) to write files anywhere that process could reach: into other tenants' /packages/<ns>/ directories, into mounted secret/config volumes, or into the fetcher's own binary. This issue has been patched in version 1.25.0.

Fission is an open-source, Kubernetes-native serverless framework that simplifies the deployment of functions and applications on Kubernetes. Prior to version 1.24.0, a tenant with environments.fission.io create/update RBAC can run privileged / allowPrivilegeEscalation / dangerous-capability containers in the Fission function or builder namespace, scheduled under the executor's high-privilege service account — enabling container-sandbox escape, host filesystem and network access, and potential node- and cluster-level compromise. This issue has been patched in version 1.24.0.

Fission is an open-source, Kubernetes-native serverless framework that simplifies the deployment of functions and applications on Kubernetes. Prior to version 1.24.0, Fission builder pods were created with ServiceAccountName: fission-builder and no AutomountServiceAccountToken: false, so the kubelet auto-mounted the service-account token into every container in the pod — including the user-supplied builder image. This issue has been patched in version 1.24.0.

Fission is an open-source, Kubernetes-native serverless framework that simplifies the deployment of functions and applications on Kubernetes. Prior to version 1.24.0, Fission's Environment CRD exposes spec.runtime.podSpec and spec.builder.podSpec, which are merged into the Kubernetes pod specs for runtime and builder pods. The merge logic propagated hostNetwork, hostPID, hostIPC, container privileged, and serviceAccountName from the user-supplied podspec with no filtering, and Environment.Validate performed no security-relevant checks on these fields. This issue has been patched in version 1.24.0.

Fission is an open-source, Kubernetes-native serverless framework that simplifies the deployment of functions and applications on Kubernetes. Prior to version 1.24.0, Fission's Container Executor path lets a tenant supply Function.spec.podspec directly; the executor merges it into the executor-built podspec and creates a Deployment whose pods run the user's container image. This issue has been patched in version 1.24.0.

Fission is an open-source, Kubernetes-native serverless framework that simplifies the deployment of functions and applications on Kubernetes. Prior to version 1.24.0, the Environment.spec.runtime.podSpec / spec.builder.podSpec passthrough lacked validation, and MergePodSpec propagated dangerous fields into the generated pods. This issue has been patched in version 1.24.0.

Fission is an open-source, Kubernetes-native serverless framework that simplifies the deployment of functions and applications on Kubernetes. Prior to version 1.24.0, the Fission Function admission webhook (pkg/webhook/function.go) validated that spec.secrets[].namespace and spec.configmaps[].namespace equalled the function's own namespace but performed no equivalent check on spec.environment.namespace. This issue has been patched in version 1.24.0.

Fission is an open-source, Kubernetes-native serverless framework that simplifies the deployment of functions and applications on Kubernetes. Prior to version 1.24.0, a Fission Function spec carries three reference types — Secret, ConfigMap, and Package. The first two were namespace-validated by the admission webhook; PackageRef.Namespace was not. This issue has been patched in version 1.24.0.

Fission is an open-source, Kubernetes-native serverless framework that simplifies the deployment of functions and applications on Kubernetes. Prior to version 1.24.0, a low-privilege developer who could create a KubernetesWatchTrigger (KWT) in their own namespace was able to establish a persistent surveillance channel over any other namespace. This issue has been patched in version 1.24.0.

Fission is an open-source, Kubernetes-native serverless framework that simplifies the deployment of functions and applications on Kubernetes. Prior to version 1.24.0, Fission's buildermgr controller processed Package CRDs without verifying that Package.spec.environment.namespace matched Package.metadata.namespace. This issue has been patched in version 1.24.0.