361,366
Total CVEs
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85,612
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1,625
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ComfyUI v0.23.0 contains an unsafe deserialization vulnerability in the LoadTrainingDataset node that allows unauthenticated remote attackers to execute arbitrary Python code by uploading a crafted pickle file and triggering its deserialization. Attackers can upload a malicious shard_*.pkl file via the unauthenticated POST /upload/image endpoint and then queue a workflow graph via POST /prompt referencing the uploaded file, causing torch.load to deserialize the attacker-controlled pickle payload using __reduce__ and execute arbitrary commands as the ComfyUI process user.
sentence-transformers contains a security control bypass vulnerability that allows attackers to achieve arbitrary code execution by exploiting a logic flaw in the import_module_class helper within sentence_transformers/util/misc.py, where the guard condition includes an 'or os.path.exists(model_name_or_path)' clause that satisfies the trust gate whenever the supplied path exists on the local filesystem, regardless of the trust_remote_code=False argument. Attackers who can control or influence the contents of a model directory on disk can place malicious Python files such as modeling_*.py referenced via modules.json, causing the code to execute at import time when an application loads the model with SentenceTransformer(path, trust_remote_code=False), bypassing the documented security contract and achieving code execution within the loading process.
Banks generates meaningful LLM prompts using a simple template language. In versions prior to 2.4.3, banks parses Tool JSON objects from the rendered body of {% completion %} blocks and later resolves their import_path field through importlib.import_module(...) + getattr(...) to obtain the callable that handles a tool call. There is no allowlist or sanitization on import_path, so any importable Python attribute (e.g. os.system, subprocess.getoutput) can be selected. When the LLM emits a tool_calls entry whose function.name matches the attacker-supplied tool name, the resolved callable is invoked with kwargs decoded from tool_call.function.arguments, yielding arbitrary code execution in the banks-hosting process. This is distinct from GHSA-gphh-9q3h-jgpp / CVE-2026-44209. That advisory was fixed in 2.4.2 by switching src/banks/env.py from Environment to SandboxedEnvironment. The fix does not touch src/banks/extensions/completion.py, and the unsafe import + getattr chain still executes on 2.4.2. The malicious Tool JSON is plain text in the rendered template body — it requires no Jinja attribute access, so the sandbox is irrelevant. This issue has been fixed in version 2.4.3.
