361,800
Total CVEs
26,223
Critical
85,816
High
1,626
CISA KEV
533
This Week
10,269 results · Page 2/411
Pluck CMS's admin panel relies solely on a Referer-header comparison (requestedByTheSameDomain() in data/inc/functions.admin.php, gating every admin.php action) for CSRF protection, with no per-request anti-CSRF token anywhere in the admin area. When a request carries no Referer/Host information, the function's elseif branch returns true, treating the request as same-origin. Because a cross-site attacker page can suppress the Referer header (e.g. via <meta name=referrer content=no-referrer>), it can force an authenticated administrator's browser to submit forged admin actions with no valid Referer, including creating pages with raw HTML (stored XSS via the rendered page) and installing PHP modules/themes (remote code execution).
The ShopLentor plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to arbitrary function execution via the woolentoropt/v1/custom-action REST API endpoint in all versions up to, and including, 3.3.7. This is due to the handle_action() method passing user-supplied input directly to call_user_func() without an allowlist of permitted callbacks. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Administrator-level access and above, to execute arbitrary PHP callable functions via the 'callback' parameter.
The Askeet plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to SQL Injection via the 'sql_query' parameter in multiple AJAX actions (askeet_execute_sql_query, askeet_export_all_results) in all versions up to, and including, 3.0. This is due to the askeet_is_safe_query() filter being bypassable using MySQL conditional comments (e.g., /*!UNION*/). The filter strips regular block comments before checking for forbidden SQL keywords, but MySQL interprets conditional comments as executable code. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Administrator-level access and above, to append additional SQL queries into already existing queries that can be used to extract sensitive information from the database.