The Erlang/OTP ssl application does not detect cycles when reconstructing an incomplete peer certificate chain during a TLS or DTLS handshake. In ssl_certificate:handle_incomplete_chain/5, the received chain is passed to ssl_certificate:build_certificate_chain/5, which walks issuer relationships via ssl_certificate:do_certificate_chain/7 with no cycle detection and no depth limit. When the peer supplies two mutually cross-signed certificates in unordered form (A issues B, B issues A), the issuer lookup alternates between the two certificates and the pair of functions recurses indefinitely, growing the call stack and chain accumulator without bound. An unauthenticated remote attacker can send a crafted certificate chain in a TLS or DTLS Certificate handshake message to exhaust available memory and crash the BEAM node. Only a TCP connection and a partial handshake are required; no authentication or completed handshake is needed, and both TLS/DTLS servers and clients are affected when processing peer certificate messages. This issue affects OTP from OTP 23.2 before OTP 29.0.4, OTP 28.5.0.4 and OTP 27.3.4.15, corresponding to ssl from 10.2 before 11.7.4, 11.6.0.4 and 11.2.12.11.

The Erlang/OTP ssl TLS 1.2 (and earlier) and DTLS client does not verify that the cipher suite selected by the server in ServerHello was among the suites offered by the client in ClientHello. The client-side tls_handshake:hello/5 handler validates the negotiated protocol version and the downgrade sentinel but hands the server-chosen suite directly to ssl_handshake:handle_server_hello_extensions/9, which installs it without a membership check. The TLS 1.3 client path performs this check (per RFC 8446), so it is not affected. An on-path attacker between the client and the intended server can respond with a ServerHello selecting an anonymous key exchange suite such as TLS_DH_anon_* or TLS_ECDH_anon_* that the client never offered. Anonymous suites do not require the server to present a certificate, so the entire verify_peer and cacerts configuration is bypassed: the attacker completes the handshake with its own ephemeral parameters, no certificate is validated, no hostname is checked, and ssl:connect returns {ok, Socket}. All subsequent application traffic is readable and modifiable by the attacker. This issue affects OTP from OTP R13B03 before OTP 27.3.4.15, from OTP 28.0 before OTP 28.5.0.4, and from OTP 29.0 before OTP 29.0.4, corresponding to ssl from 3.10.7 before 11.2.12.11, from 11.3 before 11.6.0.4, and from 11.7 before 11.7.4. Whether OTP before OTP R13B03, corresponding to ssl before 3.10.7, is affected is unknown.

The lack of cryptographic mechanisms to ensure the integrity and authenticity of communications in Ghost Robotics' Vision 60 robot (APK v5.5.0) exposes the system to man-in-the-middle attacks. An attacker located on the local network can use ARP spoofing and selective traffic blocking techniques to intercept and manipulate packets between the legitimate operator and the robot. This allows the attacker to disconnect the original controller, establish unauthorized communications, and prevent the operator from regaining control of the device, seriously compromising the confidentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA) of operations.

In Zephyr's userspace dynamic-objects subsystem, thread_idx_alloc() in kernel/userspace/userspace.c allocated a new thread permission index from the global _thread_idx_map[] bitmap without holding lists_lock. On SMP systems, two user-mode threads invoking the k_object_alloc(K_OBJ_THREAD) syscall concurrently can both observe the same low free bit, perform the same non-atomic RMW to clear it, and return the identical tidx. The two newly created K_OBJ_THREAD objects are then assigned the same thread_id, so the two user threads alias a single bit position in every kernel object's perms[] bitfield: any subsequent grant of access on a kernel object to one thread is implicitly a grant to the other, defeating userspace ACL isolation. A secondary lost-update window between the unlocked &=~BIT() in alloc and the locked |= BIT() in thread_idx_free() can also leak entries from the thread-index pool. The defect is reachable from any user-mode thread via the unrestricted __syscall k_object_alloc and is gated on CONFIG_USERSPACE, CONFIG_DYNAMIC_OBJECTS, and CONFIG_SMP. The flaw was introduced when the per-thread permission index was added in 2018 and is present in every release up to and including v4.4.0. Fixed by holding lists_lock across the bitmap RMW and the permissions clear (and inlining the obj_list traversal that previously took the lock itself).

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfrm: move policy_bydst RCU sync from per-netns .exit to .pre_exit The struct pernet_operations docstring in include/net/net_namespace.h explicitly warns against blocking RCU primitives in .exit handlers: Exit methods using blocking RCU primitives, such as synchronize_rcu(), should be implemented via exit_batch. [...] Please, avoid synchronize_rcu() at all, where it's possible. Note that a combination of pre_exit() and exit() can be used, since a synchronize_rcu() is guaranteed between the calls. xfrm_policy_fini() violates this: it calls synchronize_rcu() before freeing the policy_bydst hash tables (so no RCU reader is mid- traversal at free time), but runs from xfrm_net_ops.exit -- once per namespace -- so a cleanup_net() of N namespaces pays N full RCU grace periods serially. Use the documented pre_exit/exit split. Move the policy flush (and the workqueue drains it depends on) into a new .pre_exit handler; xfrm_policy_fini() then runs in .exit and frees the hash tables after the synchronize_rcu_expedited() that cleanup_net() guarantees between the two phases. Providing O(1) RCU grace periods per batch instead of O(N). Observed on Linux 6.18 with a workload doing unshare(CLONE_NEWNET) at ~13/sec sustained: cleanup_net() and the netns_wq rescuer kthread both stuck in xfrm_policy_fini()'s synchronize_rcu(), >300k struct net accumulated in the cleanup queue, Percpu in /proc/meminfo climbed to 130+ GB on 256-CPU hosts, and memcg OOMs followed. setup_net and __put_net counts were balanced, ruling out a refcount leak.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/handshake: Take a long-lived file reference at submit handshake_nl_accept_doit() needs the file pointer backing req->hr_sk->sk_socket to survive the window between handshake_req_next() and the subsequent FD_PREPARE() and get_file(). The submit-side sock_hold() does not provide that. sk_refcnt keeps struct sock alive, but struct socket is owned by sock->file: when the consumer fputs the last file reference, sock_release() tears the socket down regardless of any sock_hold. Add an hr_file pointer to struct handshake_req and acquire an explicit reference on sock->file during handshake_req_submit(). handshake_complete() and handshake_req_cancel() release the reference on the completion-bit-winning path. The submit error path must also release the file reference, but after rhashtable insertion a concurrent handshake_req_cancel() can discover the request and race the error path. Gate the error-path cleanup -- sk_destruct restoration, fput, and request destruction -- with test_and_set_bit(HANDSHAKE_F_REQ_COMPLETED), the same serialization handshake_complete() and handshake_req_cancel() already use. When cancel has already claimed ownership, the submit error path returns without touching the request; socket teardown handles final destruction. The accept-side dereferences are not yet retargeted; that change comes in the next patch.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iio: adc: ad_sigma_delta: fix clear_pending_event for registerless devices ad_sigma_delta_clear_pending_event() falls through to the status register read path for devices with has_registers = false and no rdy_gpiod. For such devices, ad_sd_read_reg() skips the address byte entirely and clocks raw MISO bytes with no address phase — making it byte-for-byte identical to reading conversion data. If a pending conversion result is present, this partially consumes it and corrupts the data stream for the subsequent ad_sd_read_reg() call in ad_sigma_delta_single_conversion(). Furthermore, with num_resetclks = 0 on these devices, data_read_len evaluates to 0. If the clocked byte has bit 7 clear, pending_event is set and the code attempts memset(data + 2, 0xff, 0 - 1), overflowing to SIZE_MAX and corrupting the heap. Fix by returning 0 immediately when neither rdy_gpiod nor has_registers is set. This is safe for all current registerless devices: ad7191 and ad7780 (with powerdown GPIO) are reset between conversions by CS deassertion, so there is no stale result to drain; ad7780 (without powerdown GPIO) and max11205 are continuously-converting and cycle ~DRDY at the output data rate regardless of whether the previous result was read, so the next falling edge fires naturally. A future registerless device that holds ~DRDY asserted until data is read would be broken by this early return and would require either num_resetclks set or a rdy-gpio. The same heap corruption is reachable on any device with rdy_gpiod set but num_resetclks = 0: if the GPIO indicates a pending event, the drain path executes memset(data + 2, 0xff, 0 - 1) regardless of has_registers. Add an explicit data_read_len == 0 guard after the pending event check; the stale result is then consumed by the first ad_sd_read_reg() call in ad_sigma_delta_single_conversion().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iio: event: Fix event FIFO reset race `iio_event_getfd()` creates the event file descriptor with `anon_inode_getfd()`, which allocates a new fd, creates the anonymous file and installs it in the process fd table before returning to the caller. The IIO code resets the event FIFO after `anon_inode_getfd()` has returned, but before `IIO_GET_EVENT_FD_IOCTL` has copied the fd number to userspace. But since fd tables are shared between threads, another thread can guess the newly allocated fd number and issue a `read()` on it as soon as the fd has been installed. This means the `kfifo_to_user()` in `iio_event_chrdev_read()` can run in parallel with the `kfifo_reset_out()` in `iio_event_getfd()`. The kfifo documentation says that `kfifo_reset_out()` is only safe when it is called from the reader thread and there is only one concurrent reader. Otherwise it is dangerous and must be handled in the same way as `kfifo_reset()`. If that happens, `kfifo_to_user()` can advance the FIFO `out` index based on state from before the reset, after the reset has already moved the `out` index to the current `in` index. That can leave the FIFO with an `out` index past the `in` index. A later `read()` can then see an underflowed FIFO length and copy more data than the event FIFO buffer contains. This can result in an out-of-bounds read and leak adjacent kernel memory to userspace. Move the FIFO reset before `anon_inode_getfd()`. At that point the event fd is marked busy, but the new fd has not been installed yet, so userspace cannot access it while the FIFO is reset.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: usx2y: us144mkii: fix work UAF on disconnect tascam_disconnect() cancels capture_work and midi_in_work before usb_kill_anchored_urbs() kills the capture/MIDI-in URBs. Those URBs self-resubmit, and their completion handlers reschedule the work. A URB that completes in the small window between cancel_work_sync() and usb_kill_anchored_urbs() therefore re-arms the work after its only cancel. Nothing cancels it again before snd_card_free() frees the card-private tascam structure, so the work handler then runs on freed memory. Kill the anchored URBs before cancelling the work; once the work is cancelled no remaining URB can complete to re-arm it.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: caiaq: fix out-of-bounds read in the Traktor Kontrol S4 input parser snd_usb_caiaq_tks4_dispatch() decodes the Traktor Kontrol S4 input stream in fixed 16-byte (TKS4_MSGBLOCK_SIZE) message blocks. On every iteration it advances buf and subtracts the block size while looping on "while (len)". len is urb->actual_length. That value is supplied by the device and is not guaranteed to be a multiple of 16. When a final short block leaves len between 1 and 15, the loop runs once more, reads up to buf[15], and then does "len -= TKS4_MSGBLOCK_SIZE". As len is unsigned this underflows to a huge value. The loop then keeps iterating and walking buf far past the end of the 512-byte ep4_in_buf, reading out of bounds until a bogus block id happens to be hit. Iterate only while a full message block is available. This stops the unsigned underflow and silently drops any trailing partial block, which carries no complete control value anyway. The sibling endpoint-4 parsers are not affected. The Traktor Kontrol X1 and Maschine arms in snd_usb_caiaq_ep4_reply_dispatch() floor urb->actual_length before dispatching.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tcp: restore RCU grace period in tcp_ao_destroy_sock Commit 51e547e8c89c ("tcp: Free TCP-AO/TCP-MD5 info/keys without RCU") removed the call_rcu() callback from tcp_ao_destroy_sock(), arguing that "the destruction of info/keys is delayed until the socket destructor" and therefore "no one can discover it anymore". That argument does not hold for the call site in tcp_connect() (net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:4327-4332). At that point the socket is in TCP_SYN_SENT, has already been inserted into the inet ehash by inet_hash_connect() in tcp_v4_connect(), and is therefore very much discoverable: any softirq running tcp_v4_rcv() on another CPU can take the socket out of the ehash, walk into tcp_inbound_hash(), and load tp->ao_info via implicit RCU before bh_lock_sock_nested() is taken on the destroying CPU. The reader path then enters __tcp_ao_do_lookup() (net/ipv4/tcp_ao.c:208) which re-loads tp->ao_info via rcu_dereference_check(); the re-load can still observe the (about-to-be-freed) pointer because there is no synchronize_rcu() between rcu_assign_pointer(tp->ao_info, NULL) and tcp_ao_info_free() in tcp_ao_destroy_sock(). The captured pointer is then walked at line 223: hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(key, &ao->head, node, ...) The writer's synchronous kfree() is free to complete between the line 218 re-fetch and the line 223 hlist iteration. The slab is reused (or simply LIST_POISON1-stamped if not yet reused) and the iteration walks attacker-controlled or poison memory in softirq context. Reproducer (no debug shim, stock x86_64 v7.1-rc2 SMP+KASAN, QEMU+KVM): an unprivileged uid=1000 process inside CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_NEWNET installs TCP_MD5SIG + TCP_AO_ADD_KEY on a TCP socket, sprays forged TCP-AO segments toward its eventual 4-tuple via raw sockets, then calls connect(). The md5-wins reconciliation in tcp_connect() fires tcp_ao_destroy_sock(); the softirq backlog reader on the loopback NAPI path crashes on the freed ao->head.first walk: Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xfbd59c000000002f KASAN: maybe wild-memory-access in range [0xdead000000000178-0xdead00000000017f] CPU: 0 UID: 1000 PID: 100 Comm: repro_userns RIP: 0010:__tcp_ao_do_lookup+0x107/0x1c0 Call Trace: <IRQ> __tcp_ao_do_lookup+0x107/0x1c0 tcp_ao_inbound_lookup.constprop.0+0x12a/0x200 tcp_inbound_ao_hash+0x5ea/0x1520 tcp_inbound_hash+0x7ce/0x1240 tcp_v4_rcv+0x1e7a/0x3e10 ... Restore the RCU grace period: re-add struct rcu_head to tcp_ao_info and replace the synchronous tcp_ao_info_free() with a call_rcu() callback. Readers that captured tp->ao_info before rcu_assign_pointer NULLed it now see the object remain valid until rcu_read_unlock(). With the patch applied the reproducer runs cleanly for 2000 iterations on the same kernel build.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ntfs: avoid calling post_write_mst_fixup() for invalid index_block ntfs_icx_ib_sync_write() calls post_write_mst_fixup() when ntfs_ib_write() returns an error, intending to restore the buffer after a failed write. However, ntfs_ib_write() returns an error immediately if pre_write_mst_fixup() validation fails. The caller, ntfs_icx_ib_sync_write(), interprets any error as a write failure requiring rollback. It does not differentiate between I/O errors and validation failures, and calls post_write_mst_fixup() anyway. Since post_write_mst_fixup() assumes that the index_block contents is correct, it doesn't perform the boundary checks, which results in out-of-bounds memory access. An attacker can craft a malicious NTFS image with: - large index_block.usa_ofs offset, pointing outside the ntfs_record - index_block.usa_count = 0, causing integer underflow - or index_block.usa_count larger than actual number of sectors in the ntfs_record, causing out-of-bounds access KASAN reports describing the memory corruption: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in post_write_mst_fixup+0x19c/0x1d0 Read of size 2 at addr ffff8881586c9018 by task p/9428 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x100/0x190 print_report+0x139/0x4ad ? post_write_mst_fixup+0x19c/0x1d0 ? __virt_addr_valid+0x262/0x500 ? post_write_mst_fixup+0x19c/0x1d0 kasan_report+0xe4/0x1d0 ? post_write_mst_fixup+0x19c/0x1d0 post_write_mst_fixup+0x19c/0x1d0 ntfs_icx_ib_sync_write+0x179/0x220 ntfs_inode_sync_filename+0x83d/0x1080 __ntfs_write_inode+0x1049/0x1480 ntfs_file_fsync+0x131/0x9b0 ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in post_write_mst_fixup+0x1aa/0x1d0 Write of size 2 at addr ffff8881586c91fe by task p/9428 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x100/0x190 print_report+0x139/0x4ad ? post_write_mst_fixup+0x1aa/0x1d0 ? __virt_addr_valid+0x262/0x500 ? post_write_mst_fixup+0x1aa/0x1d0 kasan_report+0xe4/0x1d0 ? post_write_mst_fixup+0x1aa/0x1d0 post_write_mst_fixup+0x1aa/0x1d0 ntfs_icx_ib_sync_write+0x179/0x220 ntfs_inode_sync_filename+0x83d/0x1080 __ntfs_write_inode+0x1049/0x1480 ntfs_file_fsync+0x131/0x9b0 ================================================================== Let's move the post_write_mst_fixup() call to ntfs_ib_write(). The ntfs_ib_write() function calls pre_write_mst_fixup() at the beginning. If the index_block contents is invalid, pre_write_mst_fixup() fails and ntfs_ib_write() returns early without calling post_write_mst_fixup() on bad index_block.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: io_uring/nop: fix file reference leak with IOSQE_FIXED_FILE NOP file-acquisition support choses between a fixed (registered) file and a normal fget()'d file based on its own IORING_NOP_FIXED_FILE flag in sqe->nop_flags. However, a request's REQ_F_FIXED_FILE is set independently from the generic IOSQE_FIXED_FILE sqe flag during request init, before the issue handler runs. If a NOP is submitted with IOSQE_FIXED_FILE set (so REQ_F_FIXED_FILE is set) but without IORING_NOP_FIXED_FILE, io_nop() takes the normal path and grabs a real reference via io_file_get_normal(). On completion, io_put_file() only drops the reference when REQ_F_FIXED_FILE is clear, so the fget()'d file is never released and leaks: BUG: memory leak unreferenced object 0xffff88800f42c240 (size 176): kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x358/0x440 alloc_empty_file+0x57/0x180 path_openat+0x44/0x1e50 do_file_open+0x121/0x200 do_sys_openat2+0xa7/0x150 __x64_sys_openat+0x82/0xf0 Decide between fixed and normal file acquisition from REQ_F_FIXED_FILE, the same way io_assign_file() does for every other opcode, and fold IORING_NOP_FIXED_FILE into REQ_F_FIXED_FILE at prep time.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: writeback: fix race between cgroup_writeback_umount() and inode_switch_wbs() When a container exits, the following BUG_ON() is occasionally triggered: ================================================================== VFS: Busy inodes after unmount of sdb (ext4) ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at fs/super.c:695! CPU: 3 PID: 6 Comm: containerd-shim Tainted: G OE K 6.6 #1 pstate: 63400009 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO +TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : generic_shutdown_super+0xf0/0x100 lr : generic_shutdown_super+0xf0/0x100 Call trace: generic_shutdown_super+0xf0/0x100 kill_block_super+0x20/0x48 ext4_kill_sb+0x28/0x60 deactivate_locked_super+0x54/0x130 deactivate_super+0x84/0xa0 cleanup_mnt+0xa4/0x140 __cleanup_mnt+0x18/0x28 task_work_run+0x78/0xe0 do_notify_resume+0x204/0x240 ================================================================== The root cause is a race between cgroup_writeback_umount() and inode_switch_wbs()/cleanup_offline_cgwb(). There is a window between inode_prepare_wbs_switch() returning true and the subsequent wb_queue_isw() call. Following is the process that triggers the issue: CPU A (umount) | CPU B (writeback) ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ inode_switch_wbs/cleanup_offline_cgwb atomic_inc(&isw_nr_in_flight) inode_prepare_wbs_switch -> passes SB_ACTIVE check __iget(inode) generic_shutdown_super sb->s_flags &= ~SB_ACTIVE cgroup_writeback_umount(sb) smp_mb() atomic_read(&isw_nr_in_flight) rcu_barrier() -> no pending RCU callbacks flush_workqueue(isw_wq) -> nothing queued, returns evict_inodes(sb) -> Inode skipped as isw still holds a ref. sop->put_super(sb) /* destroys percpu counters */ -> VFS: Busy inodes after unmount! wb_queue_isw() queue_work(isw_wq, ...) /* later in work function */ inode_switch_wbs_work_fn process_inode_switch_wbs iput() -> evict percpu_counter_dec() // UAF! Fix this by extending the RCU read-side critical section in inode_switch_wbs() and cleanup_offline_cgwb() to cover from inode_prepare_wbs_switch() through wb_queue_isw(). Since there is no sleep in this window, rcu_read_lock() can be used. Then add a synchronize_rcu() in cgroup_writeback_umount() before the existing rcu_barrier(), so that all in-flight switchers that have passed the SB_ACTIVE check have completed queue_work() before flush_workqueue() is called. The existing rcu_barrier() is intentionally retained so this fix can be backported unchanged to stable kernels (5.10.y, 6.6.y, ...) that still queue switches via queue_rcu_work(). It is a no-op on current mainline (since commit e1b849cfa6b6 ("writeback: Avoid contention on wb->list_lock when switching inodes")) and is removed in a follow-up patch.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cpufreq: pcc: fix use-after-free and double free in _OSC evaluation pcc_cpufreq_do_osc() calls acpi_evaluate_object() twice for the two-phase _OSC negotiation. Between the two calls it freed output.pointer but left output.length unchanged. Since acpi_evaluate_object() treats a non-zero length with a non-NULL pointer as an existing buffer to write into, the second call wrote into freed memory (use-after-free). The subsequent kfree(output.pointer) at out_free then freed the same pointer a second time (double free). Reset output.pointer to NULL and output.length to ACPI_ALLOCATE_BUFFER after freeing the first result, so ACPICA allocates a fresh buffer for each phase independently.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Reject fragmented frames in devmap Devmap broadcast redirects clone the packet for all but the last destination. For native XDP, that clone path copies only the linear xdp_frame data, while fragmented frames keep skb_shared_info in tailroom outside the linear area. Cloning such a frame leaves XDP_FLAGS_HAS_FRAGS set but without valid frag metadata, and the later free path can interpret uninitialized tail data as skb_shared_info, leading to an out-of-bounds access during frame return. Reject fragmented native XDP frames in dev_map_enqueue_clone(). Add the same restriction to the generic XDP clone path in dev_map_redirect_clone(). Generic XDP represents fragmented packets as nonlinear skbs, and rejecting them here keeps clone-based broadcast support aligned between native and generic XDP.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mt76: mt7921/mt7925: fix NULL dereference in CSA beacon This patch is based on a BUG as reported by Bongani Hlope at https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260502125824.425d7159@bongani-mini.home.org.za/ When a channel-switch announcement (CSA) beacon is received, cfg80211 queues a wiphy work item that eventually calls mt7921_channel_switch_rx_beacon(). If the station disconnects (or the channel context is otherwise torn down) between the time the work is queued and the time it runs, the driver's dev->new_ctx pointer can already have been cleared to NULL. mt7921_channel_switch_rx_beacon() then dereferences new_ctx unconditionally, triggering a NULL pointer dereference at address 0x0: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 RIP: 0010:mt7921_channel_switch_rx_beacon+0x1f/0x100 [mt7921_common] The same missing guard exists in mt7925_channel_switch_rx_beacon(), which shares the same code pattern introduced by the same commit. Add an early-return NULL check for dev->new_ctx in both mt7921_channel_switch_rx_beacon() and mt7925_channel_switch_rx_beacon(). When new_ctx is NULL there is no pending channel switch to process, so returning immediately is the correct and safe action. Oops-Analysis: http://oops.fenrus.org/reports/lkml/20260502125824.425d7159@bongani-mini.home.org.za/report.html

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: i2c: imx-lpi2c: mark I2C adapter when hardware is powered down On some i.MX platforms, certain I2C client drivers keep a periodic workqueue which continues to trigger I2C transfers. During system suspend/resume, there exists a time window between: - suspend_noirq and the system entering suspend - the system starting to resume and resume_noirq In this window, the I2C controller resources such as clock and pinctrl may already be disabled or not yet restored. If a workqueue triggers an I2C transfer in this period, the driver attempts to access I2C registers while the hardware resources are unavailable, which may lead to system hang. Mark the I2C adapter as suspended during noirq suspend and block new transfers until resume, ensuring that I2C transfers are only issued when hardware resources are available.

FFmpeg through 8.1.2, fixed in commit 5d7112c, contains a heap out-of-bounds write vulnerability in the vf_hqdn3d filter that allows attackers to corrupt heap memory by supplying a crafted video whose frame resolution increases between frames when filtergraph reinitialization is disabled via the -reinit_filter 0 option. Attackers can provide a malicious video input where vf_hqdn3d.config_input() allocates undersized per-plane line-history buffers based on the initial frame width, and subsequent larger frames cause denoise_spatial() to write beyond the allocation boundary, resulting in heap memory corruption.

In epa4all, prior to version 2026-05-20, an attacker on the network path between epa4all and any backend (ePA Aktensystem, Konnektor, IDP, TSS) can present a self-signed TLS certificate and intercept the connection. For non-VAU connections (Konnektor, IDP), this allows direct read and modification of the inner traffic, including smartcard operations and OIDC authentication exchanges. For the ePA backend, the disabled TLS verification is the transport-level enabler for the VAU MITM described in GHSA-vvh7-x6c7-46gh. This issue has been patched in version 2026-05-20.

In epa4all, prior to version 2026-05-20, an attacker who can intercept the TLS connection between epa4all and the ePA backend can complete the VAU handshake with attacker-controlled keys and obtain the session encryption keys. All inner HTTP traffic (patient consent decisions, medication data, document operations, authorization tokens, and entitlement queries) becomes readable and modifiable. The attacker can also inject arbitrary requests through the hijacked channel. This issue has been patched in version 2026-05-20.

Inefficient Algorithmic Complexity vulnerability in mtrudel bandit allows unauthenticated remote denial of service via CPU exhaustion during WebSocket fragment reassembly. The size guard 'Elixir.Bandit.WebSocket.Connection':oversize_message?/2 called from handle_frame/3 in lib/bandit/websocket/connection.ex appends each non-final continuation frame to a left-nested iolist and then re-measures the entire accumulated buffer with IO.iodata_length/1 on every frame. Because the buffer grows by one element per frame and is fully re-traversed each time, reassembly work is quadratic (O(n^2)) in the number of continuation frames. The max_fragmented_message_size limit (default 8 MB) bounds total bytes but not frame count, and each frame can carry as little as one payload byte, so an attacker can send millions of tiny continuation frames using modest bandwidth to pin a CPU core for minutes to hours. Many concurrent connections can starve the whole server of CPU, denying service to legitimate users. The WebSocket read timeout does not help, because it is an idle timeout evaluated between reads and cannot preempt the synchronous reassembly work spent inside a single callback. This issue affects bandit: from 1.11.0 before 1.12.1.

In Eclipse BaSyx Go Components versions up to and including 1.0.0, ABAC-enabled deployments are vulnerable to an authorization bypass caused by inconsistent trailing-slash handling between the ABAC middleware and the HTTP router. The shared router configuration used Chi's `middleware.StripSlashes`, so a request such as `GET /shells/` was dispatched to the registered `GET /shells` route. However, the ABAC middleware evaluated the original request path including the trailing slash. If ABAC route lookup did not find a matching slash-suffixed route, the request was passed onward and the router then stripped the slash and executed the protected handler without the intended ABAC authorization decision and without the expected ABAC query filters. An unauthenticated or unauthorized network attacker could append a trailing slash to protected API routes to reach handlers that should have been denied by ABAC policy. Depending on the exposed component, HTTP method, and deployed policy, this could allow unauthorized read, create, update, delete, or upload operations. The issue affects ABAC-enabled deployments of services that use the shared router and ABAC middleware, including AAS Repository, Submodel Repository, AAS Registry, Submodel Registry, Concept Description Repository, Discovery, AAS Environment upload, and related services. The issue is fixed in Eclipse BaSyx Go Components v1.0.1.