In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: qualcomm: rmnet: validate MAP frame length before ingress parsing When ingress deaggregation is disabled, rmnet_map_ingress_handler() passes the skb straight to __rmnet_map_ingress_handler(), skipping the length validation that rmnet_map_deaggregate() performs on the aggregated path. The parser then dereferences the MAP header and csum header/trailer based on the on-wire pkt_len without checking skb->len, so a short frame is read out of bounds: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in rmnet_map_checksum_downlink_packet Read of size 1 at addr ffff88801118ed00 by task exploit/147 Call Trace: ... rmnet_map_checksum_downlink_packet (drivers/net/ethernet/qualcomm/rmnet/rmnet_map_data.c:413) __rmnet_map_ingress_handler (drivers/net/ethernet/qualcomm/rmnet/rmnet_handlers.c:96) rmnet_rx_handler (drivers/net/ethernet/qualcomm/rmnet/rmnet_handlers.c:129) __netif_receive_skb_core.constprop.0 (net/core/dev.c:6089) netif_receive_skb (net/core/dev.c:6460) tun_get_user (drivers/net/tun.c:1955) tun_chr_write_iter (drivers/net/tun.c:2001) vfs_write (fs/read_write.c:688) ksys_write (fs/read_write.c:740) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94) ... Factor that validation out of rmnet_map_deaggregate() into rmnet_map_validate_packet_len() and run it on the no-aggregation path too. The MAP header is bounds-checked first, since this path can receive a frame shorter than the header.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: bpa10x: avoid OOB read of revision string in bpa10x_setup() bpa10x_setup() sends the vendor command 0xfc0e and passes the response to bt_dev_info() and hci_set_fw_info() as a "%s" string starting at skb->data + 1, without checking the length: bt_dev_info(hdev, "%s", (char *)(skb->data + 1)); hci_set_fw_info(hdev, "%s", skb->data + 1); A device that returns a one-byte response (status only) leaves skb->data + 1 past the end of the data, and the %s walk reads adjacent slab memory until it meets a NUL. The same happens when the payload is not NUL-terminated within skb->len. The out-of-bounds bytes end up in the kernel log and the firmware-info debugfs file. Print the revision string with a bounded "%.*s" limited to skb->len - 1 instead. This keeps the string readable for well-behaved devices while never reading past the received data, and does not fail setup, so a device returning a short or unterminated response keeps working.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf, sockmap: reject overflowing copy + len in bpf_msg_push_data() When the scatterlist ring is full or nearly full, bpf_msg_push_data() enters a copy fallback path and computes copy + len for the page allocation size. Since len comes from BPF with arg3_type = ARG_ANYTHING and both are u32, a crafted len can wrap the sum to a small value, causing an undersized allocation followed by an out-of-bounds memcpy. BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffed104089a402 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI Call Trace: __asan_memcpy (mm/kasan/shadow.c:105) bpf_msg_push_data (net/core/filter.c:2852 net/core/filter.c:2788) bpf_prog_9ed8b5711920a7d7+0x2e/0x36 sk_psock_msg_verdict (net/core/skmsg.c:934) tcp_bpf_sendmsg (net/ipv4/tcp_bpf.c:421 net/ipv4/tcp_bpf.c:584) __sys_sendto (net/socket.c:2206) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130) Add an overflow check before the allocation.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: usb: net1080: validate packet_len before pad-byte access in rx_fixup For an even packet_len, net1080_rx_fixup() reads the pad byte at skb->data[packet_len] before the skb->len != packet_len check further down, and packet_len is only bounded against NC_MAX_PACKET. A malicious NetChip 1080 device can send a short frame advertising a large even packet_len (e.g. 0x4000), so the pad-byte read lands past the end of the skb: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in net1080_rx_fixup Read of size 1 at addr ffff8880106c83c6 by task ksoftirqd/0/14 ... net1080_rx_fixup (drivers/net/usb/net1080.c:384) usbnet_bh (drivers/net/usb/usbnet.c:1589) process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3322) bh_worker (kernel/workqueue.c:3708) tasklet_action (kernel/softirq.c:965) handle_softirqs (kernel/softirq.c:622) ... Reject the frame when packet_len >= skb->len before reading.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/edid: fix OOB read in drm_parse_tiled_block() drm_parse_tiled_block() casts the DisplayID block to a struct displayid_tiled_block and reads the full fixed layout up to tile->topology_id[7] without checking block->num_bytes. The DisplayID iterator only validates the declared payload length, so a crafted EDID can advertise a tiled-display block (tag DATA_BLOCK_TILED_DISPLAY, or DATA_BLOCK_2_TILED_DISPLAY_TOPOLOGY for v2.0) with a small num_bytes at the end of a DisplayID extension. The read then runs past the end of the exact-sized kmemdup()'d EDID allocation, a heap out-of-bounds read. Reject blocks shorter than the spec's 22-byte tiled payload before reading the fixed struct, as drm_parse_vesa_mso_data() already does. BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in drm_edid_connector_update Read of size 2 at addr ffff888010077700 by task exploit/147 dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:94 ...) print_report (mm/kasan/report.c:378 ...) kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:595) drm_edid_connector_update (drivers/gpu/drm/drm_edid.c:7581) bochs_connector_helper_get_modes (drivers/gpu/drm/tiny/bochs.c:574) drm_helper_probe_single_connector_modes (drivers/gpu/drm/drm_probe_helper.c:426) status_store (drivers/gpu/drm/drm_sysfs.c:219) ... vfs_write (fs/read_write.c:595 fs/read_write.c:688) ksys_write (fs/read_write.c:740)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net, bpf: check master for NULL in xdp_master_redirect() xdp_master_redirect() dereferences the result of netdev_master_upper_dev_get_rcu() without a NULL check, but that helper returns NULL when the receiving device has no upper-master adjacency. The reach guard only checks netif_is_bond_slave(). On bond slave release bond_upper_dev_unlink() drops the upper-master adjacency before clearing IFF_SLAVE, so an XDP_TX reaching xdp_master_redirect() in that window still passes netif_is_bond_slave() while master is already NULL, and faults on master->flags at offset 0xb0: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000000b0 RIP: 0010:xdp_master_redirect (net/core/filter.c:4432) Call Trace: xdp_master_redirect (net/core/filter.c:4432) bpf_prog_run_generic_xdp (include/net/xdp.h:700) do_xdp_generic (net/core/dev.c:5608) __netif_receive_skb_one_core (net/core/dev.c:6204) process_backlog (net/core/dev.c:6319) __napi_poll (net/core/dev.c:7729) net_rx_action (net/core/dev.c:7792) handle_softirqs (kernel/softirq.c:622) __dev_queue_xmit (include/linux/bottom_half.h:33) packet_sendmsg (net/packet/af_packet.c:3082) __sys_sendto (net/socket.c:2252) Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt The missing check dates back to the original code; commit 1921f91298d1 ("net, bpf: fix null-ptr-deref in xdp_master_redirect() for down master") later added the master->flags read where the fault now lands but kept the unconditional deref. Check master for NULL before use; a NULL master is treated the same as one that is not up.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: crypto: asymmetric_keys - fix OOB read in pefile_digest_pe_contents pefile_digest_pe_contents() computes the trailing-data hash length as pelen - (hashed_bytes + certs_size). A crafted PE can make the addition exceed pelen, causing the unsigned subtraction to underflow to ~4 GiB. This is passed to crypto_shash_update() which reads out of bounds and panics on unmapped vmalloc guard pages. BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffc900038d8000 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI RIP: 0010:sha256_blocks_generic (lib/crypto/sha256.c:152) Call Trace: <TASK> __sha256_update (lib/crypto/sha256.c:208) crypto_sha256_update (crypto/sha256.c:142) verify_pefile_signature (crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c:436) kexec_kernel_verify_pe_sig (kernel/kexec_file.c:151) __do_sys_kexec_file_load (kernel/kexec_file.c:406) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121) </TASK> Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception Validate that the addition does not overflow and the result does not exceed pelen before the subtraction. Return -ELIBBAD on failure.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tipc: fix use-after-free of the discoverer in tipc_disc_rcv() bearer_disable() frees b->disc with tipc_disc_delete()'s plain kfree(), but tipc_disc_rcv() still dereferences b->disc in RX softirq under rcu_read_lock() (tipc_udp_recv -> tipc_rcv -> tipc_disc_rcv). L2 bearers are safe thanks to the synchronize_net() in tipc_disable_l2_media(), but the UDP bearer defers that call to the cleanup_bearer() workqueue, so the discoverer is freed with no grace period: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in tipc_disc_rcv (net/tipc/discover.c:149) Read of size 8 at addr ffff88802348b728 by task poc_tipc/184 <IRQ> tipc_disc_rcv (net/tipc/discover.c:149) tipc_rcv (net/tipc/node.c:2126) tipc_udp_recv (net/tipc/udp_media.c:391) udp_rcv (net/ipv4/udp.c:2643) ip_local_deliver_finish (net/ipv4/ip_input.c:241) </IRQ> Freed by task 181: kfree (mm/slub.c:6565) bearer_disable (net/tipc/bearer.c:418) tipc_nl_bearer_disable (net/tipc/bearer.c:1001) The bearer is freed with kfree_rcu(); free the discoverer the same way. Add an rcu_head to struct tipc_discoverer and free it and its skb from an RCU callback. Because the RCU callback (tipc_disc_free_rcu) lives in module text, a call_rcu() that is still pending when the tipc module is unloaded would invoke a freed function. Add an rcu_barrier() to tipc_exit() after the bearer subsystem has been torn down, so all pending discoverer callbacks have run before the module text goes away. Reachable from an unprivileged user namespace: the TIPCv2 genl family is netnsok and its bearer commands have no GENL_ADMIN_PERM. Needs CONFIG_TIPC and CONFIG_TIPC_MEDIA_UDP.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv6: ndisc: fix NULL deref in accept_untracked_na() accept_untracked_na() re-fetches the inet6_dev with __in6_dev_get(dev) and dereferences idev->cnf.accept_untracked_na without a NULL check, even though its only caller ndisc_recv_na() already fetched and NULL-checked idev for the same device. Both reads of dev->ip6_ptr run in the same RCU read-side critical section, but a concurrent addrconf_ifdown() can clear dev->ip6_ptr between them: lowering the MTU below IPV6_MIN_MTU calls addrconf_ifdown() without the synchronize_net() that orders the unregister path, so the re-fetch returns NULL and oopses: BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in ndisc_recv_na (net/ipv6/ndisc.c:974) Read of size 4 at addr 0000000000000364 Call Trace: <IRQ> ndisc_recv_na (net/ipv6/ndisc.c:974) icmpv6_rcv (net/ipv6/icmp.c:1193) ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu (net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:479) ip6_input_finish (net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:534) ip6_input (net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:545) ip6_mc_input (net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:635) ipv6_rcv (net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:351) </IRQ> It is reachable by an unprivileged user via a network namespace. Pass the caller's already validated idev instead of re-fetching it; the idev stays alive for the whole RCU critical section, so it is safe even after dev->ip6_ptr has been cleared.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usbnet: gl620a: fix out-of-bounds read in genelink_rx_fixup() genelink_rx_fixup() splits an aggregated RX frame into its individual packets, using a per-packet length taken from device-supplied data. That length is only bounded by GL_MAX_PACKET_LEN (1514); it is never compared against how many bytes were actually received. A malicious GeneLink (GL620A) device can therefore send a short URB whose header claims packet_count > 1 and a first packet of up to 1514 bytes. skb_put_data(gl_skb, packet->packet_data, size); then copies past the end of the receive buffer and hands the adjacent slab contents up the network stack, an out-of-bounds read that leaks kernel heap. No privilege is required: the path runs in the usbnet RX softirq as soon as the interface is up. BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in genelink_rx_fixup (drivers/net/usb/gl620a.c:112) Read of size 1514 at addr ffff888011309708 by task ksoftirqd/0/14 Call Trace: ... __asan_memcpy (mm/kasan/shadow.c:105) genelink_rx_fixup (include/linux/skbuff.h:2814 drivers/net/usb/gl620a.c:112) usbnet_bh (drivers/net/usb/usbnet.c:572 drivers/net/usb/usbnet.c:1589) process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3322) bh_worker (kernel/workqueue.c:3405) tasklet_action (kernel/softirq.c:965) handle_softirqs (kernel/softirq.c:622) run_ksoftirqd (kernel/softirq.c:1076) ... skb_pull() already verifies that the requested length fits the buffer and returns NULL otherwise. Move it ahead of the copy and check its result, so a packet that overruns the received data is rejected before it is read. Well-formed frames, whose packets are fully present, are unaffected.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: eir: Fix stack OOB write when prepending the Flags AD eir_create_adv_data() builds the advertising data into a fixed-size buffer ("size", 31 for the legacy path). It may prepend a 3-byte "Flags" AD structure (LE_AD_NO_BREDR on an LE-only controller) and then copies the per-instance data without checking that it still fits: memcpy(ptr, adv->adv_data, adv->adv_data_len); tlv_data_max_len() only reserves those 3 bytes when the user-supplied flags carry a managed-flags bit, so an instance added with flags == 0 is accepted with adv_data_len up to the full buffer. At advertise time the flags are still prepended, and the memcpy() writes 3 + adv_data_len bytes into the size-byte buffer: BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in eir_create_adv_data (net/bluetooth/eir.c:301) Write of size 31 at addr ffff88800a547bdc by task kworker/u9:0/65 Workqueue: hci0 hci_cmd_sync_work __asan_memcpy (mm/kasan/shadow.c:106) eir_create_adv_data (net/bluetooth/eir.c:301) hci_update_adv_data_sync (net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:1310) hci_schedule_adv_instance_sync (net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:1817) hci_cmd_sync_work (net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:332) This frame has 1 object: [32, 64) 'cp' The "Flags" structure is added by the kernel, not requested by userspace, so only prepend it when it fits together with the instance advertising data; when there is no room for both, drop the flags rather than the user-provided data. Reachable by a local user with CAP_NET_ADMIN owning an LE-only controller on the legacy advertising path.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv6: Fix null-ptr-deref in fib6_nh_mtu_change(). fib6_nh_mtu_change() re-fetches idev via __in6_dev_get(arg->dev) and dereferences idev->cnf.mtu6 without a NULL check. addrconf_ifdown() clears dev->ip6_ptr with RCU_INIT_POINTER() after rt6_disable_ip() has released tb6_lock, so the RA-driven MTU walk can observe a NULL idev and oops. The caller rt6_mtu_change_route() guards its own __in6_dev_get(), but this re-fetch is unguarded; nexthop-backed routes survive addrconf_ifdown()'s flush, so the walk still reaches it after ip6_ptr is nulled. Return 0 when idev is NULL, matching rt6_mtu_change_route() and the fib6_mtu() fix in commit 5ad509c1fdad ("ipv6: Fix null-ptr-deref in fib6_mtu()."). Oops: general protection fault, ... KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x00000000000002a8-0x00000000000002af] RIP: 0010:fib6_nh_mtu_change+0x203/0x990 rt6_mtu_change_route+0x141/0x1d0 __fib6_clean_all+0xd0/0x160 rt6_mtu_change+0xb4/0x100 ndisc_router_discovery+0x24b5/0x2cb0 icmpv6_rcv+0x12e9/0x1710 ipv6_rcv+0x39b/0x410

Astro is a web framework for content-driven websites. In versions 1.0.0 through 4.0.18, the source.title and enclosure.type item fields in packages/astro-rss/src/index.ts are interpolated directly into XML template strings without XML-character escaping before being parsed by fast-xml-parser. Both fields are validated only as z.string(), placing no restriction on XML special characters. An attacker who controls these values can inject arbitrary XML into the generated RSS feed: a value containing " can break out of an attribute (as with enclosure.type), and a value containing </source> can close an element early and inject additional nodes (as with source.title). This corrupts feed structure, injects false metadata (for example, a fake <link> pointing to a malicious URL), and can cause feed readers to misparse or display attacker-controlled content. In SSR mode (output: 'server'), the poisoned feed is served on every request to all subscribers. This issue has been fixed in version 4.0.19.

A buffer overflow was addressed with improved bounds checking. This issue is fixed in iOS 26.5.2 and iPadOS 26.5.2, macOS Sequoia 15.7.8, macOS Sonoma 14.8.8, macOS Tahoe 26.5.2, tvOS 26.6, visionOS 26.6, watchOS 26.6. A malicious accessory may be able to cause unexpected app termination.

apple

A buffer overflow was addressed with improved bounds checking. This issue is fixed in iOS 26.6 and iPadOS 26.6, macOS Sequoia 15.7.8, macOS Tahoe 26.6. Processing a maliciously crafted file may lead to unexpected app termination or arbitrary code execution.

apple

A buffer overflow was addressed with improved bounds checking. This issue is fixed in macOS Sequoia 15.7.8, macOS Sonoma 14.8.8, macOS Tahoe 26.6. An app may be able to execute arbitrary code out of its sandbox or with certain elevated privileges.

apple

A buffer overflow was addressed with improved bounds checking. This issue is fixed in macOS Sequoia 15.7.8, macOS Sonoma 14.8.8, macOS Tahoe 26.6. A local user may be able to read kernel memory.

apple

A buffer overflow was addressed with improved bounds checking. This issue is fixed in macOS Sequoia 15.7.8, macOS Sonoma 14.8.8, macOS Tahoe 26.6. Processing a maliciously crafted image may lead to arbitrary code execution.

apple

A buffer overflow was addressed with improved bounds checking. This issue is fixed in iOS 26.6 and iPadOS 26.6, macOS Tahoe 26.6, tvOS 26.6, watchOS 26.6. Connecting to a malicious NFS server may lead to kernel memory corruption.

apple

Build readers can access another repository's environment properties. A caller with read access to an ordinary repository can select a readable repository parameter while retrieving environment properties for a protected build, exposing build environment secrets (confidentiality impact; no integrity or availability impact demonstrated).

jfrog

An authorization weakness in JFrog Artifactory internal metadata handling could allow a user with limited repository access to write to restricted internal metadata areas under specific conditions. Successful abuse is limited to integrity and availability impact at a low level; confidentiality is not affected.

jfrog

A path validation weakness in archive extraction/write handling allows entries with traversal sequences to be written outside the intended build artifacts location.

jfrog