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Pivotick contains an uncontrolled-recursion vulnerability when processing caller-supplied graph and node data. The affected graph algorithms recursively traversed graph edges, while the JSON viewer recursively processed each level of a node’s data structure. A specially crafted graph containing an excessively long path, deeply nested properties, or circular object references could therefore exhaust the JavaScript call stack when Pivotick calculates a layout or displays a node in the inspection modal. Successful exploitation may cause an uncaught exception, freeze the affected page, or crash the browser tab, resulting in a client-side denial of service. No confidentiality or integrity impact has been identified. The patch replaces the recursive graph traversals with iterative stack-based implementations and limits the reachability calculation to 1,000,000 edge traversals. It also limits JSON rendering to 64 levels and detects circular references before descending further into an object.
Pivotick fails to sanitize attacker-controlled SVG markup supplied through the per-node style.svgIcon property before inserting it into the document. When rendering a graph node, the vulnerable code assigns the SVG icon markup directly to the innerHTML property of a live SVG element. An attacker able to influence graph data can provide crafted markup containing executable event handlers, such as an <image> element with an onerror attribute. When a victim loads or renders the malicious graph, the payload may execute arbitrary JavaScript in the security context of the application embedding Pivotick. Successful exploitation could allow the attacker to access application data available to the victim, modify displayed content, or perform actions using the victim’s authenticated session. Exploitation requires an application using Pivotick to render graph data that is controlled or modified by an attacker.
Lookyloo did not enforce limits on the decompressed size of uploaded capture archives and compressed HAR files. An attacker could submit a specially crafted ZIP, gzip, or zlib-compressed capture containing data that expands to a very large size during processing. Because the application decompressed this content directly in memory without first limiting the output size, processing the malicious capture could exhaust available memory, terminate a web or worker process, or make the Lookyloo instance unavailable. The vulnerability affects both full Lookyloo capture archive imports and API submissions containing gzip-compressed HAR data. Repeated exploitation could cause a persistent denial-of-service condition until the affected processes or instance are restarted. The patch introduces: * A 1 GB cumulative uncompressed-size limit for imported capture archives. * Size-limited gzip and zlib decompression for compressed HAR files. * Explicit detection and handling of suspected zip bombs. * An HTTP 400 response when an oversized compressed HAR file is submitted through the API.