IBM Business Automation Workflow containers and traditional 26.0.0, 25.0.0 through 25.0.0 Interim Fix 005, 24.0.1 through 24.0.1 Interim Fix 007, and 24.0.0 through 24.0.0 Interim Fix 009 IBM Business Automation Workflow fails to properly verify that the hostname matches the server certificate potentially allowing connections to an attacker-controlled server.

Issue summary: A malicious TLS server can cause a memory leak in a TLS client that has enabled OCSP response checking by sending an OCSP response that contains no single response entries. Impact summary: An attacker can leak an attacker-tunable amount of memory per TLS handshake in a victim client application. A long-running client that repeatedly connects to a malicious server can have its memory exhausted, resulting in a Denial of Service. CWE: CWE-401: Missing Release of Memory after Effective Lifetime Description: The affected function is called during X.509 certificate chain verification when OCSP response checking is enabled with the X509_V_FLAG_OCSP_RESP_CHECK or X509_V_FLAG_OCSP_RESP_CHECK_ALL verification flags, for example when a TLS client verifies an OCSP response stapled into the TLS handshake by the server. When the received BasicOCSPResponse contains an empty SEQUENCE OF SingleResponse, which is permitted on the wire and accepted by the OpenSSL decoder, the OCSP_BASICRESP structure allocated by OCSP_response_get1_basic() was not freed because an early return bypassed the cleanup code at the end of the function. The amount of memory leaked per handshake can be amplified by the attacker by padding the certs field of the BasicOCSPResponse with bogus certificates, which are parsed and stored in the leaked structure before the empty response check triggers the early return. A long-running TLS client that repeatedly connects to a malicious server can have its memory exhausted over time. OCSP response checking is not enabled by default. Only client applications that explicitly enable the OCSP response check verification flags are affected. FIPS impact: no The FIPS modules in 4.0 and 3.6 are not affected by this issue as the affected code is outside the OpenSSL FIPS module boundary.

Mistral Vibe before 2.23.3 contains a remote code execution vulnerability that allows attackers to execute arbitrary commands by embedding a malicious core.fsmonitor hook in a repository's .git/config file, which is triggered when vibe invokes git status --porcelain without suppressing hook execution. Attackers can distribute or create a crafted repository containing a malicious fsmonitor entry to achieve arbitrary command execution with the victim's full privileges when any vibe command is run inside that repository.

Zosi C519M V4.2.8.823C01450BA is vulnerable to Incorrect Access Control. The application contains hardcoded credentials in the RTSP authentication mechanism. An attacker with network access can use the unchangeable default credentials to access the RTSP video stream, resulting in unauthorized viewing of camera footage.

Cotonti CMS's Comments plugin deserializes user-supplied data without restricting the classes that may be instantiated. In plugins/comments/controllers/actions/CreateAction.php, a `ci` POST parameter obtained via `cot_import('ci', 'P', 'TXT')` (trim-only sanitization) is passed to `unserialize(base64_decode($ci))` with no `allowed_classes` restriction, reachable by any member with write access to comments (the default `Auth_members => 'RW'` setting in plugins/comments/comments.setup.php). In plugins/comments/controllers/actions/EditAction.php, a `cb` parameter is similarly deserialized via `unserialize(base64_decode($this->comeback))` in prepareComeBack(), reachable by any member editing their own comment. Because unserialize() is called without allowed_classes, an attacker can construct a serialized PHP object of any class loaded by Cotonti (a PHP Object Injection primitive). This was demonstrated in practice using Cotonti's own MySQL_cache class: a crafted serialized MySQL_cache object, once deserialized and later garbage-collected, triggers its __destruct()->flush() chain, causing an attacker-controlled INSERT INTO cot_cache with attacker-chosen row values — confirming genuine POP-chain exploitation, with further impact (including potential RCE) contingent on other gadget chains available in a given Cotonti installation's loaded classes. A third sink in DeleteAction.php contains the identical unserialize() pattern but is gated behind an admin-only authorization check and is not reachable by ordinary members.

Statamic CMS's user-augmentation resolver, AugmentedUser::get() in src/Auth/AugmentedUser.php, contains an explicit case for the `two_factor_recovery_codes` handle that returns the user's raw two-factor recovery codes with no access restriction: `if ($handle === 'two_factor_recovery_codes') { return new Value($this->data->get('two_factor_recovery_codes'), ...); }`. Unlike sensitive fields such as password/password_hash, which are excluded from AugmentedUser entirely, two_factor_recovery_codes is neither excluded from augmentation nor present in Statamic's Antlers variable guard lists (guardedVariablePatterns/guardedContentVariablePatterns in src/Providers/ViewServiceProvider.php, and the runtime GlobalRuntimeState guard paths), which by default only guard config.app.key. On any Antlers template field where raw/dynamic template rendering is enabled for a given field (an admin/developer-configured, blueprint-level field option), a template such as `{{ current_user.two_factor_recovery_codes }}{{ value }}|{{ /current_user.two_factor_recovery_codes }}` renders the viewing user's own 2FA recovery codes directly into the HTML response, allowing an attacker who can view or capture that response (e.g. via a shared/observable page, or a crafted link causing a victim to render it) to obtain the codes and bypass 2FA. Exploitation requires that dynamic Antlers rendering already be enabled on a field the target user's data flows through, which is a blueprint-configuration privilege rather than a standard content-editing permission.

The NASA-AMMOS Asynchronous Network Management System (ANMS) reference implementation's default docker-compose.yml publishes the amp-manager service's REST API directly to the host network interface (port 8089, e.g. "${ION_MGR_PORT:-8089}:8089/tcp") with cap_add: NET_ADMIN, NET_RAW, SYS_NICE, bypassing the CAM (Configuration and Access Manager) gateway that is otherwise the system's sole authentication boundary. The underlying REST server, implemented with CivetWeb in JHUAPL/dtnma-tools (src/refdm/nm_rest.c), is configured with enable_auth_domain_check set to "no" and registers every route, including the DTNMA agent command-dispatch endpoints (.../agents/{eid|idx}/send, which accept and forward EXECSET-encoded command sets to a registered DTNMA agent), with a null authentication callback. Any network-reachable client can therefore enumerate registered agents, submit arbitrary command sets to them, and clear stored reports, entirely without credentials. This affects NASA-AMMOS/anms and JHUAPL-DTNMA/dtnma-tools as published; both repositories present this as a reference/ground DTN network-management implementation and testbed, and the affected components communicate with DTNMA agents (which may represent simulated or real spacecraft/ground nodes depending on deployment) rather than being flight software running onboard a spacecraft.

Fledge's backup-restore upload handler, upload_backup() (python/fledge/services/core/api/backup_restore.py), calls tarfile.extractall(temp_path) on an admin-uploaded tar archive with no filter argument and no per-member path validation. A crafted tar archive containing member names with `../` path components extracts files outside the intended temporary directory, allowing arbitrary file writes anywhere on the filesystem reachable by the Fledge process. Requires the admin role (@has_permission("admin")).

ChirpStack's SQLite-backend device tag filtering (chirpstack/src/storage/device.rs, in both get_count() and list()) interpolates the user-supplied tag KEY directly into a raw SQL fragment via Rust's format!() macro (`dsl::sql::<Bool>(&format!("device.tags->>'{}' =", k)).bind::<Text, _>(v)`), while only the tag VALUE is safely parameter-bound via Diesel's .bind(). An authenticated user with device-list access can inject SQL via a crafted tag key when the SQLite backend (chirpstack-sqlite package) is in use; the PostgreSQL backend is unaffected as it uses Diesel's native JSONB containment operator instead of raw SQL string formatting.

rust-iot-platform allows creating a "calc rule" via POST /calc-rule/create (api/src/controller/calc_rule_router.rs) containing an arbitrary `script` field. This route does not take the AuthToken request guard used elsewhere in the application, making it reachable without authentication. The stored script is subsequently executed via quick_js::Context::eval() in api/src/biz/calc_run_biz.rs with no sandboxing, allowing an unauthenticated attacker to achieve arbitrary JavaScript execution in the server process by creating and triggering a malicious calc rule.

rust-iot-platform's AuthToken request-guard implementation (api/src/main.rs) only checks whether the Authorization HTTP header is present, and never validates its value against any session, token store, or signature. Any request carrying an arbitrary non-empty Authorization header (e.g. `Authorization: fake`) satisfies the guard, granting access to every endpoint protected only by this request guard.

OpenBK7231T's CHANNEL_SetLabel() (src/cmnds/cmd_channels.c) stores channel labels received via the MQTT SetChannelLabel command using strdup() with no HTML sanitization. CHANNEL_GetLabel() returns these labels unsanitized, and they are rendered via hprintf255() at 15+ locations in src/httpserver/http_fns.c with no HTML encoding. An attacker with MQTT broker access (commonly unauthenticated in real deployments) can set a channel label containing a <script> payload that executes when any user views the device's web panel.

Node-RED's local-filesystem library storage module (getLibraryEntry() and saveLibraryEntry() in packages/node_modules/@node-red/runtime/lib/storage/localfilesystem/library.js), reachable via GET/POST /library/:lib/:type/*path, joins the user-supplied path parameter directly into the filesystem path via fspath.join(libDir, type, path) with no traversal sanitization, containment check, or path normalization/prefix verification. An authenticated user (including read-only-scoped tokens for the read path) can supply a path containing `../` sequences to read arbitrary files outside the library directory; a user with write access can write arbitrary files, enabling remote code execution via SSH authorized_keys or cron injection. This is a distinct, separately unpatched traversal from the previously fixed CVE-2021-21298 (Projects API).

OpenPLC Runtime v3's compile_program() function (webserver/openplc.py) parses `(*FILE:path content*)` directives from uploaded Structured Text (.st) program files and writes the referenced content to `os.path.join('./core', file_path)` with no validation that file_path stays within the ./core directory. A crafted .st file containing a directive such as `(*FILE:../../../etc/cron.d/x * * * * root <command>*)` writes attacker-controlled content to an arbitrary filesystem path, enabling remote code execution (e.g. via cron or SSH authorized_keys). A path-validation function, validate_file_path(), exists elsewhere in the codebase (webserver/credentials.py) but is never invoked from compile_program(), leaving the sink unprotected. OpenPLC additionally ships with hardcoded default credentials (openplc:openplc), lowering the practical bar for exploitation.

tinyobjloader-c's tinyobj_parse_and_index_mtl_file() (tinyobj_loader_c.h) reads each line of a .mtl material file into a fixed 4096-byte stack buffer `linebuf` via memcpy(linebuf, p, p_len), guarded only by `assert(p_len < 4095)`. Because assert() compiles to a no-op under -DNDEBUG (standard for release builds), a crafted .mtl file containing a line (e.g. a "newmtl" material name) longer than 4096 bytes overflows linebuf into the adjacent stack variable namebuf and beyond, corrupting the stack of any application that loads attacker-supplied 3D model/material files. The identical vulnerable pattern is duplicated in a second function in the same file.

The LINUXTCP port of FreeModbus contains an off-by-one bounds check in xMBPortTCPPool() (demo/LINUXTCP/port/porttcp.c). The check `if (usTCPFrameBytesLeft > MB_TCP_BUF_SIZE)` uses a strict greater-than comparison instead of greater-than-or-equal against the 263-byte MB_TCP_BUF_SIZE limit. An MBAP frame with a Length field of 264 makes usTCPFrameBytesLeft equal to 263, which passes the flawed check, and the subsequent recv() call writes up to 263 bytes starting at buffer offset 7 into the 263-byte static buffer aucTCPBuf, overflowing it by 7 bytes into the adjacent static variable usTCPBufPos. A single crafted, unauthenticated Modbus TCP packet triggers the overflow, since Modbus has no built-in authentication.

dr_libs dr_wav.h (all versions through current master) contains an integer overflow in W64 CUE chunk metadata parsing. In drwav__metadata_process_chunk(), a stage-1 capacity estimate truncates the 64-bit W64 chunk sizeInBytes to size_t before dividing by DRWAV_CUE_POINT_BYTES; on 32-bit builds this truncation causes the pre-allocated extra metadata capacity to be computed incorrectly. The subsequent read in drwav__read_cue_to_metadata_obj() computes the actual cue point count and allocation size using the full-precision, attacker-controlled cuePointCount field without cross-checking it against the stage-1 capacity estimate, and the only bounds enforcement on the resulting memory region (drwav__metadata_get_memory()) is a DRWAV_ASSERT, which compiles to a no-op under -DNDEBUG (the default for release builds). A crafted W64 WAV file can therefore cause a heap buffer overflow in any 32-bit application parsing untrusted WAV metadata.

ESPHome through 2026.7.0-dev contains an operator-precedence bug in the cv.url() validator in esphome/config_validation.py: `if parsed.scheme and parsed.netloc or parsed.scheme == "file": return parsed.geturl()`. Because `and` binds tighter than `or`, any file: URI passes validation regardless of netloc. This validator gates the `url:` field of the external_components YAML directive's git source schema, which is passed to `git clone` (git supports file:// natively). A crafted `external_components` block with `url: "file:///attacker/repo"` clones an attacker-controlled local path, which is then added to Python's import machinery via ESPHome's component loader, executing arbitrary Python code when the YAML configuration is processed (e.g. via `esphome config`/`esphome run`).

@oblique/cli 15.4.0 contains an OS command injection vulnerability in the project creation functionality. The CLI constructs shell commands through string concatenation and executes them with execSync(). A user-controlled project-name argument is inserted into the shell command without proper neutralization, allowing shell metacharacters to execute additional operating-system commands when the CLI is invoked with a crafted project name.

A improper neutralization of HTTP Headers for Scripting Syntax vulnerability in SonicOS could allow a remote attacker to manipulate the Host header and redirect firewall management users to arbitrary web domains.

nanoMODBUS through v1.23.0 contains an out-of-bounds stack read leading to a wild-pointer write in nmbs_read_device_identification_basic() / recv_read_device_identification_res() in nanomodbus.c. A fixed 3-element stack array order[3] = {0,1,2} maps object IDs to buffer indices. The server-supplied object_id field (0-255, read directly from the wire) is used without any bounds check as buf_index = order[object_id]. When a malicious Modbus server sends a Read Device Identification response with object_id >= 3, this reads an out-of-bounds/garbage byte from the stack adjacent to order[], which is then used as an index into a 3-element buffers[] array of char* pointers. The resulting wild pointer is passed to strncpy() as the destination, causing an arbitrary-address write with server-controlled data.

nanoMODBUS through v1.23.0 contains an out-of-bounds write in the Modbus client-side recv_read_device_identification_res() function (FC 0x2B/MEI 0x0E, Read Device Identification) in nanomodbus.c. The server-supplied object_length field (0-246) is validated only against the remaining PDU size (res_size_left) and is never validated against the caller-supplied buffers_length parameter. After copying data with strncpy(buffers_out[buf_index], str, buffers_length), the code unconditionally writes a NUL terminator at buffers_out[buf_index][object_length]. When a malicious or compromised Modbus server sends a response with object_length greater than or equal to the client's buffers_length, this NUL write lands past the end of the caller-provided buffer, corrupting adjacent stack or heap memory on the client.