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Perspective 5.0.0 contains a path traversal vulnerability that allows unauthenticated remote attackers to read arbitrary files from the server filesystem by including literal ../ segments in HTTP request URL paths. Attackers can bypass the insufficient query-string-stripping sanitization to traverse outside the configured asset root directory and retrieve sensitive files such as system credentials and application secrets, with results exposed cross-origin due to a wildcard Access-Control-Allow-Origin header set on all responses.
A flaw has been found in chetans9 core-php-admin-panel up to 90d07ed5aac5e0f09b6a5828d7bb2eb83010763f. This issue affects some unknown processing of the file /Applications/MAMP/htdocs/core-php-admin-panel-master/customers.php. Executing a manipulation of the argument filter_col can lead to sql injection. The attack may be launched remotely. The exploit has been published and may be used. This product operates on a rolling release basis, ensuring continuous delivery. Consequently, there are no version details for either affected or updated releases. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.
The non-blocking (asynchronous) JSON parser in jackson-core does not enforce the maxNumberLength constraint defined in StreamReadConstraints (default: 1000 characters). An attacker able to submit JSON to an application that uses the async parser API can supply a number token of arbitrary length, leading to excessive memory allocation and potential CPU exhaustion, resulting in a denial of service. The synchronous parser enforces this limit correctly, so the constraint is applied inconsistently depending on which parsing API the application uses. Root cause: the async parsing path in NonBlockingUtf8JsonParserBase and related classes never invokes the number length validation methods. Number parsing methods such as _finishNumberIntegralPart() accumulate digits into the TextBuffer without any length check, then call _valueComplete() to finalize the token. _valueComplete() does not call resetInt() or resetFloat(), which are the methods in ParserBase where validateIntegerLength() and validateFPLength() are performed. Because that validation step is skipped, maxNumberLength is never enforced on the async code path. Impact: an attacker sending a JSON document containing an arbitrarily long number to an application using the async parser (for example a Spring WebFlux or other reactive application) can cause unbounded allocation in the TextBuffer and an OutOfMemoryError. If the application subsequently calls getBigIntegerValue() or getDecimalValue(), the JVM may additionally be tied up in O(n^2) BigInteger parsing, causing CPU-based denial of service. No privileges or user interaction beyond the ability to submit data for parsing are required. This issue affects com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core from version 2.15.0 through 2.18.5 and from 2.19.0 through 2.21.0, and tools.jackson.core:jackson-core from 3.0.0 through 3.0.x. Versions prior to 2.15.0 are not affected, because StreamReadConstraints -- which defines the maxNumberLength setting -- was first introduced in jackson-core 2.15.0, so no such constraint exists to be bypassed in earlier releases. Note that GHSA-72hv-8253-57qq records the lower bound of the affected 2.x range as 2.0.0.