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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/handshake: Drain pending requests at net namespace exit The arguments to list_splice_init() in handshake_net_exit() are reversed. The call moves the local empty "requests" list onto hn->hn_requests, leaving the local list empty, so the subsequent drain loop runs zero iterations. Pending handshake requests that had not yet been accepted are not torn down when the net namespace is destroyed; each one keeps a reference on a socket file and on the handshake_req allocation. Pass the source and destination in the documented order (list_splice_init(list, head) moves list onto head) so the pending list is transferred to the local scratch list and drained through handshake_complete(). Fixing the splice direction exposes a list-corruption race. After the splice each req->hr_list still has non-empty link pointers, threading the stack-local scratch list rather than hn_requests. A concurrent handshake_req_cancel() -- for example, from sunrpc's TLS timeout on a kernel socket whose netns reference was not taken -- finds the request through the rhashtable, calls remove_pending(), and sees !list_empty(&req->hr_list). __remove_pending_locked() then list_del_init()s an entry off the scratch list while the drain iterates, corrupting it. The same call arriving after the drain loop has run list_del() on an entry hits LIST_POISON instead. Have remove_pending() check HANDSHAKE_F_NET_DRAINING under hn_lock and report not-found when drain is in progress. The drain has already taken ownership; handshake_complete()'s existing test_and_set on HANDSHAKE_F_REQ_COMPLETED still arbitrates between drain and cancel for who calls the consumer's hp_done. Use list_del_init() rather than list_del() in the drain so req->hr_list does not carry LIST_POISON after drain releases the entry. The DRAINING guard in remove_pending() makes cancel return false, but cancel still falls through to test_and_set_bit on HANDSHAKE_F_REQ_COMPLETED and drops the request's hr_file reference. Without another pin, if that is the last reference, sk_destruct frees the request while it is still linked on the drain loop's local list. Pin each request's hr_file under hn_lock before releasing the list, and drop that drain pin after the loop finishes with the request.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vsock/virtio: bind uarg before filling zerocopy skb virtio_transport_send_pkt_info() allocates or reuses the zerocopy uarg before entering the send loop, but virtio_transport_alloc_skb() still fills the skb before it inherits that uarg. When fixed-buffer vectored zerocopy hits MAX_SKB_FRAGS, io_sg_from_iter() may partially attach managed frags and return -EMSGSIZE. The rollback path call kfree_skb() to free an skb that carries SKBFL_MANAGED_FRAG_REFS but no uarg, so skb_release_data() falls through to ordinary frag unref. Pass the uarg into virtio_transport_alloc_skb() and bind it immediately before virtio_transport_fill_skb(). This keeps control or no-payload skbs untouched while ensuring success and rollback share one lifetime rule.