361,800
Total CVEs
26,223
Critical
85,816
High
1,626
CISA KEV
0
This Week
207 results · Page 4/9
Decidim is a participatory democracy framework. Starting in version 0.10.0 and prior to versions 0.26.9, 0.27.5, and 0.28.0, a race condition in the endorsement of resources (for instance, a proposal) allows a user to make more than once endorsement. To exploit this vulnerability, the request to set an endorsement must be sent several times in parallel. Versions 0.26.9, 0.27.5, and 0.28.0 contain a patch for this issue. As a workaround, disable the Endorsement feature in the components.
decidim
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: netdevsim: don't try to destroy PHC on VFs PHC gets initialized in nsim_init_netdevsim(), which is only called if (nsim_dev_port_is_pf()). Create a counterpart of nsim_init_netdevsim() and move the mock_phc_destroy() there. This fixes a crash trying to destroy netdevsim with VFs instantiated, as caught by running the devlink.sh test: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000000b8 RIP: 0010:mock_phc_destroy+0xd/0x30 Call Trace: <TASK> nsim_destroy+0x4a/0x70 [netdevsim] __nsim_dev_port_del+0x47/0x70 [netdevsim] nsim_dev_reload_destroy+0x105/0x120 [netdevsim] nsim_drv_remove+0x2f/0xb0 [netdevsim] device_release_driver_internal+0x1a1/0x210 bus_remove_device+0xd5/0x120 device_del+0x159/0x490 device_unregister+0x12/0x30 del_device_store+0x11a/0x1a0 [netdevsim] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x130/0x1d0 vfs_write+0x30b/0x4b0 ksys_write+0x69/0xf0 do_syscall_64+0xcc/0x1e0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6f/0x77
linux
Decidim is a participatory democracy framework. Starting in version 0.27.0 and prior to versions 0.27.5 and 0.28.0, the dynamic file upload feature is subject to potential cross-site scripting attacks in case the attacker manages to modify the file names of the records being uploaded to the server. This appears in sections where the user controls the file upload dialogs themselves and has the technical knowledge to change the file names through the dynamic upload endpoint. Therefore I believe it would require the attacker to control the whole session of the particular user but in any case, this needs to be fixed. Successful exploit of this vulnerability would require the user to have successfully uploaded a file blob to the server with a malicious file name and then have the possibility to direct the other user to the edit page of the record where the attachment is attached. The users are able to craft the direct upload requests themselves controlling the file name that gets stored to the database. The attacker is able to change the filename e.g. to `<svg onload=alert('XSS')>` if they know how to craft these requests themselves. And then enter the returned blob ID to the form inputs manually by modifying the edit page source. Versions 0.27.5 and 0.28.0 contain a patch for this issue. As a workaround, disable dynamic uploads for the instance, e.g. from proposals.
decidim