In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nexthop: initialize extack in nh_res_bucket_migrate() nh_res_bucket_migrate() passes an uninitialized netlink_ext_ack to call_nexthop_res_bucket_notifiers(). When nh_notifier_res_bucket_info_init() fails (e.g. the kzalloc returns -ENOMEM), the error is propagated back before any notifier sets extack._msg, and the error path formats the stale pointer with pr_err_ratelimited("%s\n", extack._msg). With CONFIG_INIT_STACK_NONE this dereferences uninitialized stack memory: Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address ... KASAN: maybe wild-memory-access in range [...] RIP: 0010:string (lib/vsprintf.c:730) vsnprintf (lib/vsprintf.c:2945) _printk (kernel/printk/printk.c:2504) nh_res_bucket_migrate (net/ipv4/nexthop.c:1816) nh_res_table_upkeep (net/ipv4/nexthop.c:1866) rtm_new_nexthop (net/ipv4/nexthop.c:3323) rtnetlink_rcv_msg (net/core/rtnetlink.c:7076) netlink_sendmsg (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1900) Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception Zero-initialize extack so _msg is NULL on error paths that never set it.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: tcp: fix double sock release on batch realloc bpf_iter_tcp_batch() releases the current batch via bpf_iter_tcp_put_batch(), which drops the socket refs and rewrites each slot with the socket cookie, then grows the batch. cur_sk/end_sk are kept for bpf_iter_tcp_resume(), but on realloc failure the function returns ERR_PTR() before resume runs, leaving cur_sk < end_sk over slots that now hold cookies rather than sock pointers. bpf_iter_tcp_seq_stop() then calls bpf_iter_tcp_put_batch() again and dereferences a cookie as a struct sock. Empty the batch on the failure path so stop() does not release it again. The sockets were already freed by the first bpf_iter_tcp_put_batch(), so nothing leaks, and a later read() rescans the bucket from the start instead of skipping it. The sibling GFP_NOWAIT failure path still holds real socket references and is left for stop() to release. BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in __sock_gen_cookie Read of size 8 at addr 0000000000000059 by task exploit ... __sock_gen_cookie (net/core/sock_diag.c:28) bpf_iter_tcp_put_batch (net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:2918) bpf_iter_tcp_seq_stop (net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:3270) bpf_seq_read (kernel/bpf/bpf_iter.c:205) vfs_read (fs/read_write.c:572) ksys_read (fs/read_write.c:716) do_syscall_64 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mac80211: tear down new links on vif update error path When ieee80211_vif_update_links() adds new links it allocates a link container for each and calls ieee80211_link_init() (which registers the per-link debugfs files with file->private_data pointing into the container) and ieee80211_link_setup(). If the subsequent drv_change_vif_links() fails, the error path restores the old pointers and jumps to 'free', which frees the new containers but never removes their debugfs entries or stops the links. The debugfs files survive with file->private_data dangling at the freed container, so a later open()+read() (e.g. link-1/txpower) dereferences freed memory in ieee80211_if_read_link(), a use-after-free. The removal path already dismantles links correctly via ieee80211_tear_down_links(), which removes each link's keys and debugfs entries and calls ieee80211_link_stop(); the add path on the error branch does not. Commit be1ba9ed221f ("wifi: mac80211: avoid weird state in error path") hardened this same error path for the link-removal case (new_links == 0) but left the newly-added links' teardown unaddressed. drv_change_vif_links() can fail at runtime on MLO drivers (internal allocation / queue / firmware command failures). Remove the new links' debugfs entries and stop them before freeing. BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ieee80211_if_read_link (net/mac80211/debugfs_netdev.c:127) Read of size 8 at addr ffff888011290000 by task exploit/145 Call Trace: ... ieee80211_if_read_link (net/mac80211/debugfs_netdev.c:127) short_proxy_read (fs/debugfs/file.c:373) vfs_read (fs/read_write.c:572) ksys_read (fs/read_write.c:716) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121) ... Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc000000000a RIP: 0010:ieee80211_if_read_link (net/mac80211/debugfs_netdev.c:127) Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: qca: fix NVM tag length underflow in TLV parser In the TLV_TYPE_NVM branch of qca_tlv_check_data() the tag loop bound is "while (idx < length - sizeof(struct tlv_type_nvm))". "length" is a signed int from the firmware TLV header and sizeof(struct tlv_type_nvm) is a size_t (12), so "length" is converted to size_t and any firmware-supplied "length" < 12 makes the subtraction wrap to a huge value. The loop body then reads a 12-byte struct tlv_type_nvm past the end of the short vmalloc'd firmware buffer (and the EDL_TAG_ID_* handlers can write past it). Rewrite the bound as "idx + sizeof(struct tlv_type_nvm) <= length"; both operands are non-negative, so it no longer underflows and a "length" too small for one record correctly skips the loop. BUG: KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds in qca_download_firmware.isra.0 (drivers/bluetooth/btqca.c:421) Read of size 2 at addr ffffc900000e5004 by task kworker/u9:0/52 Workqueue: hci0 hci_power_on Call Trace: ... kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:595) qca_download_firmware.isra.0 (drivers/bluetooth/btqca.c:421 drivers/bluetooth/btqca.c:617) qca_uart_setup (drivers/bluetooth/btqca.c:948) qca_setup (drivers/bluetooth/hci_qca.c:2029) hci_uart_setup (drivers/bluetooth/hci_ldisc.c:438) hci_dev_open_sync (net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:5227) hci_power_on (net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:920) process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3322) worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3486) kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436) ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158) ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv4: fib: free fib_alias with kfree_rcu() on insert error path fib_table_insert() publishes new_fa into the leaf's fa_list with fib_insert_alias() before calling the fib entry notifiers. When a notifier fails, the error path removes new_fa with fib_remove_alias() (hlist_del_rcu) and frees it right away with kmem_cache_free(). fib_table_lookup() walks that list under rcu_read_lock() only, so a concurrent lookup that already reached new_fa keeps reading it after the free: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in fib_table_lookup (net/ipv4/fib_trie.c:1601) Read of size 1 at addr ffff88810676d4eb by task exploit/297 Call Trace: fib_table_lookup (net/ipv4/fib_trie.c:1601) ip_route_output_key_hash_rcu (net/ipv4/route.c:2814) ip_route_output_key_hash (net/ipv4/route.c:2705) __ip4_datagram_connect (net/ipv4/datagram.c:49) udp_connect (net/ipv4/udp.c:2144) __sys_connect (net/socket.c:2167) __x64_sys_connect (net/socket.c:2173) do_syscall_64 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe which belongs to the cache ip_fib_alias of size 56 Triggering the error path needs CAP_NET_ADMIN and a registered fib notifier that can reject a route; a netdevsim device whose IPv4 FIB resource is exhausted is enough. Free new_fa with alias_free_mem_rcu(), as fib_table_delete() already does for a fib_alias removed from the trie.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: p54: validate RX frame length in p54_rx_eeprom_readback() p54_rx_eeprom_readback() copies the requested EEPROM slice out of a device-supplied readback frame without checking that the skb actually holds that many bytes. Commit da1b9a55ff11 ("wifi: p54: prevent buffer-overflow in p54_rx_eeprom_readback()") closed the destination overflow by copying a fixed priv->eeprom_slice_size (and rejecting a mismatched advertised len), but the source side is still unbounded: nothing verifies the frame is long enough to supply that many bytes. A malicious USB device can send a short frame whose advertised len matches priv->eeprom_slice_size while the payload is truncated. The equality check passes and memcpy() reads past the end of the skb, leaking adjacent heap: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in p54_rx (drivers/net/wireless/intersil/p54/txrx.c:507) Read of size 1016 at addr ffff88800f077114 by task swapper/0/0 Call Trace: <IRQ> ... __asan_memcpy (mm/kasan/shadow.c:105) p54_rx (drivers/net/wireless/intersil/p54/txrx.c:507) p54u_rx_cb (drivers/net/wireless/intersil/p54/p54usb.c:163) __usb_hcd_giveback_urb (drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1657) dummy_timer (drivers/usb/gadget/udc/dummy_hcd.c:2005) ... </IRQ> The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88800f0770c0 which belongs to the cache skbuff_small_head of size 704 The buggy address is located 84 bytes inside of allocated 704-byte region [ffff88800f0770c0, ffff88800f077380) Check that the slice fits in the skb before copying.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mac80211: fix fils_discovery double free on alloc failure ieee80211_set_fils_discovery() calls kfree_rcu() on the old template before allocating the replacement. If the kzalloc() then fails, it returns -ENOMEM while link->u.ap.fils_discovery still points at the object already queued for freeing. A later update or AP teardown (ieee80211_stop_ap()) re-queues that same rcu_head; the second free is caught by KASAN when the RCU sheaf is processed in softirq: BUG: KASAN: double-free in rcu_free_sheaf (mm/slub.c:5850) Free of addr ffff88800c065280 by task swapper/0/0 ... __rcu_free_sheaf_prepare (mm/slub.c:2634 mm/slub.c:2940) rcu_free_sheaf (mm/slub.c:5850) rcu_core (kernel/rcu/tree.c:2617 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2869) handle_softirqs (kernel/softirq.c:622) The buggy address belongs to the cache kmalloc-96 of size 96 Queue the old object for kfree_rcu() only after the new one is published, matching ieee80211_set_probe_resp() and ieee80211_set_s1g_short_beacon().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mpls: fix NULL deref in mpls_valid_fib_dump_req() on CONFIG_INET=n On CONFIG_INET=n builds, mpls_valid_fib_dump_req() walks the parsed attribute table itself instead of calling ip_valid_fib_dump_req(). The RTA_OIF arm passes tb[RTA_OIF] to nla_get_u32() without checking it is present, so an RTM_GETROUTE dump for AF_MPLS with strict checking and no RTA_OIF hits a NULL dereference. RTM_GETROUTE is RTNL_KIND_GET, which rtnetlink_rcv_msg() permits without CAP_NET_ADMIN, so an unprivileged user can trigger it. Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007] RIP: 0010:mpls_valid_fib_dump_req (net/mpls/af_mpls.c:2189) Call Trace: mpls_dump_routes (net/mpls/af_mpls.c:2236) netlink_dump (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2331) __netlink_dump_start (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2446) rtnetlink_rcv_msg (net/core/rtnetlink.c:7033) netlink_rcv_skb (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2556) netlink_unicast (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1345) netlink_sendmsg (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1900) __sock_sendmsg (net/socket.c:790) ____sys_sendmsg (net/socket.c:2684) ___sys_sendmsg (net/socket.c:2738) __sys_sendmsg (net/socket.c:2770) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121) Skip unset attributes, as ip_valid_fib_dump_req() does.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mac80211: fix unsol_bcast_probe_resp double free on alloc failure ieee80211_set_unsol_bcast_probe_resp() calls kfree_rcu() on the old template before allocating the replacement. If the kzalloc() then fails, it returns -ENOMEM while link->u.ap.unsol_bcast_probe_resp still points at the object already queued for freeing. A later update or AP teardown re-queues that same rcu_head; the second free is caught by KASAN when the RCU sheaf is processed in softirq: BUG: KASAN: double-free in rcu_free_sheaf (mm/slub.c:5850) Free of addr ffff88800d06f300 by task exploit/145 ... __rcu_free_sheaf_prepare (mm/slub.c:2634 mm/slub.c:2940) rcu_free_sheaf (mm/slub.c:5850) rcu_core (kernel/rcu/tree.c:2617 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2869) handle_softirqs (kernel/softirq.c:622) The buggy address belongs to the cache kmalloc-128 of size 128 Queue the old object for kfree_rcu() only after the new one is published, matching ieee80211_set_probe_resp() and ieee80211_set_s1g_short_beacon().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: reject free space cache with more entries than pages When loading a v1 free space cache, __load_free_space_cache() takes num_entries and num_bitmaps straight from the on-disk btrfs_free_space_header. That header is stored in the tree_root under a key with type 0, which the tree-checker has no case for, so neither count is validated before the load trusts it. The load loops num_entries times and maps the next page whenever the current one runs out, going through io_ctl_check_crc() -> io_ctl_map_page(), which does io_ctl->pages[io_ctl->index++]. But pages[] is allocated in io_ctl_init() from the cache inode's i_size, not from num_entries: num_pages = DIV_ROUND_UP(i_size_read(inode), PAGE_SIZE); io_ctl->pages = kcalloc(num_pages, sizeof(struct page *), GFP_NOFS); So if num_entries claims more records than the pages can hold, io_ctl->index runs off the end of pages[]. The write side never hits this because io_ctl_add_entry() and io_ctl_add_bitmap() both stop once io_ctl->index >= io_ctl->num_pages; the read side just never had the same check. To trigger it, take a clean cache (num_entries = <N> here), set num_entries in the header to 0x10000, and fix up the leaf checksum so it still passes the tree-checker. The cache inode has i_size = 65536, so num_pages is 16 and pages[] is a 16-pointer (kmalloc-128) array. The load now tries to read 65536 entries, io_ctl->index walks up to 16, and pages[16] is read past the array: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in io_ctl_check_crc (fs/btrfs/free-space-cache.c:420 fs/btrfs/free-space-cache.c:565) Read of size 8 at addr ffff88800c833a80 by task kworker/u8:3/58 io_ctl_check_crc (fs/btrfs/free-space-cache.c:420 fs/btrfs/free-space-cache.c:565) __load_free_space_cache (fs/btrfs/free-space-cache.c:655 fs/btrfs/free-space-cache.c:820) load_free_space_cache (fs/btrfs/free-space-cache.c:1017) caching_thread (fs/btrfs/block-group.c:880) btrfs_work_helper (fs/btrfs/async-thread.c:312) process_one_work worker_thread kthread ret_from_fork free-space-cache.c:420 is io_ctl_map_page(), inlined into io_ctl_check_crc() at line 565, which is why that is the frame KASAN names. The out-of-bounds slot is then treated as a struct page and handed to crc32c(), so the bad read turns into a GP fault. Add the missing check to io_ctl_check_crc(), which is where both the entry loop and the bitmap loop end up. When num_entries is too large the load now fails like any corrupt cache: __load_free_space_cache() drops it and rebuilds the free space from the extent tree, so a valid cache is never rejected.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfrm: iptfs: propagate SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG in iptfs_skb_add_frags() When iptfs_skb_add_frags() copies frag references from the source frag walk into a new SKB, it increments the page reference count via __skb_frag_ref() but does not propagate SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG to the destination SKB's skb_shinfo->flags. If the source SKB carries shared frags (e.g. from a page-pool backed receive path), the new inner SKB will appear to ESP as having privately owned frags. A subsequent esp_input() call for a nested transport-mode SA then takes the no-COW fast path and decrypts in place, writing over pages that are still referenced by the outer IPTFS SKB. This causes kernel-visible memory corruption and can trigger a panic. All other frag-transfer helpers in the kernel (skb_try_coalesce, skb_gro_receive, __pskb_copy_fclone, skb_shift, skb_segment) correctly propagate SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG; align iptfs_skb_add_frags() with this convention by setting the flag inside the loop immediately after __skb_frag_ref() and nr_frags++, so every exit path that attaches a frag unconditionally propagates SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG.

** UNSUPPORTED WHEN ASSIGNED ** Stack-based Buffer Overflow vulnerability in Apache Lucy. This issue affects Apache Lucy: all versions. As this project is retired, we do not plan to release a version that fixes this issue. Users are recommended to find an alternative or restrict access to the instance to trusted users. NOTE: This vulnerability only affects products that are no longer supported by the maintainer.

The Askeet plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to SQL Injection via the 'sql_query' parameter in multiple AJAX actions (askeet_execute_sql_query, askeet_export_all_results) in all versions up to, and including, 3.0. This is due to the askeet_is_safe_query() filter being bypassable using MySQL conditional comments (e.g., /*!UNION*/). The filter strips regular block comments before checking for forbidden SQL keywords, but MySQL interprets conditional comments as executable code. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Administrator-level access and above, to append additional SQL queries into already existing queries that can be used to extract sensitive information from the database.

Crater isolates data per company_id, and its Invoice/Estimate/Payment/Expense policies enforce both a Bouncer ability check and $user->hasCompany($model->company_id). CustomerPolicy's view/update/delete methods omit the company-ownership check entirely, checking only the blanket ability. Route-model-bound customer lookups and the bulk Customer::deleteCustomers() method are similarly unscoped (self::find($id) with no company filter). Any authenticated user of one company can read, reassign (steal), or delete another company's customer records, with deletion cascading to that customer's invoices and payments.

Leantime through 3.6.2 exposes the JSON-RPC methods leantime.rpc.TwoFA.TwoFA.getSetupData, saveSecret, verifyAndEnable, and disable2FA, which act on a caller-supplied userId parameter with no ownership check, session pinning, or permission-attribute gate (unlike other RPC-exposed methods in the same dispatcher). Any authenticated user can invoke getSetupData with an arbitrary userId to read that user's live TOTP secret, or disable2FA to strip another account's two-factor authentication entirely, fully defeating account-level 2FA protection. This is related to CVE-2026-15509, which covers a similar missing-authorization pattern in the JSON-RPC editUser/addUser role-assignment path in the same application; the TwoFA service methods addressed here are a distinct, independently fixable set of RPC endpoints.

The Groundhogg — CRM, Newsletters, and Marketing Automation plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Insecure Direct Object Reference in all versions up to, and including, 4.5.2 via the GET /wp-json/gh/v4/contacts/<id> REST endpoint. The endpoint's permission callback checks only the role-level view_contacts capability and read_single() returns the full contact record by sequential integer ID without the object-level view_contact ownership check applied elsewhere in the codebase. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers holding view_contacts but not view_others_contacts — notably Groundhogg's built-in Sales Rep role, designed to see only its own contacts — to read any contact record on the site, including PII, contact meta, owner IDs, the admin edit URL, and (for contacts linked to a WordPress user) that user's full capability set.

HashBrown CMS through 1.4.6 contains an OS Command Injection vulnerability (CWE-78) in the media upload thumbnail generation routine. Media.generateThumbnail() in src/Server/Entity/Resource/Media.js builds a temporary file path as 'thumbnail' + Path.extname(filename) and passes it, unescaped, into a shell command executed via AppService.exec() ('convert ' + tempFile + ...). The MIME-type filter in getMIMEType() (src/Common/utilities.js) truncates the extracted extension at the first '?' character, while Path.extname() does not, allowing a filename such as 'x.jpg?$(command)' to pass the image-type check while still injecting a shell command substitution into the exec() call. An authenticated user holding the media resource scope can achieve arbitrary OS command execution in the context of the Node.js process via POST /api/{project}/{environment}/media/new.

The built-in PostgreSQL service on the mobile device suffers from misconfiguration flaws and command injection vulnerabilities. This service listens on a specific port, runs with root privileges, and is protected by weak credentials. The database supports the COPY FROM PROGRAM syntax, allowing local attackers to bypass Android's permission sandbox and gain full root access.

The GeoDirectory WordPress plugin before 2.8.168 does not restrict a user-search handler to users allowed to list users, allowing any authenticated user with Contributor-level access or higher to retrieve the email addresses of all registered users, including administrators.

The Cost Calculator Builder plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized access of sensitive data due to a missing capability check on the `cost-calculator-custom-export-run` AJAX action (handler `CCBExportImport::export_calculators()`) in all versions up to, and including, 3.6.17. The handler only verifies a nonce, but the corresponding `ccb_export_nonce` is broadcast on every wp-admin page (including pages reachable to Subscribers, such as `/wp-admin/profile.php`) by the `ccb_add_admin_nonces` callback hooked to `admin_head`. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to export every calculator's full configuration — including stored Stripe secret keys, PayPal client secrets, Razorpay secret keys, webhook secret keys, and reCAPTCHA secret keys.

In OpenStack Swift through 2.38.0, the S3API middleware does not sanitize Swift-native control headers (X-Copy-From, X-Copy-From-Account) from S3 API requests when s3_acl=true. An attacker can inject these headers into a signed PUT request targeting their own bucket, causing Swift to perform a server-side copy from another tenant's private object. The source object authorization is bypassed because the S3API middleware has already authorized the request against the destination. The attacker can read any object whose project_id, container name, and object name are known, regardless of the source object's ACLs or ownership. This requires the non-default s3_acl=true configuration.

A vulnerability was determined in yeqifu warehouse up to aaf29962ba407d22d991781de28796ee7b4670e4. This issue affects some unknown processing of the file src/main/java/com/yeqifu/sys/controller/FileController.java. This manipulation of the argument path causes path traversal. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. The exploit has been publicly disclosed and may be utilized. This product is using a rolling release to provide continious delivery. Therefore, no version details for affected nor updated releases are available. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.

The VikRentItems – Flexible Rental Management System plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Stored Cross-Site Scripting via the customer email field of the booking checkout form in versions up to, and including, 1.2.1. This is due to insufficient input sanitization and output escaping in the saveorder() function, which stores the raw email value via VikRequest::getString() (applying only sanitize_text_field(), which does not neutralize HTML attribute-breaking characters such as double quotes), and in the editorder template which echoes the stored custmail value into an HTML input element's value attribute without esc_attr(). This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to inject arbitrary web scripts in pages that will execute whenever a user accesses an injected page.