Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in benoitc hackney allows Flooding. The WebSocket client in src/hackney_ws.erl imposes no upper bound on memory consumption in three code paths. First, read_handshake_response/3 accumulates received bytes into a growing buffer with no size cap; the per-receive timeout resets on every chunk, so a server that streams bytes without ever sending \r\n\r\n causes the buffer to grow until memory is exhausted. Second, parse_payload/9 and parse_active_payload/8 do not validate the declared frame payload length against any limit; because RFC 6455 allows payload lengths up to 2^63-1 bytes, a server that announces a very large frame and dribbles bytes causes the accumulation buffer to grow until OOM. Third, the frag_buffer field in #ws_data{} accumulates continuation frames indefinitely; a server that sends an endless stream of non-final (nofin) fragmented frames without ever sending a final (fin) frame grows frag_buffer without bound. In all three cases the attacker only needs to control the WebSocket server the hackney client connects to, with no authentication or special client configuration required. This issue affects hackney: from 2.0.0 before 4.0.1.

benoitc

Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences ('CRLF Injection') vulnerability in benoitc hackney allows HTTP Request/Response Splitting. The WebSocket upgrade code in src/hackney_ws.erl copies the host, path, headers (ExtraHeaders), and protocols options from the caller-supplied opts map into the internal #ws_data{} record in init/1 and then splices them verbatim into the raw HTTP/1.1 upgrade request by binary concatenation in do_handshake/1. No CRLF or NUL stripping is performed at any of these four injection sites. An attacker who controls any of these options — for example by forwarding URL components or header values from untrusted input into hackney_ws:start_link/1 — can inject arbitrary HTTP headers into the outbound WebSocket upgrade request, leading to header injection, credential spoofing toward the upstream server, log and cache poisoning, or request smuggling via intermediary proxies. This issue affects hackney: from 2.0.0 before 4.0.1.

benoitc

Uncontrolled Resource Consumption vulnerability in benoitc hackney allows Flooding. The SOCKS5 transport in src/hackney_socks5.erl correctly applies the caller-supplied timeout to the SOCKS5 negotiation phase, but then upgrades the connection to TLS using the two-argument form ssl:connect/2, which defaults to an infinite timeout. The Timeout value is in scope at the call site but is not forwarded. A hostile SOCKS5 proxy that completes the SOCKS5 handshake normally and then goes silent (or sends a partial TLS ServerHello and stalls) will cause the connecting process to block indefinitely, regardless of the connect_timeout or recv_timeout options supplied by the caller. This issue affects hackney: from 0.10.0 before 4.0.1.

benoitc

Sensitive Data Exposure vulnerability in benoitc hackney allows Retrieve Embedded Sensitive Data. The HTTP/3 redirect handler in src/hackney_h3.erl passes the original request headers unchanged to the redirect target without performing any cross-origin check. When a client issues an HTTP/3 request with follow_redirect enabled and includes Authorization or Cookie headers, a server responding with a 3xx redirect to a different host will cause the client to forward those credentials verbatim to the new origin. The main hackney.erl module has maybe_strip_auth_on_redirect/2 (guarded by the location_trusted option) to address CVE-2018-1000007, but hackney_h3.erl is missing this protection entirely. This issue affects hackney: from 3.1.1 before 4.0.1.

benoitc

Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences ('CRLF Injection') vulnerability in benoitc hackney allows HTTP Response Splitting. The hackney_cookie:setcookie/3 function in src/hackney_cookie.erl validates the Name and Value arguments against CRLF and control characters, but concatenates the domain and path options verbatim into the output iolist with no equivalent check. An attacker who controls either option — for example by supplying a Host header value forwarded as the cookie domain, or a request path forwarded as the cookie path — can inject a literal CRLF sequence and arbitrary additional Set-Cookie headers into the HTTP response. This issue affects hackney: from 0.9.0 before 4.0.1.

benoitc

Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in benoitc hackney allows Flooding. The URL parser in src/hackney_url.erl converts every unrecognized URL scheme to a permanent BEAM atom via binary_to_atom/2. BEAM atoms are never garbage-collected and the atom table defaults to a hard limit of 1,048,576 entries. An attacker who can supply URLs with attacker-chosen scheme prefixes — directly as request targets, as configured webhook URLs, or via Location headers followed during redirects — can exhaust the atom table and crash the entire BEAM VM with system_limit. This issue affects hackney: from 2.0.0 before 4.0.1.

benoitc

Loop with Unreachable Exit Condition ('Infinite Loop') vulnerability in benoitc hackney allows Excessive Allocation. The Alt-Svc response header parser in src/hackney_altsvc.erl does not guarantee forward progress. When parse_token/2 receives a non-token, non-whitespace, non-comma byte (e.g. !, @, =, ;), it returns the input unchanged. skip_comma/1 also returns the buffer unchanged when the first byte is not a comma. parse_entries/2 then recurses with identical data, creating a tight infinite tail-recursive loop that pins a scheduler at 100% CPU. The calling process never returns. The entry point parse_and_cache/3 is called synchronously in the connection process on every HTTP response. A single-byte Alt-Svc: ! response header is sufficient to trigger the hang; the header is fully controlled by any HTTP origin the client connects to. This issue affects hackney: from 2.0.0-beta.1 before 4.0.1.

benoitc