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@langchain/langgraph-checkpoint-mongodb provides a LangGraph.js CheckpointSaver implementation that uses MongoDB for storage. Versions 1.3.0 and below are vulnerable to NoSQL injection: checkpoint identifiers (thread_id, checkpoint_ns, checkpoint_id) from config.configurable are passed into MongoDB find() queries in MongoDBSaver.getTuple() without type enforcement. If an attacker supplies an object payload (such as MongoDB operators $gt or $ne) instead of a string, it can be interpreted as a query operator, bypassing thread scoping and leaking checkpoints, including pending writes, across tenants. Applications are at risk if they forward untrusted input into config.configurable without coercing it to strings or validating it against a schema, particularly in multi-tenant or user-isolated setups. Apps that only use server-issued, string-typed identifiers with schema validation rejecting non-string fields are not affected. This issue has been fixed in version 1.3.1.
A flaw was found in CRIU's handling of restartable sequences (rseq) during checkpoint/restore. A malicious process inside a container can register an rseq critical section that hijacks CRIU's parasite code injection during checkpoint, allowing it to spoof the process credentials saved in the checkpoint image. On restore, the container process gains elevated capabilities and zeroed UIDs/GIDs. The practical impact on Red Hat products is limited by several factors: checkpoint/restore requires root privileges (podman) or cluster-admin RBAC (OpenShift) to trigger and cannot be initiated from within the container itself; on OpenShift prior to 4.17 the feature required explicit opt-in, and on 4.17+ the kubelet checkpoint API RBAC is not configured by default; OpenShift enforces user namespaces by default for regular workloads (hostUsers is gated behind admin-only SCCs), which makes the spoofed capabilities namespace-scoped and ineffective for privilege escalation; SELinux type enforcement (container_t) blocks privilege transitions independently of capabilities; seccomp filters persist through checkpoint/restore and cannot be corrupted via the parasite; and kernel mount namespace ownership checks on RHEL 9/10 kernels prevent mount-based container escape even with spoofed capabilities.