361,800
Total CVEs
26,223
Critical
85,816
High
1,626
CISA KEV
1,906
This Week
78 results · Page 1/4
HestiaCP versions 1.2.0 through 1.9.4 contain an IP spoofing vulnerability that allows unauthenticated remote attackers to bypass authentication security controls by supplying an arbitrary IP address in the CF-Connecting-IP HTTP header without verifying the request originated from Cloudflare's network. Attackers can exploit this to circumvent fail2ban brute-force protection, bypass per-user IP allowlists, and poison authentication audit logs by spoofing trusted IP addresses on each request.
Fleet is open source device management software. Prior to version 4.80.1, a vulnerability in Fleet's IP extraction logic allows unauthenticated attackers to bypass API rate limiting by spoofing client IP headers. This may allow brute-force login attempts or other abuse against Fleet instances exposed to the public internet. Fleet extracted client IP addresses from request headers (`True-Client-IP`, `X-Real-IP`, `X-Forwarded-For`) without validating that those headers originate from a trusted proxy. The extracted IP is used as the key for rate limiting and IP ban decisions. As a result, an attacker could rotate the value of these headers on each request, causing Fleet to treat each attempt as coming from a different client. This effectively bypasses per-IP rate limits on sensitive endpoints such as the login API, enabling unrestricted brute-force or credential stuffing attacks. This issue primarily affects Fleet instances that are directly exposed to the internet without a reverse proxy that overwrites forwarded-IP headers. Instances behind a properly configured proxy or WAF are less affected. Version 4.80.1 contains a patch. If an immediate upgrade is not possible, administrators should ensure Fleet is deployed behind a reverse proxy (e.g., nginx, Cloudflare, AWS ALB) that overwrites `X-Forwarded-For` with the true client IP, and apply rate limiting at the proxy or WAF layer.
fleetdm