Concrete CMS 9.5.0 and below is vulnerable to IDOR in AddMessage/UpdateMessage via attachments[] parameter which can lead to file permission bypass. The `AddMessage` and `UpdateMessage` conversation controllers accept user-supplied file attachment IDs and load files directly via `$em->find(File::class, $attachmentID)` without checking per-file permissions (`canViewFile()`). A user who can post in any conversation can reference any file in the CMS file manager by its sequential ID, effectively bypassing the file permission system.  The Concrete CMS security team gave this vulnerability a CVSS v.4.0 score of 2.3 with a vector CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N. Thanks Tristan Mandani for reporting. if a site truly has private files, the owner should set up a private storage location https://documentation.concretecms.org/user-guide/editors-reference/dashboard/system-and-maintenance/files/file-storage-locations outside of the webroot so that permissions can be checked on view as well. That way, even if a authorized user attaches a file, or otherwise links to it, unauthorized users won't be able to view the file.

concretecms

ConcreteCMS v9.4.7 contains a Denial of Service (DoS) vulnerability in the File Manager component. The 'download' method in 'concrete/controllers/backend/file.php' improperly manages memory when creating zip archives. It uses 'ZipArchive::addFromString' combined with 'file_get_contents', which loads the entire content of every selected file into PHP memory. An authenticated attacker can exploit this by requesting a bulk download of large files, triggering an Out-Of-Memory (OOM) condition that causes the PHP-FPM process to terminate (SIGSEGV) and the web server to return a 500 error.