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The WPMU DEV Dashboard plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass in all versions up to, and including, 5.0.0. On sites not yet connected to the WPMU DEV Hub — the default state after installation — the site API key that keys the WDP-AUTH request signature is empty, making the signature verified by validate_hash() trivially forgeable; version 5.0.0 additionally removed the replay check in validate_nonce(), and the remote handler is bound to the public init hook with no capability check. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to invoke privileged Hub actions — including installing and activating a plugin from an attacker-supplied URL (resulting in remote code execution), deleting plugins and themes, upgrading WordPress core, or logging in as an administrator via SSO. Sites connected to a WPMU DEV account, which have a non-empty 64-character API key, are not affected.
Relative Path Traversal vulnerability in livebook-dev livebook allows an attacker-authored notebook to write a file with attacker-controlled content to an arbitrary path. A .livemd notebook can declare file_entries metadata, each entry carrying a name. Every path that creates a file entry through the user interface validates that name with Livebook.Notebook.validate_file_entry_name/2, which requires a flat filename of alphanumerics, dashes, underscores and dots, ending in an extension. The import path does not: Livebook.LiveMarkdown.Import.file_entry_metadata_to_attrs/1 in lib/livebook/live_markdown/import.ex takes the name verbatim from the notebook source. For a URL-type file entry, Livebook.Session.file_entry_cache_file/2 in lib/livebook/session.ex resolves that name beneath the session's temporary directory without checking that the result stays inside it, and Livebook.FileSystem.Utils.resolve_unix_like_path/2 collapses parent-directory segments while clamping only at the filesystem root. When the entry's content is requested and no cached copy exists, Livebook fetches the entry's URL and writes the response body to the resolved path, creating parent directories as needed. The attacker therefore controls both the destination and the contents of the written file, which may land anywhere the Livebook process can write. The same missing containment check is present in Livebook.Session.to_attachment_file_entry/2. A victim who opens an attacker-supplied notebook and causes the entry to be fetched triggers the write within their own authenticated session; the attacker needs no account on the target instance. URL-type entries are also not placed under notebook stamping quarantine on import, so no warning is shown. This issue affects livebook: from 0.11.0 before 0.18.7 and from 0.19.0 before 0.19.9.