Deployment of the VPS.org one-click Supabase template deploys a PostgreSQL instance that is published on all interfaces (0.0.0.0:5432) with a default database password set to "postgres". Because Docker installs its own iptables rules, this exposure bypasses a standard host UFW configuration.

Juggle through 1.6.0 contains a remote code execution vulnerability that allows unauthenticated remote attackers to execute arbitrary OS commands by connecting to the exposed H2 database web console using default shipped credentials. Attackers can access the unprotected /h2-console endpoint, authenticate with default credentials, and leverage the H2 CREATE ALIAS Runtime.exec() technique to execute arbitrary commands, resulting in root-level code execution when running the stock Docker image.

When enabling Spring Boot DevTools support for a remote application target (for example a Docker container or Cloud Foundry app) from the Spring Tools Boot Dashboard, Spring Tools generates a shared secret that authenticates DevTools remote-restart uploads to the deployed application. This secret was generated using a non-cryptographic pseudo-random number generator rather than a cryptographically secure source of randomness. Affected Spring Products and Versions: Spring Tools for Eclipse: 5.2.0 and earlier

The Boot Dashboard Docker integration in Spring Tools publishes container control ports on all of the host's network interfaces (0.0.0.0) rather than restricting them to loopback. Affected Spring Products and Versions: Spring Tools for Eclipse: 5.2.0 and earlier

proot-distro is a utility for managing proot containers. Prior to version 5.1.5, proot-distro install extracted plain tarball root filesystems through _extract_plain_tar() in proot_distro/commands/install.py and Docker layers through _apply_layer() in proot_distro/helpers/docker.py without validating archive-controlled symlink targets in member.linkname, allowing a malicious archive to plant an absolute host-path symlink and write files through it onto the host filesystem. This issue is fixed in version 5.1.5.

Papra is a minimalistic document management and archiving platform. Prior to version 26.5.0, Papra's webhook delivery system contains an SSRF protection bypass that allows any authenticated organisation member to cause the server to make HTTP requests to internal addresses — loopback, link-local, and RFC-1918 ranges. The SSRF protection validates the registered webhook URL but ignores redirect destinations. The HTTP client (ofetch) follows 3xx responses automatically, and the redirect target is never checked against the blocklist. An attacker registers a webhook pointing to an attacker-controlled server, which redirects incoming POSTs to any internal address. Exploitation was confirmed by live test against the official Docker image. The fix is a single-line change to the webhook HTTP client. This issue has been patched in version 26.5.0.

A vulnerability was identified in localstack serverless-localstack up to 1.4.0. The affected element is an unknown function of the file src/index.js of the component Configuration Handler. The manipulation of the argument custom.localstack.docker.compose_file leads to os command injection. An attack has to be approached locally. The exploit is publicly available and might be used. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet.

DbGate is cross-platform database manager. In versions 7.1.8 and prior, the `unzipDirectory()` function in `packages/api/src/shell/unzipDirectory.js` (line 27) does not validate that extracted file paths stay within the output directory. A malicious ZIP with `../` entries writes files anywhere on the filesystem. In the default Docker deployment, DbGate runs as root and the `none` auth provider issues JWT tokens without credentials via `POST /auth/login`, so this is exploitable by any network-adjacent attacker. Version 7.1.9 fixes the issue.

Mailpit is an email testing tool and API for developers. Prior to version 1.30.1, the fix for GHSA-fpxj-m5q8-fphw (CVE-2026-45710, "Mailpit: Set a default 50MB p/m limit to prevent DoS via unlimited SMTP DATA and /api/v1/send body sizes") wrapped only `POST /api/v1/send` with `http.MaxBytesReader`. The four other Mailpit JSON-body API endpoints `PUT /api/v1/messages` (SetReadStatus), `DELETE /api/v1/messages` (DeleteMessages), `PUT /api/v1/tags` (SetMessageTags), and `POST /api/v1/message/{id}/release` (ReleaseMessage) still call `json.NewDecoder(r.Body)` directly with no body-size cap and remain reachable unauthenticated in the default `docker run axllent/mailpit:latest` deploy. An unauthenticated remote attacker can post a multi-million-element `IDs` slice and drive RSS from ~25 MiB baseline to ~450 MiB per 16 MB request body. Repeating across multiple connections accumulates the same per-request amplification per process. Version 1.30.1 contains a patch.

axllent

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv4: raw: reject IP_HDRINCL packets with ihl < 5 raw_send_hdrinc() validates that the caller-supplied IPv4 header fits within the message length: iphlen = iph->ihl * 4; err = -EINVAL; if (iphlen > length) goto error_free; if (iphlen >= sizeof(*iph)) { /* fix up saddr, tot_len, id, csum, transport_header */ } It does not, however, reject ihl < 5. For such a packet the "if (iphlen >= sizeof(*iph))" branch is skipped, leaving the crafted iphdr untouched, but the packet is still handed to __ip_local_out() and onward. Downstream consumers that read iph->ihl assume a sane value: net/ipv4/ah4.c:ah_output() in particular subtracts sizeof(struct iphdr) from top_iph->ihl * 4 and passes the (signed-int-negative, then cast to size_t) result to memcpy(), producing an OOB access of length close to SIZE_MAX and a host kernel panic. An IPv4 header with ihl < 5 is malformed by definition (RFC 791: "Internet Header Length is the length of the internet header in 32 bit words ... Note that the minimum value for a correct header is 5."). The kernel should not be willing to inject such a packet into its own output path. Reject "iphlen < sizeof(*iph)" alongside the existing "iphlen > length" check. This matches the principle that locally constructed packets that re-enter the IP stack must pass the same basic sanity tests that a foreign packet would be subjected to. Once this lands, the "if (iphlen >= sizeof(*iph))" wrapper around the fixup branch becomes redundant; left in place to keep the patch minimal and backport-friendly. A follow-up can unwrap it. Note that commit 86f4c90a1c5c ("ipv4, ipv6: ensure raw socket message is big enough to hold an IP header") ensures the message buffer is large enough to hold an iphdr, but does not constrain the self-reported iph->ihl. Reachability: the malformed packet source is any caller with CAP_NET_RAW, including an unprivileged process in a user+net namespace on a kernel with CONFIG_USER_NS=y. The reproduced AH crash also requires a matching xfrm AH policy on the outgoing route; a container granted CAP_NET_ADMIN can install that state and policy in its netns. Loopback bypasses xfrm_output, so the trigger uses a real netdev. Reproduced on UML + KASAN: kernel-mode fault at addr 0x0 with memcpy_orig at the crash site. Same shape reproduces inside a rootless Docker container with --cap-add NET_ADMIN on a stock distro kernel.

Moby is an open source container framework. In Docker Engine prior to version 29.5.1, Docker Daemon versions 28.5.2 and prior, and Moby Daemon prior to version 2.0.0-beta.14, a race condition during docker cp mount setup allows a malicious container to redirect a bind mount target to an arbitrary host path, potentially overwriting host files or causing denial of service. This issue has been patched in Docker Engine version 29.5.1 and Moby Daemon version 2.0.0-beta.14.

Moby is an open source container framework. In Docker Engine prior to version 29.5.1, Docker Daemon versions 28.5.2 and prior, and Moby Daemon prior to version 2.0.0-beta.14, a race condition during docker cp mount setup allows a malicious container to create empty files or directories at arbitrary absolute paths on the host filesystem. This issue has been patched in Docker Engine version 29.5.1 and Moby Daemon version 2.0.0-beta.14.

In Duck Site before version 1.0.1, the repository has a deploy workflow that runs after the build workflow completes. The build workflow runs on pull requests, while the deploy workflow runs with package-write permissions and deployment secrets. If an attacker can make a pull request build satisfy the deploy workflow’s main branch condition, the deploy job checks out the triggering workflow commit, builds it into a Docker image, pushes it as latest, and triggers Dokploy deployment. This can allow attacker-controlled pull request code to become the deployed production site image without being merged. This issue has been patched in version 1.0.1.

Quest Bot is an opensource modern Discord Bot built for moderation, utilities and support. Prior to version 1.0.3, the repository has a privileged deploy workflow that runs after the unprivileged build workflow completes. The build workflow runs on pull requests, and the deploy workflow checks out the triggering workflow’s head_sha, builds that code into a Docker image, pushes it as latest, and triggers production deployment. If an attacker can open a pull request from a branch named main, the deploy workflow condition can treat the PR build as deployable and build the attacker-controlled commit in a privileged deployment context. This can result in malicious container deployment and production bot compromise. This issue has been patched in version 1.0.3.

Keras versions prior to 3.14.0 are vulnerable to a path traversal issue in the archive extraction utilities located in `keras/src/utils/file_utils.py`. The functions `filter_safe_tarinfos()` and `filter_safe_zipinfos()` validate archive member paths against the process current working directory (CWD) instead of the actual extraction destination. When the process runs with CWD set to `/`, which is common in Docker containers, CI/CD runners, and Jupyter environments, the validation boundary becomes the filesystem root, allowing traversal paths to bypass the security check. Additionally, the zip filter contains a bug that causes an `AttributeError` when a blocked entry is encountered, leading to incomplete extraction. Furthermore, Python 3.11 installations lack the `filter="data"` safety net, leaving them entirely reliant on the flawed CWD-based filter. Exploitation of this vulnerability can result in arbitrary file writes outside the intended extraction directory, enabling attackers to overwrite configuration files, inject malicious code, or corrupt machine learning datasets and pipelines.

Boxlite is a sandbox service that allows users to create lightweight virtual machines (Boxes) and launch OCI containers within them to run untrusted code. Prior to version 0.9.0, Boxlite allows users to specify the OCI image used by containers in the sandbox. However, when processing tar entries in OCI images, Boxlite does not account for the possibility that entries may be symlinks pointing to absolute paths. An attacker can craft a malicious OCI image and distribute it on image hosting platforms such as DockerHub, tricking users into using it. Once a user loads the malicious image, the attacker can write arbitrary content to any path on the host, which can further lead to remote code execution on the host. This issue has been patched in version 0.9.0.

An HTML injection vulnerability in the "fetch links" email sent by Thinkst Applied Research Canarytokens, enabling Interface Manipulation, Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) in emails clients that render HTML emails. This issue affects Canarytokens: from Docker tag sha-c0f3cf142 before sha-08c3f93d, from Git commit c0f3cf142 before 08c3f93d.

Moby is an open source container framework. In versions prior to 29.5.1 and in moby/moby v2 prior to v2.0.0-beta.14, when a compressed archive is uploaded to a container via `PUT /containers/{id}/archive` or piped through `docker cp -`, the daemon resolves decompression binaries (such as `xz` or `unpigz`) from the container's filesystem rather than the host's due to incorrect ordering of operations. A malicious container image containing a trojanized decompression binary can achieve arbitrary code execution with full daemon privileges, including host root UID and unrestricted capabilities, when a user uploads a compressed (xz or gzip) archive into that container. This issue is fixed in Docker Engine 29.5.1 and moby/moby v2.0.0-beta.14. Workarounds include only running containers from trusted images, using authorization plugins to restrict access to the `PUT /containers/{id}/archive` endpoint, and avoiding piping compressed archives into containers created from untrusted images

Arcane is an interface for managing Docker containers, images, networks, and volumes. Prior to 1.19.4, ProjectService.GetProjectFileContent returns the contents of any Docker Compose include directive declared in a project's compose file before any path-traversal validation runs. Because ProjectService.CreateProject writes attacker-supplied compose content to disk without validating include paths, an authenticated user can create a project whose compose file declares include: ['../../../../etc/passwd'], then read the include via the project file API. The result is arbitrary read of any file readable by the Arcane backend process, including /app/data/arcane.db (the SQLite database containing every user's password hash and API key), enabling escalation to admin and, via Arcane's Docker control plane, RCE on the host. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.19.4.

Arcane is an interface for managing Docker containers, images, networks, and volumes. Prior to 1.19.2, the PUT /api/environments/{id}/templates/variables endpoint, which writes the system-wide .env.global file used for variable substitution in every project's compose file, is missing an admin authorization check. Any authenticated non-admin user can call this endpoint with their bearer token or API key and overwrite the global environment variables that are merged into every project deployment. By overriding values like REGISTRY, IMAGE, DATABASE_URL, or SECRET_KEY that other users reference via ${VAR} in compose files, an attacker can redirect image pulls to attacker-controlled registries (supply-chain RCE on the Docker host), exfiltrate database credentials, or disrupt all projects. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.19.2.

Dokploy is a free, self-hostable Platform as a Service (PaaS). In 0.26.6 and earlier, Dokploy contains a command injection vulnerability in the /docker-container-logs WebSocket endpoint. The tail and since parameters are not validated and are directly concatenated into shell commands, allowing authenticated users to execute arbitrary commands with root privileges.

Dokploy is a free, self-hostable Platform as a Service (PaaS). In 0.29.2 and earlier, Dokploy constructs shell commands using JavaScript template literals and executes them via child_process.exec() (which runs through /bin/sh -c). User-supplied branch names, repository URLs, and Docker credentials are interpolated directly into these commands without escaping. This requires an authenticated user with application create/edit privileges.