In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: us144mkii: capture_urb_complete: redundant usb_anchor_urb corrupts anchor list on each resubmission In capture_urb_complete(), usb_anchor_urb() is called on every completion callback, but the URB is already anchored from the initial submission in tascam_trigger_start(). Each redundant call corrupts the anchor's doubly-linked list and inflates the URB refcount. When usb_kill_anchored_urbs() traverses the list during stream stop / suspend / disconnect, the corrupted list leads to use-after-free. Remove the redundant usb_anchor_urb() from the resubmit path.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: crypto: amlogic - avoid double cleanup in meson_crypto_probe() When meson_allocate_chanlist() fails after a partial allocation, it already unwinds the allocated chanlist state through its local error path. meson_crypto_probe() then jump to error_flow and calls meson_free_chanlist() again, causing the same per-flow resources to be torn down twice. In the reproduced failure path, the second teardown re-entered crypto_engine_exit() on an already destroyed worker and KASAN reported a slab-use-after-free in kthread_destroy_worker(). Prevent double-free by handling partial allocation failures locally within meson_allocate_chanlist() and skipping the outer cleanup path. The bug was first flagged by an experimental analysis tool we are developing for kernel memory-management bugs while analyzing v6.13-rc1. The tool is still under development and is not yet publicly available. The bug was reproduced in a QEMU x86_64 guest booted with KASAN on v7.1, using the reproducer under tools/testing/meson_crypto_probe. The reproducer forces the second dma_alloc_attrs() call in the gxl-crypto probe path to return NULL, making meson_allocate_chanlist() fail after partial initialization. On the unpatched kernel this reliably triggered a slab-use-after-free. With this fix applied, the same reproducer no longer emits any KASAN report and the probe fails cleanly with -ENOMEM. ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in kthread_destroy_worker+0xb2/0xd0 Read of size 8 at addr ff1100010c057a68 by task insmod/265 CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 265 Comm: insmod Tainted: G O 7.1.0-rc2-00376-g810af9adc907-dirty #10 PREEMPT(lazy) Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x68/0xa0 print_report+0xcb/0x5e0 ? __virt_addr_valid+0x21d/0x3f0 ? kthread_destroy_worker+0xb2/0xd0 ? kthread_destroy_worker+0xb2/0xd0 kasan_report+0xca/0x100 ? kthread_destroy_worker+0xb2/0xd0 kthread_destroy_worker+0xb2/0xd0 meson_crypto_probe+0x4d0/0xc10 [amlogic_gxl_crypto] platform_probe+0x99/0x140 really_probe+0x1c6/0x6a0 ? __pfx___device_attach_driver+0x10/0x10 __driver_probe_device+0x248/0x310 ? acpi_driver_match_device+0xb0/0x100 driver_probe_device+0x48/0x210 ? __pfx___device_attach_driver+0x10/0x10 __device_attach_driver+0x160/0x320 bus_for_each_drv+0x104/0x190 ? __pfx_bus_for_each_drv+0x10/0x10 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x2c/0x50 __device_attach+0x19d/0x3b0 ? __pfx___device_attach+0x10/0x10 ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x53/0x220 device_initial_probe+0x78/0xa0 bus_probe_device+0x5b/0x130 device_add+0xcfd/0x1430 ? __pfx_device_add+0x10/0x10 ? insert_resource+0x34/0x50 ? lock_release+0xc9/0x290 platform_device_add+0x24e/0x590 ? __pfx_meson_crypto_probe_repro_init+0x10/0x10 [meson_crypto_probe_repro] meson_crypto_probe_repro_init+0x330/0xff0 [meson_crypto_probe_repro] do_one_initcall+0xc0/0x450 ? __pfx_do_one_initcall+0x10/0x10 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x2c/0x50 ? __create_object+0x59/0x80 ? kasan_unpoison+0x27/0x60 do_init_module+0x27b/0x7d0 ? __pfx_do_init_module+0x10/0x10 ? kasan_quarantine_put+0x84/0x1d0 ? kfree+0x32c/0x510 ? load_module+0x561e/0x5ff0 load_module+0x54fe/0x5ff0 ? __pfx_load_module+0x10/0x10 ? security_file_permission+0x20/0x40 ? kernel_read_file+0x23d/0x6e0 ? mmap_region+0x235/0x4a0 ? __pfx_kernel_read_file+0x10/0x10 ? __file_has_perm+0x2c0/0x3e0 init_module_from_file+0x158/0x180 ? __pfx_init_module_from_file+0x10/0x10 ? __lock_acquire+0x45a/0x1ba0 ? idempotent_init_module+0x315/0x610 ? lock_release+0xc9/0x290 ? lock ---truncated---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb/client: Fix error code in smb2_aead_req_alloc() The "*num_sgs" variable is a u32 so "ERR_PTR(*num_sgs)" doesn't work. We would have to do something similar to the previous line where it's cast to int and then long. However, it's simpler to store the return in an int ret variable. This bug would eventually result in a crash when dereference the invalid error pointer.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: fix double-free in SMB2_close() replay A response-bearing attempt can return a replayable error and free its response buffer. If SMB2_close_init() fails before the next send, cleanup retains the previous buffer type and frees that response again. Reset response bookkeeping before each attempt to prevent the stale free.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: libfs: set SB_I_NOEXEC and SB_I_NODEV by default in init_pseudo() Since commit 1e7ab6f67824 ("anon_inode: rework assertions"), path_noexec() warns when an anonymous-inode file is mmap'd from a superblock that has not set SB_I_NOEXEC. dma-buf backs its files this way and never set the flag, so mmap of any exported buffer trips the warning on a CONFIG_DEBUG_VFS=y kernel: WARNING: CPU: 11 PID: 121813 at fs/exec.c:118 path_noexec+0x47/0x50 do_mmap+0x2b5/0x680 vm_mmap_pgoff+0x129/0x210 ksys_mmap_pgoff+0x177/0x240 __x64_sys_mmap+0x33/0x70 init_pseudo() sets up internal SB_NOUSER mounts that are never path-reachable. Set both flags here so every pseudo filesystem gets them by default instead of each caller setting them. SB_I_NODEV is inert for unreachable mounts. SB_I_NOEXEC has one visible effect: an executable mapping of a pseudo-fs fd, such as a dma-buf, now fails with -EPERM, which is the invariant the assertion enforces. No in-tree caller maps these executable. Reproduce on CONFIG_DEBUG_VFS=y: make -C tools/testing/selftests/dmabuf-heaps sudo ./tools/testing/selftests/dmabuf-heaps/dmabuf-heap -t system

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: hid-lenovo-go: cancel cfg_setup work in hid_go_cfg_remove() hid_go_cfg_probe() initialises drvdata.go_cfg_setup and schedules it to run 2 ms later: INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&drvdata.go_cfg_setup, &cfg_setup); schedule_delayed_work(&drvdata.go_cfg_setup, msecs_to_jiffies(2)); cfg_setup() dereferences drvdata.hdev to issue MCU command requests. hid_go_cfg_remove() tears down sysfs and stops the HID device, but never drains the delayed work. If the device is unbound within the 2 ms scheduling delay (a probe failure rolling back via remove, or a fast rmmod after probe), the work fires after hid_destroy_device() has dropped its reference and released the underlying hdev struct, leaving cfg_setup() with a stale drvdata.hdev pointer. Mirror the sibling driver hid-lenovo-go-s.c, whose hid_gos_cfg_remove() already calls cancel_delayed_work_sync() on its analogous work, and drain go_cfg_setup at the top of hid_go_cfg_remove(). The cancel must come before guard(mutex)(&drvdata.cfg_mutex) because cfg_setup() acquires that mutex; reversing the order would deadlock.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: gadget: f_fs: initialize reset_work at allocation time ffs_fs_kill_sb() unconditionally calls cancel_work_sync() on ffs->reset_work when a functionfs instance is unmounted: ffs_data_reset(ffs); cancel_work_sync(&ffs->reset_work); However ffs->reset_work is only ever initialized via INIT_WORK() in ffs_func_set_alt() and ffs_func_disable(), and only on the FFS_DEACTIVATED path. That state is reached solely by ffs_data_closed() when the instance is mounted with the "no_disconnect" option, so for the common case (no "no_disconnect", or mounted and unmounted without ever being deactivated) reset_work is never initialized. ffs_data_new() allocates the ffs_data with kzalloc_obj() and does not initialize reset_work, and ffs_data_reset()/ffs_data_clear() do not touch it either, so reset_work.func is left NULL. cancel_work_sync() on such a work then trips the WARN_ON(!work->func) guard in __flush_work(): WARNING: kernel/workqueue.c:4301 at __flush_work+0x330/0x360, CPU#3: umount Call trace: __flush_work cancel_work_sync ffs_fs_kill_sb [usb_f_fs] deactivate_locked_super deactivate_super cleanup_mnt __cleanup_mnt task_work_run exit_to_user_mode_loop el0_svc On older kernels cancel_work_sync() on a zero-initialized work struct was a silent no-op, which hid the missing initialization. Initialize reset_work once in ffs_data_new() so it is always valid for the lifetime of the ffs_data, and drop the now-redundant INIT_WORK() calls from the two deactivation paths.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: do not trim a device which is not writeable [BUG] There is a bug report that btrfs/242 can randomly fail with the following NULL pointer dereference: run fstests btrfs/242 at 2026-06-01 10:25:08 BTRFS: device fsid d4d7f234-487c-4787-88e4-47a8b68c9874 devid 1 transid 9 /dev/sdc (8:32) scanned by mount (122609) BTRFS info (device sdc): first mount of filesystem d4d7f234-487c-4787-88e4-47a8b68c9874 BTRFS info (device sdc): using crc32c checksum algorithm BTRFS warning (device sdc): devid 2 uuid fbe72d72-3272-482d-80fb-ab88ed398192 is missing BTRFS warning (device sdc): devid 2 uuid fbe72d72-3272-482d-80fb-ab88ed398192 is missing BTRFS info (device sdc): allowing degraded mounts BTRFS info (device sdc): turning on async discard BTRFS info (device sdc): enabling free space tree Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000018 user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=000000013fd6b000 CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 122625 Comm: fstrim Not tainted 7.0.10-2-default #1 PREEMPT(full) openSUSE Tumbleweed e9a5f6b24978fba3bf015a992f865837fdfff3dd Hardware name: QEMU KVM Virtual Machine, BIOS edk2-20250812-19.fc42 08/12/2025 pstate: 01400005 (nzcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : btrfs_trim_fs+0x34c/0xa00 [btrfs] lr : btrfs_trim_fs+0x1f0/0xa00 [btrfs] Call trace: btrfs_trim_fs+0x34c/0xa00 [btrfs f02c1d570ceea621c69d302ba75dd61868083840] (P) btrfs_ioctl_fitrim+0xe8/0x178 [btrfs f02c1d570ceea621c69d302ba75dd61868083840] btrfs_ioctl+0xdd4/0x2bd8 [btrfs f02c1d570ceea621c69d302ba75dd61868083840] __arm64_sys_ioctl+0xac/0x108 invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x5c/0xd0 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x40/0xf0 do_el0_svc+0x24/0x40 el0_svc+0x40/0x1d0 el0t_64_sync_handler+0xa0/0xe8 el0t_64_sync+0x1b0/0x1b8 Code: 17ffff83 f94017e0 f9002be0 f9402ea0 (f9400c00) ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Also the reporter is very kind to test the following ASSERT() added to btrfs_trim_free_extents_throttle(): ASSERT(device->bdev, "devid=%llu path=%s dev_state=0x%lx\n", device->devid, btrfs_dev_name(device), device->dev_state); And it shows the following output: assertion failed: device->bdev, in extent-tree.c:6630 (devid=2 path=/dev/sdd dev_state=0x82) Which means the device->bdev is NULL, and the dev_state is BTRFS_DEV_STATE_IN_FS_METADATA | BTRFS_DEV_STATE_ITEM_FOUND, without BTRFS_DEV_STATE_WRITEABLE flag set. [CAUSE] The pc points to the following call chain: btrfs_trim_fs() |- btrfs_trim_free_extents() |- btrfs_trim_free_extents_throttle() |- bdev_max_discard_sectors(device->bdev) So the NULL pointer dereference is caused by device->bdev being NULL. This looks impossible by a quick glance, as just before calling btrfs_trim_free_extents_throttle(), we have skipped any device that has BTRFS_DEV_STATE_MISSING flag set. However in this particular case, there is a window where the missing device is later re-scanned, causing btrfs to remove the BTRFS_DEV_STATE_MISSING flag: btrfs_control_ioctl() |- btrfs_scan_one_device() |- device_list_add() |- rcu_assign_pointer(device->name, name); | This updates the missing device's path to the new good path. | |- clear_bit(BTRFS_DEV_STATE_MISSING, &device->dev_state) This removes the BTRFS_DEV_STATE_MISSING flag. This allows the missing device to re-appear and clear the BTRFS_DEV_STATE_MISSING flag. However the device still does not have the BTRFS_DEV_STATE_WRITEABLE flag set, nor is its bdev pointer updated. The bdev pointer remains NULL, triggering the crash later. [FIX] This is a big de-synchronization between BTRFS_DEV_STATE_MISSING and device->bdev pointer, and shows a gap in btrfs's re-appearing-device handling. The proper handling of re-appearing device will need quite some extra work, which is out of the context of this small ---truncated---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: riscv: mm: Unconditionally sfence.vma for spurious fault Svvptc does not guarantee that it's safe to just return here. Since we have already cleared our bit, if, theoretically, the bounded timeframe for the accessed page to become valid still hasn't happened after sret, we could fault again and actually crash. Hopefully, these spurious faults should be rare enough that this is an acceptable slowdown.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iommu/vt-d: Avoid WARNING in sva unbind path The Intel IOMMU driver allows SVA on devices even if they do not support PCI/PRI. Commit 39c20c4e83b9 ("iommu/vt-d: Only handle IOPF for SVA when PRI is supported") modified the SVA bind path to allow this configuration by skipping IOPF enablement when PRI is missing. However, it failed to update the unbind path. This creates an imbalance: the unbind path attempts to disable IOPF for a device that never had it enabled, triggering a WARNING in intel_iommu_disable_iopf(): WARNING: drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c:3475 at intel_iommu_disable_iopf+0x4f/0x90d Call Trace: <TASK> blocking_domain_set_dev_pasid+0x50/0x70 iommu_detach_device_pasid+0x89/0xc0 iommu_sva_unbind_device+0x73/0x150 xe_vm_close_and_put+0x4d2/0x1200 [xe] Fix this by bypassing IOPF operations for SVA domains on non-PRI hardware in both the bind and unbind paths.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dma-buf/udmabuf: skip redundant cpu sync to fix cacheline EEXIST warning When CONFIG_DMA_API_DEBUG_SG is enabled, importing a udmabuf into a DRM driver (e.g. amdgpu for video playback in GNOME Videos / Showtime) triggers a spurious warning: DMA-API: amdgpu 0000:03:00.0: cacheline tracking EEXIST, \ overlapping mappings aren't supported WARNING: kernel/dma/debug.c:619 at add_dma_entry+0x473/0x5f0 The call chain is: amdgpu_cs_ioctl -> amdgpu_ttm_backend_bind -> dma_buf_map_attachment -> [udmabuf] map_udmabuf -> get_sg_table -> dma_map_sgtable(dev, sg, direction, 0) // attrs=0 -> debug_dma_map_sg -> add_dma_entry -> EEXIST This happens because udmabuf builds a per-page scatter-gather list via sg_set_folio(). When begin_cpu_udmabuf() has already created an sg table mapped for the misc device, and an importer such as amdgpu maps the same pages for its own device via map_udmabuf(), the DMA debug infrastructure sees two active mappings whose physical addresses share cacheline boundaries and warns about the overlap. The DMA_ATTR_SKIP_CPU_SYNC flag suppresses this check in add_dma_entry() because it signals that no CPU cache maintenance is performed at map/unmap time, making the cacheline overlap harmless. All other major dma-buf exporters already pass this flag: - drm_gem_map_dma_buf() passes DMA_ATTR_SKIP_CPU_SYNC - amdgpu_dma_buf_map() passes DMA_ATTR_SKIP_CPU_SYNC The CPU sync at map/unmap time is also redundant for udmabuf: begin_cpu_udmabuf() and end_cpu_udmabuf() already perform explicit cache synchronization via dma_sync_sgtable_for_cpu/device() when CPU access is requested through the dma-buf interface. Pass DMA_ATTR_SKIP_CPU_SYNC to dma_map_sgtable() and dma_unmap_sgtable() in udmabuf to suppress the spurious warning and skip the redundant sync.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: i2c: core: fix NULL-deref on adapter registration failure If adapter registration ever fails the release callback would trigger a NULL-pointer dereference as the completion struct has not been initialised. Note that before the offending commit this would instead have resulted in a minor memory leak of the adapter name.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fuse-uring: fix data races on ring->ready On weakly-ordered architectures, the store to fiq->ops can be reordered past the store to ring->ready, allowing a CPU that sees ring->ready == true via fuse_uring_ready() to dispatch requests through a stale fiq->ops pointer. Upgrade the store to smp_store_release() and the load in fuse_uring_ready() to smp_load_acquire() so that the preceding WRITE_ONCE(fiq->ops, ...) is visible to any CPU that observes ring->ready == true. Additionally, fuse_uring_do_register() publishes ring->ready with WRITE_ONCE() but the fast-path check reads it with a plain load. This is a marked-vs-unmarked access that KCSAN will flag. Wrap it in READ_ONCE() to mark it without adding unnecessary ordering. Also wrap the fc->ring load in fuse_uring_ready() in READ_ONCE() to prevent the compiler from reloading it between the NULL check and the dereference.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: ethernet: arc: emac: quiesce interrupts before requesting IRQ Normal RX/TX interrupts are enabled later, in arc_emac_open(), so probe should not see interrupt delivery in the usual case. However, hardware may still present stale or latched interrupt status left by firmware or the bootloader. If probe later unwinds after devm_request_irq() has installed the handler, such a stale interrupt can still reach arc_emac_intr() during teardown and race with release of the associated net_device. Avoid that window by putting the device into a known quiescent state before requesting the IRQ: disable all EMAC interrupt sources and clear any pending EMAC interrupt status bits. This keeps the change hardware-focused and minimal, while preventing spurious IRQ delivery from leftover state.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: brcmfmac: drain bus_reset work on device removal brcmf_fw_crashed() and the debugfs "reset" entry both schedule drvr->bus_reset, whose callback recovers drvr through container_of() and dereferences it. The removal path frees drvr (brcmf_free -> wiphy_free) without draining the work, so a bus_reset callback pending or running during removal can outlive drvr. Cancellation cannot live in brcmf_detach() or brcmf_free(): the work callback reaches teardown through the bus .reset op (PCIe brcmf_pcie_reset -> brcmf_detach; SDIO brcmf_sdio_bus_reset -> brcmf_sdiod_remove -> brcmf_free), so cancelling there would wait for the running work and deadlock. Add a per-bus mutex (bus_reset_lock) and route all arming through brcmf_bus_schedule_reset(), which under the lock skips when the bus is marked removing. Each bus remove entry calls brcmf_bus_cancel_reset_work(), which under the same lock sets removing and cancels the work. Holding the mutex across cancel_work_sync() makes the set-removing + drain step atomic. Every producer reaches the arming path from process context -- the PCIe firmware-halt notification runs in the threaded IRQ handler (brcmf_pcie_isr_thread) and the SDIO hostmail path runs from the data workqueue -- so the mutex is taken only in sleepable contexts. Where applicable the remove entry first stops the firmware-crash producer: on PCIe mask the mailbox and synchronize_irq; on SDIO unregister the bus interrupt and cancel the data worker, which also reports firmware halts through brcmf_fw_crashed(). The mutex is initialized at bus allocation. The SDIO suspend power-off path frees drvr through the same brcmf_sdiod_remove() and takes the same lock; resume re-allows the work only on a successful re-probe. Also guard brcmf_fw_crashed() against a NULL bus_if/drvr: it can fire before brcmf_attach() wires up drvr, and it dereferences drvr (bphy_err/brcmf_dev_coredump) before reaching the arming gate. The bus_reset work is shared across buses, so the drain is applied to every remove path: PCIe (the .reset op introduced by the Fixes commit), SDIO (arms the same work through brcmf_fw_crashed()), and USB (via the debugfs "reset" entry). cancel_work_sync() drains a running or pending bus_reset work item before removal frees drvr, and patch 1/2 makes the scratch-buffer release safe when reset teardown has already released those DMA buffers. This patch fixes the lifetime of the bus_reset work item itself. It does not attempt to address the separate, pre-existing lifetime of the asynchronous firmware completion started by the PCIe reset path. That callback needs its own lifetime/ownership protocol and is being tracked separately. This issue was found by an in-house static analysis tool.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: can: esd_usb: kill anchored URBs before freeing netdevs esd_usb_disconnect() frees each CAN netdev with free_candev() inside its per-netdev loop and only calls unlink_all_urbs(dev) afterwards. The per-netdev private data (struct esd_usb_net_priv) is embedded in the net_device allocation returned by alloc_candev(), so once free_candev() has run, dev->nets[i] points to freed memory. unlink_all_urbs() then dereferences the freed dev->nets[i] to kill the per-netdev TX anchor (usb_kill_anchored_urbs(&priv->tx_submitted)), clear active_tx_jobs, and reset priv->tx_contexts[]. Reorder the teardown so the anchored URBs are killed before the netdevs are freed, matching other CAN/USB drivers in the same directory such as ems_usb, usb_8dev and mcba_usb, which unregister, then unlink, then free: unregister the netdevs first (which stops their TX queues), call unlink_all_urbs(dev) once, then free the netdevs. This issue was found by an in-house static analysis tool.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: gadget: f_midi: cancel pending IN work before freeing the midi object The f_midi driver embeds a work item (midi->work) whose handler, f_midi_in_work(), dereferences the enclosing struct f_midi through container_of(). This work is armed from two sites: f_midi_complete(), on a normal IN-endpoint completion, and f_midi_in_trigger(), on an ALSA rawmidi output-stream start. Neither f_midi_disable() nor f_midi_unbind() cancels midi->work. f_midi_disable() only disables the endpoints and drains the in_req_fifo; it does not synchronize the work item, and the sound card is released asynchronously to the final free of the midi object. The midi object is reference-counted (midi->free_ref) and is freed in f_midi_free() only once both the usb_function reference and the rawmidi private_data reference have been dropped. In f_midi_unbind(), f_midi_disable() runs before the sound card is released, so while the USB endpoints are already disabled the rawmidi device is still usable by an open substream. A concurrent userspace write on such a substream can reach f_midi_in_trigger() and queue midi->work again after f_midi_disable() has returned. A work item armed this way may still be pending when the last reference drops and f_midi_free() proceeds to kfree(midi), letting f_midi_in_work() dereference the struct after it has been freed, a use-after-free. For this reason cancelling midi->work in f_midi_disable() would not be sufficient: the ALSA trigger path can rearm the work after disable() returns. Cancelling at the refcount-zero free site is the boundary after which neither arming source can survive, because by then both references that keep the midi object alive have been dropped: the USB endpoints are already disabled and the rawmidi device has been released. Fix this by calling cancel_work_sync(&midi->work) in the refcount-zero block of f_midi_free(), before the embedded work_struct is freed along with the rest of the structure. opts->lock is a sleeping mutex, so calling cancel_work_sync() under it is permitted, and the handler takes midi->transmit_lock rather than opts->lock, so no self-deadlock can occur while it waits for a running instance of the work to finish. This issue was found by an in-house static analysis tool.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: gadget: udc: bdc: free IRQ and drain func_wake_notify before teardown The Broadcom BDC UDC driver registers its IRQ handler with devm_request_irq() in bdc_udc_init(), so the IRQ is released by devm only after bdc_remove() returns. devm releases resources in reverse LIFO order, but bdc_remove() runs bdc_udc_exit() and bdc_hw_exit() -> bdc_mem_free() manually before returning: bdc_udc_exit() tears down individual endpoint objects via bdc_free_ep(), while bdc_hw_exit() -> bdc_mem_free() frees and NULLs the DMA-coherent status-report ring (bdc->srr.sr_bds) and kfree()s bdc->bdc_ep_array. Both happen while the IRQ handler (bdc_udc_interrupt, requested with IRQF_SHARED) remains deliverable in the window up to the post-remove devm free_irq(). On receipt of a shared interrupt in that window, bdc_udc_interrupt() dereferences bdc->srr.sr_bds[bdc->srr.dqp_index] (NULL or freed DMA) and dispatches sr_handler callbacks that index into bdc_ep_array, causing a NULL-deref or use-after-free. The same window affects the delayed_work bdc->func_wake_notify, which is armed from the IRQ handler via bdc_sr_uspc() -> handle_link_state_change() -> schedule_delayed_work() and may self-rearm from its own callback bdc_func_wake_timer(). No cancel exists anywhere in the driver, so a queued work item that fires after bdc_remove() returns and the bdc structure is devm-freed dereferences freed memory. Replace devm_request_irq() with request_irq() and add an explicit free_irq(bdc->irq, bdc) in bdc_remove(). Clear BDC_GIE before free_irq() to stop the device from asserting interrupts, then free_irq() drains any in-flight handler, then cancel_delayed_work_sync() drains the func_wake_notify delayed work. This ordering ensures the IRQ handler and delayed work cannot interfere with the subsequent endpoint and DMA teardown in bdc_udc_exit() and bdc_hw_exit(). Wire the matching free_irq() into the bdc_udc_init() error path so the IRQ is released on probe failure, and route the bdc_init_ep() failure through err0 instead of returning directly. This issue was found by an in-house static analysis tool.

The JWT authentication mechanism accepts tokens signed with algorithms other than those explicitly configured or supported. This allows an attacker to craft a JWT with an unsupported algorithm, which is then incorrectly validated, leading to unauthorized access. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may result in unauthorized access to the system, including the potential compromise of administrative accounts and full account takeover. The CVSS score is adjusted to 9.8 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H) in single-tenant deployments, reflecting that the impact is contained within a single security authority boundary.

Tokens issued to a low-privileged user are not sufficiently restricted, allowing them to be used to access product-level Admin REST APIs. Exploitation of this vulnerability allows a low-privileged user to invoke the Admin REST APIs of WSO2 products, potentially leading to full administrative account takeover. This requires the attacker to already possess a low-privileged user account and be able to obtain a valid token for it.

A security vulnerability has been detected in SourceCodester Computer Repair Shop Management System 1.0. Affected by this issue is some unknown functionality of the file /classes/Master.php?f=delete_product. Such manipulation of the argument ID leads to sql injection. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The exploit has been disclosed publicly and may be used.

A weakness has been identified in itsourcecode Hospital Management System 1.0. Affected by this vulnerability is an unknown functionality of the file /servicetype.php. This manipulation of the argument editid causes sql injection. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. The exploit has been made available to the public and could be used for attacks.

A security flaw has been discovered in poco-ai poco-agent up to 0.5.4. Affected is the function WorkspaceManager._setup_session_persistence of the file executor/app/core/workspace.py of the component Claude File Handler. The manipulation results in incomplete cleanup. The attack may be performed from remote. Attacks of this nature are highly complex. The exploitability is told to be difficult. The exploit has been released to the public and may be used for attacks.