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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iommufd: Set upper bounds on cache invalidation entry_num and entry_len iommufd_hwpt_invalidate() takes a user-controlled entry_num and entry_len, each bounded only by U32_MAX. An entry_len beyond the kernel's struct size makes the copy helper verify the extra bytes are zero, scanning that excess in one uninterruptible pass; a multi-gigabyte value over zeroed user memory trips the soft-lockup watchdog. A large entry_num is the other half, driving the backend invalidation loop with no reschedule. The VT-d nested handler, for one, copies each entry and flushes caches per iteration, pinning the CPU on a non-preemptible kernel. Cap both in the ioctl. entry_len is held under PAGE_SIZE, above any request struct, and entry_num under 1 << 19, the order of a hardware invalidation queue and well beyond any real batch, bounding the per-call loop length.
FFmpeg through 8.1.2, fixed in commit 5d7112c, contains an uncontrolled resource consumption vulnerability in the IAMF demuxer that allows an unauthenticated attacker to cause multi-gigabyte memory allocation from a 17-byte input file by supplying a crafted count_label field. The mix_presentation_obu() function in libavformat/iamf_parse.c calls av_calloc(count_label, sizeof(*language_label)) with an attacker-controlled value before validating available OBU data, enabling an allocation amplification of approximately 126 million bytes per input byte that exhausts process memory or triggers an OOM-kill during format probing.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/siw: Reject MPA FPDU length underflow before signed receive math A malicious connected siw peer can send an iWARP FPDU whose MPA length field (c_hdr->mpa_len, 16 bit big-endian, peer-controlled) is smaller than the fixed DDP/RDMAP header for the announced opcode. Soft-iWARP parses the full header in siw_get_hdr() based on iwarp_pktinfo[opcode] .hdr_len, but never compares mpa_len against that header length. siw_tcp_rx_data() then derives srx->fpdu_part_rem = be16_to_cpu(mpa_len) - fpdu_part_rcvd + MPA_HDR_SIZE; where fpdu_part_rcvd equals iwarp_pktinfo[opcode].hdr_len at this point. For a tagged WRITE (hdr_len 16, MPA_HDR_SIZE 2) the smallest on-wire mpa_len of 0 yields fpdu_part_rem = -14, and any mpa_len below hdr_len - MPA_HDR_SIZE underflows to a negative int. The signed value then flows into siw_proc_write()/siw_proc_rresp() as bytes = min(srx->fpdu_part_rem, srx->skb_new); is handed to siw_check_mem() as an int len (whose interval check addr + len > mem->va + mem->len is satisfied for a valid base when len is negative), and reaches siw_rx_data() -> siw_rx_kva() / siw_rx_umem() -> skb_copy_bits() as a signed copy length. The header copy branch in skb_copy_bits() promotes that to size_t, producing a multi-gigabyte read. KASAN under a KUnit harness that drives the real kernel TCP receive path -- a loopback AF_INET socketpair, the malformed FPDU written via kernel_sendmsg, sk_data_ready firing in softirq, tcp_read_sock dispatching to siw_tcp_rx_data -- reports: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in skb_copy_bits+0x284/0x480 Read of size 4294967295 at addr ffff888... Call Trace: skb_copy_bits siw_rx_kva siw_rx_data siw_check_mem siw_proc_write siw_tcp_rx_data __tcp_read_sock siw_qp_llp_data_ready tcp_data_ready tcp_data_queue Add the missing invariant at the earliest point where the peer header is fully assembled. iwarp_pktinfo[*].hdr_len - MPA_HDR_SIZE is exactly the value the siw transmitter uses as the minimum mpa_len for each opcode (drivers/infiniband/sw/siw/siw_qp.c:33), so this matches the protocol contract. Out-of-range FPDUs terminate the connection with TERM_ERROR_LAYER_LLP / LLP_ETYPE_MPA / LLP_ECODE_FPDU_START -- which is RFC 5044 Section 8 error code 3 ("Marker and ULPDU Length fields do not agree on the start of an FPDU"), the correct framing-error class for this inconsistency.