Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. In netty-codec-haproxy prior to versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final, when decoding a PP2_TYPE_SSL TLV, HAProxyMessage.readNextTLV() first calls `header.retainedSlice(header.readerIndex(), length)` and only then reads the 1-byte client field and 4-byte verify field. If the attacker sets the TLV length below 5, the subsequent readByte/readInt throws IndexOutOfBoundsException. HAProxyMessageDecoder only catches HAProxyProtocolException around this call, so the IOOBE propagates and the retained slice on the pooled cumulation buffer is never released. Versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final patch the issue.

netty

Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache and Keepalived servers. In versions 8.2.6.4 and prior, ommit d4d10006 ("Expand validation to block .. in config_file_name and configver for improved security") added a line in app/modules/config/config.py:462. This is tuple-membership, not substring containment — '..' in (a, b, c) evaluates to True only if any of a, b, c is equal to the literal string '..'. For any realistic path-traversal payload (../../etc/passwd, ..\\..\\etc\\passwd, etc.) the check returns False and the patch silently lets the payload through. At time of publication, there are no publicly available patches.

Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache and Keepalived servers. In versions 8.2.6.4 and prior, there is an authentication bypass vulnerability via 'api' substring in URL + unauthenticated /api/gpt. At time of publication, there are no publicly available patches.

Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache and Keepalived servers. In versions 8.2.6.4 and prior, the login flow allow-lists next URLs by rejecting strings containing https:// or http:// substrings, then constructs https://{request.host}{next_url} and the JS client redirects via window.location.replace(). The block does not consider the userinfo@host syntax. next=@evil.example/path produces https://victim.example@evil.example/path, which all modern browsers route to evil.example. At time of publication, there are no publicly available patches.

Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache and Keepalived servers. In versions 8.2.6.4 and prior, EscapedString (app/modules/roxywi/class_models.py:16-30) is the centralised Pydantic validator used on dozens of fields including SSH credential name, username, description, etc. Its if/elif/elif/else flow returns the metacharacter-stripped value without also enforcing the .. block. An attacker who appends a single ;, &, |, $, or backtick to a .. payload routes the value through the strip arm, where .. survives unblocked and the result is not shlex.quote()'d either. At time of publication, there are no publicly available patches.

Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache and Keepalived servers. In versions 8.2.6.4 and prior, POST /config/versions/<service>/<server_ip>/<configver>/save interpolates the URL-path configver parameter directly into a config-version path that ends up at os.system(f"dos2unix -q {cfg}"). configver is not run through EscapedString (Pydantic doesn't validate path segments declared as str) and the surrounding .. block is the broken tuple-membership patch from GHSA-vapt-004. An authenticated user with role <= 3 ("user") therefore reaches a bin/sh -c command-injection sink. At time of publication, there are no publicly available patches.

Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache and Keepalived servers. In versions 8.2.6.4 and prior, GET /history/<service>/<server_ip> re-uses the server_ip path parameter as a user-id when service == 'user', with no authorization check. Any authenticated user — even a guest in an unrelated group — can list any other user's full action audit trail (server IPs touched, configs deployed, services restarted). At time of publication, there are no publicly available patches.

Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache and Keepalived servers. In versions 8.2.6.4 and prior, the /smon/agent/{version,uptime,status,checks}/<server_ip> family of routes takes the URL path component verbatim into requests.get(f'http://{server_ip}:{agent_port}/...'). The path component is constrained only by Flask's default URL converter, which permits any value (including IPv4 literals like 169.254.169.254, RFC1918 ranges, and 127.0.0.1). At time of publication, there are no publicly available patches.

Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache and Keepalived servers. In versions 8.2.6.4 and prior, wrap_line (app/modules/common/common.py:181-186) and highlight_word (app/modules/common/common.py:188-192) build raw HTML by string concatenation with no escaping. The frontend (app/static/js/script.js, log-viewer paths) uses .html(data) / .append(data) to inject the response body. Anyone able to write a line into a managed HAProxy/Nginx access log (i.e. anyone who can send an HTTP request to the public LB) can land an <svg/onload=…> payload that executes when a Roxy-WI admin opens the log viewer. At time of publication, there are no publicly available patches.

Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache and Keepalived servers. In versions 8.2.6.4 and prior, get_ldap_email (app/modules/roxywi/user.py:120-157) builds the LDAP search filter via f-string concatenation. The username URL path parameter is taken verbatim — no checkAjaxInput, no LDAP escape — and inserted, a username like *)(mail=*)(cn=* injects additional clauses, allowing the admin to enumerate or harvest attributes outside the intended record. At time of publication, there are no publicly available patches.

Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache and Keepalived servers. In versions 8.2.6.4 and prior, the HAProxy section-save endpoints (POST /api/service/haproxy/<server_id>/section/<section_type> and the PUT / global / defaults variants) accept a JSON option field that is not validated, not escaped, and is rendered verbatim into the generated HAProxy configuration via the section.j2, global.j2, and defaults.j2 Ansible templates. Because Roxy-WI then pushes the generated config to the load balancer and runs systemctl reload haproxy, an authenticated user with role ≤ 3 (user) can inject arbitrary HAProxy directives into the config that runs on every load balancer their group manages — including option external-check + external-check command /bin/bash -c '…', which gives remote code execution on the load balancer as the haproxy user on every health-check tick. At time of publication, there are no publicly available patches.

Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache and Keepalived servers. In versions 8.2.6.4 and prior, POST /waf/<service>/<server_ip>/rule/<rule_id>/save accepts a config_file_name form field that is passed straight through to config_mod.master_slave_upload_and_restart(...) as the destination path. The validation chain (_replace_config_path_to_correct → check_is_conf) only requires the path to contain a hard-coded service substring (nginx/haproxy/apache2/httpd/keepalived) and the substring conf or cfg, and to not contain ... The encoded-slash substitution 92 → / is applied before the substring check, so the attacker can build any absolute path anywhere on the LB filesystem as long as it satisfies those substring constraints. The body of the WAF rule (config form field) is written verbatim to that path. By choosing a filename like 92etc92cron.d92nginx_cfg_evil (resolving to /etc/cron.d/nginx_cfg_evil), an attacker drops a cron entry on the load balancer with attacker-controlled content. Cron parses the file on its next scan, executing the embedded job as root — full RCE on every load balancer the caller's group manages. At time of publication, there are no publicly available patches.

Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache and Keepalived servers. In versions 8.2.6.4 and prior, the install blueprint declares only bp.before_request → @jwt_required() (app/routes/install/routes.py:36-39). The individual endpoints install_exporter, install_waf, install_geoip, check_geoip, get_exporter_version, and get_task_status are not wrapped in page_for_admin and do not call roxywi_common.is_user_has_access_to_its_group(server_ip) or check_is_server_in_group(server_ip). Only the GET index page (install_monitoring) gates on roxywi_auth.page_for_admin(level=2). Because the missing decorators omit both role and group checks, any logged-in user — including the default guest role 4 — can install/reconfigure exporters, WAF, and GeoIP databases on every server in the Roxy-WI database, regardless of tenant ownership. The Ansible playbooks run with the per-server SSH credential stored in Roxy-WI, which the credentials' rightful owner (a different tenant) has provisioned with sudo rights for the management workflow. At time of publication, there are no publicly available patches.

Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache and Keepalived servers. In versions 8.2.6.4 and prior, PUT /smon/check (app/routes/smon/routes.py:117-138) gates only on roxywi_common.check_user_group_for_flask() — which validates that the caller has some group, not that the target check_id belongs to it. The downstream SQL update functions update_smon, update_smonHttp, update_smonTcp, update_smonPing, update_smonDns (app/modules/db/smon.py:515-562) all execute WHERE smon_id = ? with no user_group filter. The DELETE path is correctly filtered (app/modules/db/smon.py:319-327 does WHERE id = ? AND user_group = ?), demonstrating that the maintainers know the right pattern but did not apply it on UPDATE. Therefore any authenticated user can iterate over smon_id values and silently rewrite any other tenant's HTTP / TCP / Ping / DNS monitoring check. At time of publication, there are no publicly available patches.

Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache and Keepalived servers. In versions 8.2.6.4 and prior, agent_action (app/routes/smon/agent_routes.py:166-179) has decorators @bp.post('/agent/action/<action>') and @jwt_required() only — no role check, no group ownership check on the server_ip form field. Any authenticated user, including role 4 (guest), can start, stop, or restart the roxy-wi-smon-agent systemd unit on any server they can name. Roxy-WI executes the systemd action over its own SSH credentials (passwordless sudo), so the action runs as root on the target. At time of publication, there are no publicly available patches.

The Route OpenShift resource allows to define routes to make pods reachable at a subdomain through HAProxy. It was found that the checks performed on the spec.path YAML stanza in a Route document was insufficient and could allow a controlled injection of the HAProxy configuration.

redhat

Loop with Unreachable Exit Condition ('Infinite Loop') vulnerability in mtrudel bandit allows unauthenticated remote denial of service via worker process exhaustion. 'Elixir.Bandit.HTTP1.Socket':do_read_chunked_data!/5 in lib/bandit/http1/socket.ex terminates only when the last-chunk line 0\r\n is followed immediately by the empty trailer line \r\n. RFC 9112 §7.1.2 permits zero or more trailer fields between them. When trailers are present, none of the match clauses fit: the catch-all arm computes a negative to_read, calls read_available!/2, receives <<>> on timeout, and tail-recurses with unchanged state. The worker process is pinned for the lifetime of the TCP connection. A handful of concurrent connections sending RFC-conformant chunked requests with trailer fields is sufficient to exhaust the Bandit worker pool and render the server unresponsive to all further traffic. No authentication, special headers, or large payload is required. Proxies such as NGINX and HAProxy legitimately forward trailer-bearing requests, so servers behind such proxies may be affected without any malicious client involvement. This issue affects bandit: from 1.6.1 before 1.11.1.

mtrudel

Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache and Keepalived servers. Prior to version 8.2.6.4, the /config/ < service > /find-in-config endpoint in Roxy-WI fails to sanitize the user-supplied words parameter before embedding it into a shell command string that is subsequently executed on a remote managed server via SSH. An authenticated attacker can inject arbitrary shell metacharacters to break out of the intended grep command context and execute arbitrary OS commands with sudo privileges on the target server, resulting in full Remote Code Execution (RCE). Version 8.2.6.4 patches the issue.

roxy-wi

Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache and Keepalived servers. Versions prior to 8.2.6.4 have a SQL injection vulnerability in the haproxy_section_save function in app/routes/config/routes.py. The server_ip parameter, sourced from the URL path, is passed unsanitized through multiple function calls and ultimately interpolated into a SQL query string using Python string formatting, allowing attackers to execute arbitrary SQL commands. Version 8.2.6.4 fixes the issue.

roxy-wi

Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache and Keepalived servers. Prior to version 8.2.6.4, the oldconfig parameter in the haproxy_section_save interface has an arbitrary file read vulnerability. Version 8.2.6.4 fixes the issue.

roxy-wi

Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache and Keepalived servers. Prior to version 8.2.6.4, the haproxy_section_save interface presents a vulnerability that could lead to remote code execution due to path traversal and writing into scheduled tasks. Version 8.2.6.4 fixes the issue.

roxy-wi

Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache and Keepalived servers. In versions up to and including 8.2.8.2, when LDAP authentication is enabled, Roxy-WI constructs an LDAP search filter by directly concatenating the user-supplied login username into the filter string without escaping LDAP special characters. An unauthenticated attacker can inject LDAP filter metacharacters into the username field to manipulate the search query, cause the directory to return an unintended user entry, and bypass authentication entirely — gaining access to the application without knowing any valid password. As of time of publication, no known patches are available.

roxy-wi