Relative Path Traversal vulnerability in livebook-dev livebook allows an attacker-authored notebook to write a file with attacker-controlled content to an arbitrary path. A .livemd notebook can declare file_entries metadata, each entry carrying a name. Every path that creates a file entry through the user interface validates that name with Livebook.Notebook.validate_file_entry_name/2, which requires a flat filename of alphanumerics, dashes, underscores and dots, ending in an extension. The import path does not: Livebook.LiveMarkdown.Import.file_entry_metadata_to_attrs/1 in lib/livebook/live_markdown/import.ex takes the name verbatim from the notebook source. For a URL-type file entry, Livebook.Session.file_entry_cache_file/2 in lib/livebook/session.ex resolves that name beneath the session's temporary directory without checking that the result stays inside it, and Livebook.FileSystem.Utils.resolve_unix_like_path/2 collapses parent-directory segments while clamping only at the filesystem root. When the entry's content is requested and no cached copy exists, Livebook fetches the entry's URL and writes the response body to the resolved path, creating parent directories as needed. The attacker therefore controls both the destination and the contents of the written file, which may land anywhere the Livebook process can write. The same missing containment check is present in Livebook.Session.to_attachment_file_entry/2. A victim who opens an attacker-supplied notebook and causes the entry to be fetched triggers the write within their own authenticated session; the attacker needs no account on the target instance. URL-type entries are also not placed under notebook stamping quarantine on import, so no warning is shown. This issue affects livebook: from 0.11.0 before 0.18.7 and from 0.19.0 before 0.19.9.

Origin Validation Error vulnerability in livebook-dev livebook allows untrusted notebook output JavaScript to trigger session-wide keyboard shortcuts, including forced evaluation of all cells and runtime restart. Livebook's JS-view feature renders notebook-defined JavaScript inside a sandboxed, cross-origin iframe specifically because that JavaScript is untrusted. The trusted iframe shell in iframe/priv/static/iframe/v5.html forwards every keydown event fired in its own window to the parent page without consulting Event.isTrusted, so an event synthesized by the untrusted script through window.dispatchEvent is forwarded exactly as a genuine keystroke would be. The parent-side relay in assets/js/hooks/js_view.js reconstructs and re-dispatches it on the live page with no further validation, and because assets/js/hooks/session.js registers the global shortcut handler on the document in the capture phase, that handler acts on the replicated event regardless of how it was produced. Sandboxed output JavaScript can therefore drive Livebook's session-wide keyboard shortcuts. Two of them reach LivebookWeb.SessionLive and execute immediately with no confirmation: the shortcut for queueing full evaluation runs every cell in the notebook, and the shortcut for reconnecting the runtime disconnects and reconnects it, discarding in-memory state. A third shortcut deletes the focused cell behind a confirmation dialog that the user can permanently dismiss, after which it too executes silently. Forced full evaluation is the significant consequence, because it causes the notebook's own Elixir code to run without the user choosing to evaluate anything. A user who merely opens a notebook obtained from a third party, or reached from published documentation, can have its code executed on their runtime. Livebook also mirrors cell outputs to every connected client, so a malicious output triggers in a collaborator's browser as soon as it renders. This issue affects livebook: from 0.5.0 before 0.18.7 and from 0.19.0 before 0.19.9.

Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command (OS Command Injection) vulnerability in livebook-dev livebook allows command injection into generated deployment setup commands. LivebookWeb.Hub.Teams.DeploymentGroupAgentComponent.docker_instructions/2 and LivebookWeb.Hub.Teams.DeploymentGroupAgentComponent.fly_instructions/4 in lib/livebook_web/live/hub/teams/deployment_group_agent_component.ex interpolate deployment group environment variable values into the generated Docker and Fly.io setup commands without shell escaping. The values originate from the deployment group configuration and reach the sinks through Livebook.Hubs.Dockerfile.online_docker_info/3. Both sinks place the value inside a double-quoted shell word, so a value containing a command substitution such as $(...) or backticks is evaluated by the shell without any need to break out of the quoting, and a literal double quote terminates the quoted word and allows arbitrary further tokens. The generated command is displayed in the Livebook web interface with a copy button, so a user who copies it and runs it without reviewing it first executes the injected commands on their own machine, under their own account. An attacker requires privileges sufficient to set deployment group environment variables, while the resulting code execution occurs on the machine of whoever runs the generated command. The Kubernetes instructions are not affected, because they render the same values into a YAML manifest with escaping rather than into a shell command. This issue affects livebook: from 0.13.0 before 0.18.7 and from 0.19.0 before 0.19.9.

Livebook is a web application for writing interactive and collaborative code notebooks. On Windows, it is possible to open a `livebook://` link from a browser which opens Livebook Desktop and triggers arbitrary code execution on victim's machine. Any user using Livebook Desktop on Windows is potentially vulnerable to arbitrary code execution when they expect Livebook to be opened from browser. This vulnerability has been fixed in version 0.8.2 and 0.9.3.

livebook · microsoft