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LobeHub is a work-and-lifestyle space to find, build, and collaborate with agent teammates that grow with you. Prior to 2.1.48, when LobeChat processes custom tags in the Render process of src/features/Portal/Artifacts/Body/Renderer/index.tsx, if no type match is found, it will choose to call the default method, HTMLRenderer, for HTML rendering. If an attacker can induce the LLM to output content containing malicious tags, an XSS vulnerability can be created on the client side. Additionally, Lobechat's Electron main process exposes an IPC interface called runCommand, used to invoke system commands. This interface allows arbitrary command execution and does not filter the command parameter. Therefore, if an attacker can obtain a handle to window.parent.electronAPI via XSS and call the runCommand method of the IPC, the ipcMain process can execute arbitrary system commands with the current user's privileges. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.1.48.
LobeHub is a work-and-lifestyle space to find, build, and collaborate with agent teammates that grow with you. Prior to 2.1.48, the webapi authentication layer trusts a client-controlled X-lobe-chat-auth header that is only XOR-obfuscated, not signed or otherwise authenticated. Because the XOR key is hardcoded in the repository, an attacker can forge arbitrary auth payloads and bypass authentication on protected webapi routes. Affected routes include /webapi/chat/[provider], /webapi/models/[provider], /webapi/models/[provider]/pull, and /webapi/create-image/comfyui. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.1.48.
lobehub
LobeHub is an open source human-and-AI-agent network. Prior to version 1.143.3, the file upload feature in `Knowledge Base > File Upload` does not validate the integrity of the upload request, allowing users to intercept and modify the request parameters. As a result, it is possible to create arbitrary files in abnormal or unintended paths. In addition, since `lobechat.com` relies on the size parameter from the request to calculate file usage, an attacker can manipulate this value to misrepresent the actual file size, such as uploading a `1 GB` file while reporting it as `10 MB`, or falsely declaring a `10 MB` file as a `1 GB` file. By manipulating the size value provided in the client upload request, it is possible to bypass the monthly upload quota enforced by the server and continuously upload files beyond the intended storage and traffic limits. This abuse can result in a discrepancy between actual resource consumption and billing calculations, causing direct financial impact to the service operator. Additionally, exhaustion of storage or related resources may lead to degraded service availability, including failed uploads, delayed content delivery, or temporary suspension of upload functionality for legitimate users. A single malicious user can also negatively affect other users or projects sharing the same subscription plan, effectively causing an indirect denial of service (DoS). Furthermore, excessive and unaccounted-for uploads can distort monitoring metrics and overload downstream systems such as backup processes, malware scanning, and media processing pipelines, ultimately undermining overall operational stability and service reliability. Version 1.143.3 contains a patch for the issue.