Lookyloo did not enforce limits on the decompressed size of uploaded capture archives and compressed HAR files. An attacker could submit a specially crafted ZIP, gzip, or zlib-compressed capture containing data that expands to a very large size during processing. Because the application decompressed this content directly in memory without first limiting the output size, processing the malicious capture could exhaust available memory, terminate a web or worker process, or make the Lookyloo instance unavailable. The vulnerability affects both full Lookyloo capture archive imports and API submissions containing gzip-compressed HAR data. Repeated exploitation could cause a persistent denial-of-service condition until the affected processes or instance are restarted. The patch introduces: * A 1 GB cumulative uncompressed-size limit for imported capture archives. * Size-limited gzip and zlib decompression for compressed HAR files. * Explicit detection and handling of suspected zip bombs. * An HTTP 400 response when an oversized compressed HAR file is submitted through the API.

Lookyloo is a web interface that allows users to capture a website page and then display a tree of domains that call each other. Prior to 1.35.3, Lookyloo passed improperly escaped values to cells rendered in datatables using the orthogonal-data feature. It is definitely exploitable from the popup view, but it is most probably also exploitable in many other places. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.35.3.

lookyloo