361,800
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85,816
High
1,626
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Zigbee2MQTT's ExternalJSExtension.getFilePath() (lib/extension/externalJS.ts) joins a `name` parameter received via an MQTT message (topic zigbee2mqtt/bridge/request/extension/save) into the extensions base path using path.join(basePath, name) with no sanitization. Because path.join() resolves `../` sequences, a name such as `../../tmp/evil.js` escapes the intended extensions directory. The extension handler only validates that the name ends in .js/.mjs/.cjs, writes the file, and then dynamically imports it via Node.js import(), achieving remote code execution. Requires the `enable_external_js` config option (off by default, but commonly enabled in legacy installs) and MQTT broker access, which is frequently unauthenticated in real deployments. The identical unsanitized getFilePath() is also used by the extension-removal handler, enabling arbitrary file deletion.
OpenBK7231T's CHANNEL_SetLabel() (src/cmnds/cmd_channels.c) stores channel labels received via the MQTT SetChannelLabel command using strdup() with no HTML sanitization. CHANNEL_GetLabel() returns these labels unsanitized, and they are rendered via hprintf255() at 15+ locations in src/httpserver/http_fns.c with no HTML encoding. An attacker with MQTT broker access (commonly unauthenticated in real deployments) can set a channel label containing a <script> payload that executes when any user views the device's web panel.
An unauthenticated remote attacker can inject malicious input into the ModbusServer application because it does not validate the input it fetches from MQTT. This may lead to integrity and availability loss.