Nimiq is a Rust implementation of the Nimiq Proof-of-Stake protocol based on the Albatross consensus algorithm. Prior to version 1.4.0, iIn handle_dht_get(), the DhtResults accumulator is only initialized when the first DHT record passes verification. If the first record fails (from a malicious DHT node), DhtResults is never created, and all subsequent valid records are discarded with "DHT inconsistent state" errors. This issue has been patched in version 1.4.0.

Nimiq is a Rust implementation of the Nimiq Proof-of-Stake protocol based on the Albatross consensus algorithm. Prior to version 1.4.0, when LightBlockchain::rebranch() adopts a fork chain whose tip is a macro block (checkpoint or election), it only updates self.head but fails to update self.macro_head, self.election_head, self.current_validators, or store the election header in the chain_store. This is in direct contrast with the full Blockchain::rebranch() at blockchain/src/blockchain/push.rs:504-518, which correctly updates all macro/election state when the new head is a macro block. After a rebranch to a macro block, the stale macro_head causes subsequent macro blocks pushed via push() to be verified against the wrong predecessor via verify_macro_successor(&this.macro_head). If the rebranch target was an election block, the stale current_validators causes every subsequent block to fail verify_validators(), completely stalling the light client's chain progression. This issue has been patched in version 1.4.0.

Nimiq is a Rust implementation of the Nimiq Proof-of-Stake protocol based on the Albatross consensus algorithm. Prior to version 1.4.0, a logic flaw in BlockInclusionProof::is_block_proven causes the function to return true without performing any cryptographic verification when get_interlink_hops yields an empty hop list. This occurs when the target block is at the election block position immediately preceding the election head's epoch. An attacker providing transaction inclusion proofs can forge a MacroBlock header for that epoch position and have it accepted as "proven" without any hash or signature verification. This issue has been patched in version 1.4.0.

Nimiq is a Rust implementation of the Nimiq Proof-of-Stake protocol based on the Albatross consensus algorithm. network-libp2p handles kad get-record query progress in handle_dht_get (network-libp2p/src/swarm.rs). Prior to version 1.4.0, when a peer returns a FoundRecord, the code verifies the record via dht_verifier.verify(&record.record). On verifier error, handle_dht_get logs and returns early without completing the oneshot used by Network::dht_get, and without cleaning up per-query bookkeeping. Later query progress can hit the "DHT inconsistent state" path and also return without cleanup. Because Network::dht_get awaits the oneshot without a timeout, the caller future can hang indefinitely. This issue has been patched in version 1.4.0.

nimiq-blockchain provides persistent block storage for Nimiq's Rust implementation. In versions 1.3.0 and prior, network-libp2p discovery accepts signed PeerContact updates from untrusted peers and stores them in a peer contact book, eventually leading to address book crash. A PeerContact can legally contain an empty addresses list (no intrinsic validation enforces non-empty). Later, PeerContactBook::known_peers builds an address book by taking addresses.first().expect("every peer should have at least one address"). If the attacker has inserted a signed peer contact with addresses=[], any call to get_address_book (RPC/web client) can panic and crash the node/RPC task depending on panic settings. This issue has been fixed in version 1.4.0.

nimiq-blockchain provides persistent block storage for Nimiq's Rust implementation. In versions 1.3.0 and below, a malicious network peer can crash any Nimiq full node by publishing a crafted Kademlia DHT record. The maliciously crafted record would contain a TaggedSigned<ValidatorRecord, KeyPair> with a signature field whose byte length is not exactly 64 in order to cause a crash. When the victim node's DHT verifier calls TaggedSigned::verify, execution reaches Ed25519Signature::from_bytes(sig).unwrap() in the TaggedPublicKey implementation for Ed25519PublicKey. The from_bytes call fails because ed25519_zebra::Signature::try_from rejects slices not 64 bytes, and the unwrap() panics. The BLS TaggedPublicKey implementation correctly returns false on error; only the Ed25519 implementation panics. This issue has been fixed in version 1.4.0.

nimiq-transaction provides the transaction primitive to be used in Nimiq's Rust implementation. Prior to version 1.3.0, the staking contract accepts `UpdateValidator` transactions that set `new_voting_key=Some(...)` while omitting `new_proof_of_knowledge`. this skips the proof-of-knowledge requirement that is needed to prevent BLS rogue-key attacks when public keys are aggregated. Because tendermint macro block justification verification aggregates validator voting keys and verifies a single aggregated BLS signature against that aggregate public key, a rogue-key voting key in the validator set can allow an attacker to forge a quorum-looking justification while only producing a single signature. While the impact is critical, the exploitability is low: The voting keys are fixed for the epoch, so the attacker would need to know the next epoch validator set (chosen through VRF), which is unlikely. The patch for this vulnerability is included as part of v1.3.0. No known workarounds are available.

nimiq

nimiq-transaction provides the transaction primitive to be used in Nimiq's Rust implementation. Prior to version 1.3.0, `HistoryTreeProof::verify` panics on a malformed proof where `history.len() != positions.len()` due to `assert_eq!(history.len(), positions.len())`. The proof object is derived from untrusted p2p responses (`ResponseTransactionsProof.proof`) and is therefore attacker-controlled at the network boundary until validated. A malicious peer could trigger a crash by returning a crafted inclusion proof with a length mismatch. The patch for this vulnerability is included as part of v1.3.0. No known workarounds are available.

nimiq

nimiq-blockchain provides persistent block storage for Nimiq's Rust implementation. Prior to version 1.3.0, `HistoryStore::put_historic_txns` uses an `assert!` to enforce invariants about `HistoricTransaction.block_number` (must be within the macro block being pushed and within the same epoch). During history sync, a peer can influence the `history: &[HistoricTransaction]` input passed into `Blockchain::push_history_sync`, and a malformed history list can violate these invariants and trigger a panic. `extend_history_sync` calls `this.history_store.add_to_history(..)` before comparing the computed history root against the macro block header (`block.history_root()`), so the panic can happen before later rejection checks run. The patch for this vulnerability is included as part of v1.3.0. No known workarounds are available.

nimiq

nimiq-primitives contains primitives (e.g., block, account, transaction) to be used in Nimiq's Rust implementation. Prior to version 1.3.0, an untrusted p2p peer can cause a node to panic by announcing an election macro block whose `validators` set contains an invalid compressed BLS voting key. Hashing an election macro header hashes `validators` and reaches `Validators::voting_keys()`, which calls `validator.voting_key.uncompress().unwrap()` and panics on invalid bytes. The patch for this vulnerability is included as part of v1.3.0. No known workarounds are available.

nimiq

nimiq-account contains account primitives to be used in Nimiq's Rust implementation. Prior to version 1.3.0, `VestingContract::can_change_balance` returns `AccountError::InsufficientFunds` when `new_balance < min_cap`, but it constructs the error using `balance: self.balance - min_cap`. `Coin::sub` panics on underflow, so if an attacker can reach a state where `min_cap > balance`, the node crashes while trying to return an error. The `min_cap > balance` precondition is attacker-reachable because the vesting contract creation data (32-byte format) allows encoding `total_amount` without validating `total_amount <= transaction.value` (the real contract balance). After creating such a vesting contract, the attacker can broadcast an outgoing transaction to trigger the panic during mempool admission and block processing. The patch for this vulnerability is included as part of v1.3.0. No known workarounds are available.

nimiq

Nimiq's network-libp2p is a Nimiq network implementation based on libp2p. Prior to version 1.3.0, `network-libp2p` discovery uses a libp2p `ConnectionHandler` state machine. the handler assumes there is at most one inbound and one outbound discovery substream per connection. if a remote peer opens/negotiate the discovery protocol substream a second time on the same connection, the handler hits a `panic!(\"Inbound already connected\")` / `panic!(\"Outbound already connected\")` path instead of failing closed. This causes a remote crash of the networking task (swarm), taking the node's p2p networking offline until restart. The patch for this vulnerability is formally released as part of v1.3.0. No known workarounds are available.

nimiq

nimiq-libp2p is a Nimiq network implementation based on libp2p. Prior to version 1.3.0, `MessageCodec::read_request` and `read_response` call `read_to_end()` on inbound substreams, so a remote peer can send only a partial frame and keep the substream open. because `Behaviour::new` also sets `with_max_concurrent_streams(1000)`, the node exposes a much larger stalled-slot budget than the library default. The patch for this vulnerability is formally released as part of v1.3.0. No known workarounds are available.

nimiq

nimiq-block contains block primitives to be used in Nimiq's Rust implementation. `SkipBlockProof::verify` computes its quorum check using `BitSet.len()`, then iterates `BitSet` indices and casts each `usize` index to `u16` (`slot as u16`) for slot lookup. Prior to version 1.3.0, if an attacker can get a `SkipBlockProof` verified where `MultiSignature.signers` contains out-of-range indices spaced by 65536, these indices inflate `len()` but collide onto the same in-range `u16` slot during aggregation. This makes it possible for a malicious validator with far fewer than `2f+1` real signer slots to pass skip block proof verification by multiplying a single BLS signature by the same factor. The patch for this vulnerability is included as part of v1.3.0. No known workarounds are available.

nimiq

nimiq/core-rs-albatross is a Rust implementation of the Nimiq Proof-of-Stake protocol based on the Albatross consensus algorithm. In versions 1.2.2 and below, an unauthenticated p2p peer can cause the RequestMacroChain message handler task to panic. Sending a RequestMacroChain message where the first locator hash on the victim’s main chain is a micro block hash (not a macro block hash) causes said panic. The RequestMacroChain::handle handler selects the locator based only on "is on main chain", then calls get_macro_blocks() and panics via .unwrap() when the selected hash is not a macro block (BlockchainError::BlockIsNotMacro). This issue has been fixed in version 1.3.0.

nimiq

nimiq/core-rs-albatross is a Rust implementation of the Nimiq Proof-of-Stake protocol based on the Albatross consensus algorithm. Prior to version 1.3.0, an untrusted peer could crash a validator by publishing a signed tendermint proposal message where signer == validators.num_validators(). ProposalSender::send uses > instead of >= for the signer bounds check, so the equality case passes and reaches validators.get_validator_by_slot_band(signer), which panics with an out-of-bounds index before any signature verification runs. This issue has been fixed in version 1.3.0.

nimiq

nimiq-blockchain provides persistent block storage for Nimiq's Rust implementation. In 1.3.0 and earlier, block timestamp validation enforces that timestamp >= parent.timestamp for non-skip blocks and timestamp == parent.timestamp + MIN_PRODUCER_TIMEOUT for skip blocks, but there is no visible upper bound check against the wall clock. A malicious block-producing validator can set block timestamps arbitrarily far in the future. This directly affects reward calculations via Policy::supply_at() and batch_delay() in blockchain/src/reward.rs, inflating the monetary supply beyond the intended emission schedule.

nimiq

nimiq/core-rs-albatross is a Rust implementation of the Nimiq Proof-of-Stake protocol based on the Albatross consensus algorithm. Prior to version 1.3.0, two peer-facing consensus request handlers assume that the history index is always available and call blockchain.history_store.history_index().unwrap() directly. That assumption is false by construction. HistoryStoreProxy::history_index() explicitly returns None for the valid HistoryStoreProxy::WithoutIndex state. when a full node is syncing or otherwise running without the history index, a remote peer can send RequestTransactionsProof or RequestTransactionReceiptsByAddress and trigger an Option::unwrap() panic on the request path. This issue has been patched in version 1.3.0.

nimiq

nimiq/core-rs-albatross is a Rust implementation of the Nimiq Proof-of-Stake protocol based on the Albatross consensus algorithm. Prior to version 1.3.0, an elected validator proposer can send an election macro block whose header.interlink does not match the canonical next interlink. Honest validators accept that proposal in verify_macro_block_proposal() because the proposal path validates header shape, successor relation, proposer, body root, and state, but never checks the interlink binding for election blocks. The same finalized block is later rejected by verify_block() during push with InvalidInterlink. Because validators prevote and precommit the malformed header hash itself, the failure happens after Tendermint decides the block, not before voting. This issue has been patched in version 1.3.0.

nimiq

nimiq/core-rs-albatross is a Rust implementation of the Nimiq Proof-of-Stake protocol based on the Albatross consensus algorithm. Prior to version 1.3.0, the discovery handler accepts a peer-controlled limit during handshake and stores it unchanged. The immediate HandshakeAck path then honors limit = 0 and returns zero contacts, which makes the session look benign. Later, after the same session reaches Established, the periodic update path computes self.peer_list_limit.unwrap() as usize - 1. With limit = 0, that wraps to usize::MAX and then in rand 0.9.2, choose_multiple() immediately attempts Vec::with_capacity(amount), which deterministically panics with capacity overflow. This issue has been patched in version 1.3.0.

nimiq

nimiq/core-rs-albatross is a Rust implementation of the Nimiq Proof-of-Stake protocol based on the Albatross consensus algorithm. Prior to version 1.2.2, a malicious or compromised validator that is elected as proposer can publish a macro block proposal where `header.body_root` does not match the actual macro body hash. The proposal can pass proposal verification because the macro proposal verification path validates the header but does not validate the binding `body_root == hash(body)`; later code expects this binding and may panic on mismatch, crashing validators. Note that the impact is only for validator nodes. The patch for this vulnerability is formally released as part of v1.2.2. The patch adds the corresponding body root verification in the proposal checks. No known workarounds are available.

nimiq

nimiq/core-rs-albatross is a Rust implementation of the Nimiq Proof-of-Stake protocol based on the Albatross consensus algorithm. The `nimiq-network-libp2p` subcrate of nimiq/core-rs-albatross is vulnerable to a Denial of Service (DoS) attack due to uncontrolled memory allocation. Specifically, the implementation of the `Discovery` network message handling allocates a buffer based on a length value provided by the peer, without enforcing an upper bound. Since this length is a `u32`, a peer can trigger allocations of up to 4 GB, potentially leading to memory exhaustion and node crashes. As Discovery messages are regularly exchanged for peer discovery, this vulnerability can be exploited repeatedly. The patch for this vulnerability is formally released as part of v1.1.0. The patch implements a limit to the discovery message size of 1 MB and also resizes the message buffer size incrementally as the data is read. No known workarounds are available.