pgAdmin 4's Import/Export Data tool builds a psql \copy (...) command line by interpolating a user-supplied SQL query into a Jinja template and passing the rendered line to psql via --command. To stop an attacker from breaking out of the (...) wrapper, create_import_export_job() (route POST /import_export/job/<sid>, gated only by the ordinary, commonly-granted tools_import_export_data permission) validated the query with a hand-written parenthesis-balance checker, _is_query_parens_balanced(). That checker always treated a backslash before a single quote (\') as escaping the quote, i.e. as if standard_conforming_strings were off. PostgreSQL has defaulted standard_conforming_strings to on since 9.1 (2010), the default on every PostgreSQL version pgAdmin 4 currently supports (13-18); under that default psql's own \copy tokenizer treats \ as an ordinary character, so a single quote immediately after it closes the string literal. A query such as SELECT 'a\') TO PROGRAM 'echo pwned' x' was therefore accepted as "balanced" by pgAdmin's checker (which believed the ) was still inside the string), while psql, run through the actual rendered command line, closes the string at that point and treats the following ) as the end of the wrapping \copy (...) subquery, exposing an attacker-chosen TO PROGRAM '<command>' clause that psql executes via popen() -- independent of a subsequent syntax error later on the same line. This is the same class of bug as CVE-2025-12762/CVE-2025-13780 (RCE via psql meta-command/COPY injection during PLAIN-format dump restore), reached through an independently written defense in a different module (Import/Export Data rather than Restore) that had its own, different logic bug (inverted backslash-escape semantics rather than a BOM-defeated regex anchor). The fix rejects any backslash inside a single-quoted string in the query outright, rather than picking one of the two possible psql interpretations. This is intentionally conservative: because the correct interpretation of \ depends on the target server's standard_conforming_strings setting, which the checker cannot reliably know at validation time, refusing the query is safer than guessing. This issue affects pgAdmin 4: from the introduction of _is_query_parens_balanced() before 9.18.

The fix for CVE-2026-12045 in pgAdmin 4 9.16 required the LLM-supplied query passed to the AI Assistant's execute_sql_query tool to parse, via sqlparse, as exactly one non-transaction-control statement before running it inside a BEGIN TRANSACTION READ ONLY wrapper. sqlparse's string-literal lexing can disagree with PostgreSQL's own parser: under standard_conforming_strings = on (PostgreSQL's default since 9.1), a backslash immediately before a quote is an ordinary character to PostgreSQL, but sqlparse treats it as escaping the quote. A payload such as SELECT '\';COMMIT;CREATE TABLE pwn(x int);SELECT 1 --' therefore parses as a single SELECT to sqlparse's validator, while PostgreSQL executes it as four statements: the smuggled COMMIT ends the wrapping read-only transaction, and the trailing ROLLBACK becomes a no-op. This reintroduces the same write/RCE bypass CVE-2026-12045 was meant to close, reachable via the same indirect prompt-injection delivery (an attacker plants the payload in any object the AI Assistant may read; the LLM emits it as a tool call). An initial candidate fix ran the query with psycopg's execute(..., prepare=True), intending to force PostgreSQL's own Parse step (extended query protocol) to reject multi-statement text regardless of sqlparse's classification. This candidate fix does not work as submitted: psycopg3's PrepareManager silently ignores the prepare argument whenever the connection's prepare_threshold is None, which is pgAdmin's default for every server connection (the per-server "Prepare threshold" field is blank unless an administrator explicitly sets it) -- psycopg3 falls back to the simple query protocol, the same multi-statement-capable path the bypass exploits, so the candidate fix closes nothing on any real-world default configuration. The corrected fix sets conn.prepare_threshold = 0 directly on the dedicated, single-use read-only connection the AI Assistant tool opens, structurally forcing the extended query protocol independent of any server-level configuration. Verified against a live PostgreSQL 18 instance: the payload executes successfully under the prepare_threshold=None (default) behavior, and is rejected with "cannot insert multiple commands into a prepared statement" once prepare_threshold=0 is set on that connection. This issue affects pgAdmin 4: from 9.13 before 9.17.

The fix for CVE-2026-12044 in pgAdmin 4 9.16 hardened qtLiteral and switched sixteen COMMENT ON / pgstattuple / pgstatindex templates to it, but missed several sinks that had been placed in test_sql_string_literal_lint.py's ALLOWLIST on the incorrect assumption that schema, table, publication, and subscription names sourced from pg_catalog via the browser tree could never contain an apostrophe. PostgreSQL permits arbitrary characters in quoted identifiers, so a low-privileged user able to CREATE TABLE, CREATE PUBLICATION, or CREATE SUBSCRIPTION can plant an apostrophe'd object name that breaks out of the unescaped '{{ name }}' template interpolation the moment any user (including a higher-privileged one) opens that object's Statistics or Dependencies tab, allowing arbitrary SQL statement injection in the viewing user's database session. Affected sinks: the Index Statistics query for all-indexes listing (coll_stats.sql, both the 16_plus and default PostgreSQL-version template variants -- distinct from the single-index stats.sql path already fixed in CVE-2026-12044), and the publication and subscription dependencies.sql / get_position.sql templates (both the pg and ppas/EPAS dialect variants for publications). Fix switches all of these templates to qtLiteral(conn) for name interpolation, and updates publications/__init__.py and subscriptions/__init__.py to pass conn=self.conn into the dependencies.sql render_template call so the qtLiteral filter has a connection to quote against. The corresponding ALLOWLIST entries in test_sql_string_literal_lint.py are removed now that these sinks are properly escaped rather than merely assumed safe. A behavioral regression test renders each fixed template with a stacked-statement apostrophe payload and asserts both that the object name appears exactly as qtLiteral-escaped and that the rendered SQL parses as exactly one statement, verifying the assertion genuinely fails against the pre-patch raw-interpolation form. This issue affects pgAdmin 4: the Index Statistics sink from 1.0, and the Publications/Subscriptions sinks from 5.0, both before 9.17.

Deployment of the VPS.org one-click Supabase template deploys a PostgreSQL instance that is published on all interfaces (0.0.0.0:5432) with a default database password set to "postgres". Because Docker installs its own iptables rules, this exposure bypasses a standard host UFW configuration.

Kamaji is the Hosted Control Plane Manager for Kubernetes. Prior to 26.7.4-edge, the PostgreSQL and MySQL datastore drivers build DDL statements by interpolating the user-supplied DataStoreUsername/DataStoreSchema directly into SQL via fmt.Sprintf, without escaping identifiers. These fields have no format validation, so a value containing a quote character breaks out of the quoted identifier — SQL injection executed over Kamaji's root connection to the shared datastore. etcd driver is not affected.This issue is fixed in version 26.7.4-edge.

A flaw was found in ansible-collection-redhat-leapp. When a remediation task is executed with elevated privileges and the `leapp_old_postgresql_data` option is selected, a PostgreSQL data backup archive is created with insecure permissions. This allows a local non-root user on the managed node to read sensitive archived PostgreSQL data, leading to information disclosure.

CentreStack before 17.4 contains a SQL injection vulnerability in GladDBFiles.SearchEx() and SearchExUnder() that allows authenticated attackers to execute arbitrary SQL statements by supplying a crafted x-glad-filter request header through the jsondir API endpoint. Attackers can exploit unsanitized interpolation of the Field parameter directly into SQL query strings to write arbitrary files to the server filesystem via PostgreSQL lo_from_bytea() and lo_export() functions, enabling remote code execution.

A use-after-free condition exists in pglogical's worker signaling code, where a worker structure can be dereferenced after the underlying slot has been freed or recycled during normal worker lifecycle events. The condition is reachable during normal replication operation, including by a low-privileged user able to influence worker start, stop, and restart timing through permitted pglogical operations. In the typical case the condition crashes replication workers, causing an availability impact. In the worst case a use-after-free in a PostgreSQL backend can be leveraged as a remote code execution primitive at the privilege of that backend.

When applying replicated changes for a row that is missing one or more columns, pglogical evaluates the affected table's default expressions on the subscriber. Because the apply worker runs at a privilege level equivalent to a PostgreSQL superuser in default installations, any function invoked by such a default expression also runs at that privilege. A party acting as the publisher can use this path to cause functions to be executed on the subscriber as superuser, escalating from a role permitted to use pglogical to full superuser. This is a second, independent path to the same superuser escalation tracked under CVE-2026-50736 (the pglogical queue issue). To exploit the issue an attacker must be able to direct a subscription at an endpoint they control. In default installations this requires privileges normally reserved for a superuser, so the issue is most relevant to managed deployments where the ability to create subscriptions has been delegated to non-superuser roles.

The pglogical queue mechanism, used to convey out-of-band commands such as replicated DDL from a publisher to a subscriber, executes message payloads on the subscriber at the privilege level of the apply worker, which is equivalent to a PostgreSQL superuser in default installations. A party acting as the publisher can send crafted queue messages that cause arbitrary SQL to be executed on the subscriber as superuser, escalating from a role permitted to use pglogical to full superuser and breaking the isolation between tenants in shared deployments. To exploit the issue an attacker must be able to direct a subscription at an endpoint they control. In default installations this requires privileges normally reserved for a superuser, so the issue is most relevant to managed deployments where the ability to create subscriptions has been delegated to non-superuser roles.

pglogical's apply worker does not sufficiently validate the length of certain fields in incoming replication protocol messages before copying them, resulting in an out-of-bounds read. A party acting as the publisher for a subscription, for example a non-PostgreSQL endpoint that speaks the pglogical replication protocol, can return crafted messages that cause the subscriber's apply worker to read beyond the bounds of an allocated buffer, disclosing adjacent process memory or crashing the worker. To exploit the issue an attacker must be able to direct a subscription at an endpoint they control. In default installations this requires privileges normally reserved for a superuser, so the issue is most relevant to managed deployments where the ability to create subscriptions has been delegated to non-superuser roles.

APIFold reads an OpenAPI 3.x or Swagger 2.x specification and generates a live, production-ready MCP server endpoint. Prior to commit 7f19b52280f414f57af2b79a95333d1c8fbeece5, the `/webhooks/:serverSlug/:eventName` endpoint accepts arbitrary unauthenticated JSON and stores it in Redis and the `webhook_events` PostgreSQL table without any signature check or authentication requirement. The root cause is that `createWebhookRouter` is called at `server.ts:188` without a `validators` map, so `receivers.ts:80`'s optional-chaining guard evaluates to `undefined` and the signature-validation block (`receiver.ts:81–95`) is unconditionally skipped. Any unauthenticated network client that knows a valid server slug can inject arbitrary payloads, which are subsequently served as trusted resource state to legitimate MCP clients. Commit 7f19b52280f414f57af2b79a95333d1c8fbeece5 patches the issue.

OpenRemote before 1.26.0 contain an authenticated SQL injection vulnerability in the datapoint crosstab export endpoint that constructs PostgreSQL queries by concatenating asset display names into raw SQL. An authenticated attacker with asset creation or rename permissions can inject SQL through the asset name parameter and receive query results in the exported CSV response, enabling database data exfiltration.

openremote

PostgreSQL Anonymizer contains a vulnerability that allows a user to gain superuser privileges by creating a JSON document and placing malicious code inside a particular key-value pair. If a superuser calls the import_database_rules() or import_roles_rules() functions, the malicious code is executed with superuser privileges. The problem is resolved in PostgreSQL Anonymizer 3.1.1 and further versions

In Splunk Enterprise versions below 10.2.4 and 10.0.7, and Splunk Cloud Platform versions below 10.4.2604.3 and 10.2.2510.14, an unauthenticated user could create or truncate arbitrary files through a PostgreSQL sidecar service endpoint.<br><br>The vulnerability exists because the PostgreSQL sidecar service endpoint lacks authentication controls, allowing any network-reachable user to invoke file operations without credentials.

splunk

Ghidra before 12.1 contains a SQL injection vulnerability in BSim filter types that concatenate user-supplied values directly into SQL queries without escaping or parameterization. Remote attackers can inject arbitrary SQL via the BSim network query protocol to read, modify, or delete data in the PostgreSQL database.

nsa

Ghidra 11.0 before 12.1 contains a SQL injection vulnerability in the changePassword() method of PostgresFunctionDatabase that fails to escape double quotes in usernames interpolated into ALTER ROLE statements. Authenticated attackers can inject SQL commands via crafted username parameters in PasswordChange network messages to escalate to PostgreSQL superuser privileges and gain full database control.

nsa

Marten is a .NET Transactional Document DB and Event Store on PostgreSQL. Prior to 8.36.1, Marten's full-text search APIs interpolated the user-supplied regConfig parameter directly into the generated SQL without parameterization or validation, making every code path that exposes regConfig to untrusted input a SQL injection sink. This vulnerability is fixed in 8.36.1.

CloudNativePG is a platform designed to manage PostgreSQL databases within Kubernetes environments. Prior to 1.29.1 and 1.28.3, the CloudNativePG metrics exporter opens its PostgreSQL connection as the postgres superuser via the pod-local Unix socket, then demotes the session with SET ROLE pg_monitor. SET ROLE changes only current_user; session_user remains postgres. Any SQL expression evaluated inside the scrape session can invoke RESET ROLE to recover real superuser privileges, then use COPY ... TO PROGRAM to spawn an OS-level subprocess as the postgres user inside the primary pod. The READ ONLY transaction flag does not block this; it gates writes to database state, not external processes. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.29.1 and 1.28.3.

Kysely is a type-safe TypeScript SQL query builder. From 0.26.0 to 0.28.16, DefaultQueryCompiler.visitJSONPathLeg does not escape JSON-path metacharacters (., [, ], *, **, ?). When attacker-controlled input flows into eb.ref(col, '->$').key(input) or .at(input) — including type-safe code where the JSON column is shaped like Record<string, T> so K extends string is the inferred type — every dot becomes a path-leg separator, letting an attacker traverse from the intended key into sibling and child fields the developer never meant to expose. The result is read access (and, in update statements, write access) to JSON sub-fields outside the intended scope across MySQL, PostgreSQL ->$/->>$, and SQLite. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.28.17.

Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.38.1, Budibase exposes a REST API for datasource management. The route PUT /api/datasources/:datasourceId is registered in the authorizedRoutes group with TABLE/READ permission. This is the same authorization level as the read endpoint (GET /api/datasources/:datasourceId). Every authenticated Budibase app user with the BASIC built-in role or higher carries TABLE/WRITE (and therefore TABLE/READ) permissions, and the datasource update controller performs no additional builder check. As a result, any authenticated non-builder app user can submit a PUT request to rewrite a datasource's config object — including the connection host, port, database credentials, or the base url of a REST datasource. Because no network-level SSRF protection is applied to SQL driver connections, redirecting a PostgreSQL/MySQL/MongoDB datasource to an internal IP address succeeds and the attacker can probe or interact with internal services on arbitrary ports. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.38.1.

PostgreSQL Anonymizer contains a vulnerability that allows a user to gain superuser privileges by creating a table and placing malicious code inside a column identifier. If a superuser calls the k-anonymity function, the malicious code is executed with superuser privileges. The risk is higher with PostgreSQL 14 or with instances upgraded from PostgreSQL 14 or a prior version. With PostgreSQL 15 and later, the creation permission on the public schema is revoked by default and this exploit can only be achieved by a user who was explicitly granted the CREATE TABLE privilege. The problem is resolved in PostgreSQL Anonymizer 3.1.0 and further versions