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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: xilinx: axienet: Fix BQL accounting for multi-BD TX packets When a TX packet spans multiple buffer descriptors (scatter-gather), axienet_free_tx_chain sums the per-BD actual length from descriptor status into a caller-provided accumulator. That sum is reset on each NAPI poll. If the BDs for a single packet complete across different polls, the earlier bytes are lost and never credited to BQL. This causes BQL to think bytes are permanently in-flight, eventually stalling the TX queue. The SKB pointer is stored only on the last BD of a packet. When that BD completes, use skb->len for the byte count instead of summing per-BD status lengths. This matches netdev_sent_queue(), which debits skb->len, and naturally survives across polls because no partial packet contributes to the accumulator.
linux
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: comedi: me_daq: Fix potential overrun of firmware buffer `me2600_xilinx_download()` loads the firmware that was requested by `request_firmware()`. It is possible for it to overrun the source buffer because it blindly trusts the file format. It reads a data stream length from the first 4 bytes into variable `file_length` and reads the data stream contents of length `file_length` from offset 16 onwards. Although it checks that the supplied firmware is at least 16 bytes long, it does not check that it is long enough to contain the data stream. Add a test to ensure that the supplied firmware is long enough to contain the header and the data stream. On failure, log an error and return `-EINVAL`.
linux
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: comedi: me4000: Fix potential overrun of firmware buffer `me4000_xilinx_download()` loads the firmware that was requested by `request_firmware()`. It is possible for it to overrun the source buffer because it blindly trusts the file format. It reads a data stream length from the first 4 bytes into variable `file_length` and reads the data stream contents of length `file_length` from offset 16 onwards. Add a test to ensure that the supplied firmware is long enough to contain the header and the data stream. On failure, log an error and return `-EINVAL`. Note: The firmware loading was totally broken before commit ac584af59945 ("staging: comedi: me4000: fix firmware downloading"), but that is the most sensible target for this fix.
linux